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Boeing
KC-767 Tanker: Sized Right for the Fight
ST.
LOUIS, May 07, 2008 -- The KC-767 Advanced Tanker developed
by Boeing [NYSE: BA] was sized to meet the aerial refueling
requirements of the U.S. Air Force's mission and exceeded performance
requirements to replace the aging, yet storied fleet of KC-135
medium tankers.
Despite
the fact that the stated parameters for evaluating the aircraft
said no extra credit would be assigned for exceeding certain
requirement objectives, the Northrop Grumman and European Aeronautic
Defence and Space Company (EADS) team received such credit.
As a result, the oversized Airbus A330-based KC-30 was selected.
Boeing has protested the decision to the U.S. Government Accountability
Office.
According
to the Statement of Objectives for the KC-X program, the primary
mission of the new tanker would be aerial refueling rather than
hauling cargo or transporting passengers. In order to meet the
documented mission requirements, Boeing offered the KC-767,
which efficiently fulfills the vital mission of a mid-sized
aerial refueling fleet while also exceeding the highest requirements
for airlift, passenger and aeromedical evacuation capabilities.
"Tanker
flight crews are asked to bring the right amount of fuel to
the fight in the most efficient, reliable manner, and the KC-767
meets that fundamental requirement," said Mark McGraw, vice
president, Boeing Tanker Programs. "Asking these aircrews to
fly longer missions in larger, less survivable planes with more
fuel capacity than needed and vast amounts of unused cargo and
passenger space just doesn't add up.
"The
Boeing KC-767 exceeded the requirements in a manner that still
kept the plane right-sized and efficient," McGraw said. "Our
competition likes to talk about offering more, more, more --
but in reality, the KC-30 will cost more to operate, more to
maintain, and more to house, with the U.S. taxpayer footing
the bill."
A
larger plane -- like the KC-30 tanker offered by Northrop Grumman
and EADS -- simply results in wasted capacity, wasted efficiency
and wasted taxpayer dollars.
The
contrasts between the KC-767 and the KC-30 are notable and worth
considering in determining the appropriate tanker for the mission:
Fuel Capacity -- The historical average offload on a tanker
mission is 60,000 to 70,000 pounds of fuel. The Air Force
fuel offload requirement was set at 94,000 pounds of fuel
at 1,000 nautical miles, comfortably above the historical
average. The KC-767 exceeded the 94,000-pound requirement
by 20 percent while remaining within the optimum size for
medium tanker operations. The KC-30 fuel capacity exceeded
that requirement by 50 percent -- meaning more than half of
its fuel load would be unused during an average mission. The
result: a large tanker that burns more fuel and requires significantly
higher costs in maintenance and support.
Cargo/Passenger Capacity -- In 2006, the Air Force moved less
than 1 percent of its cargo and passengers in tankers. The
KC-767 does offer significantly more cargo and passenger capacity
than the KC-135, but not at the expense of airplane size or
efficiency. Again, the KC-30 carries more passengers and slightly
more cargo based on weight, but with a bigger, less survivable
and more costly plane.
Aeromedical Evacuation -- The Air Force Request for Proposals
set an objective requirement of being able to carry 24 litters
and 26 ambulatory patients. The KC-767 carries 30 litters
and 67 ambulatory patients, far exceeding the highest requirement.
The Air Force praised the KC-767's superior aeromedical crew
stations, its ability to generate oxygen onboard, and the
power provided for aeromedical crew systems. The KC-30 again
offered more quantity with less quality and less survivability.
The
Boeing [NYSE: BA] KC-767 would be a lower-risk aerial
refueling tanker for the American military and taxpayers
than the Airbus A330-based KC-30, and it would be superior
in the areas of cost, production, schedule and capability.
An
analysis of the evaluation that led to the choice of
the tanker proposed by the team of Northrop Grumman
and the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company
(EADS) reveals that numerous irregularities in the process
resulted in a higher-risk, higher-cost aircraft being
selected. Those irregularities form the basis of a protest
Boeing filed with the Government Accountability Office
following the contract award announced on Feb. 29.
"We
offered a tanker that exceeded the mission requirements,
kept the manufacturing risk as low as possible and offered
an aircraft that saved billions of taxpayer dollars,"
said Gregg Rusbarsky, director of Boeing's U.S. Air
Force Tanker Program. "Compare that with EADS-Northrop,
who have never delivered the core technology for aerial
refueling -- a working air-to-air refueling boom."
When
calculating risk, the contract decision failed to account
for multiple manufacturing challenges the A330-based
tanker is likely to encounter. EADS and Northrop will
need to integrate different corporate partners, numerous
factory sites, different cultures and technical standards,
all into a single enterprise that is expected to deliver
aerial tankers on time and on budget.
KC-30
production would be managed by two companies on two
continents in five countries, separated by one ocean.
According to EADS-Northrop, the initial production plan
will build the first six aircraft in five different
ways. The first tanker will be assembled as a passenger
plane by Airbus in Toulouse, France, converted to a
freighter in Dresden, Germany, converted to a tanker
in Madrid, Spain, and flown to Melbourne, Fla., for
finishing. For aircraft 2 and 3, Madrid's involvement
will be eliminated, and Melbourne will do the tanker
conversion -- for the first time. By aircraft 4, Mobile,
Ala., will replace Melbourne, and for the first time,
begin the tanker conversion. Production will vastly
change when the process converts from a modification
to an in-line production system at the start of low-rate
assembly. Finally, the basic aircraft will likely change
from the passenger A330 to the A330 Freighter, so the
aircraft would have a real cargo floor for the first
time. This presents extreme challenges for configuration
control and U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
certification, yet this approach was rated equal in
risk to the less risky, more efficient Boeing plan.
Not
only has Boeing built or upgraded more than 2,000 operational
tankers to include recent delivery of two KC-767s to
Japan, the company has also delivered more than 100
commercially derived military aircraft to the U.S. military
and all have passed rigorous FAA certification requirements.
Boeing has also delivered five commercial derivatives
of the initial 767 airplane.
Not
only has Boeing built or upgraded more than 2,000 operational
tankers to include recent delivery of two KC-767s to
Japan, the company has also delivered more than 100
commercially derived military aircraft to the U.S. military
and all have passed rigorous FAA certification requirements.
Boeing has also delivered five commercial derivatives
of the initial 767 airplane.
Additionally,
Boeing has met all the manufacturing requirements requested
by the Air Force, including an independent analysis
by The Rand Corp. that was commissioned by the U.S.
Department of Defense. Rand had recommended an export-compliant
in-line manufacturing approach for the new tanker.
Boeing:
Study Projects That As Oil Prices Climb, 767 Tanker Most
Cost Efficient
ST. LOUIS, March 17, 2008 --
Boeing [NYSE: BA] reports that the U.S. Air Force likely
would pay up to $30 billion more in fuel bills over 40 years
to operate a fleet of 179 Airbus A330-200 aerial refueling
tankers, compared to a similar number of tankers based on
the Boeing 767-200ER.
This
assessment is based on a Conklin & de Decker Aviation Information
study, funded by Boeing, that calculated the Air Force's
cost with oil at $100 per barrel and $125 per barrel. Oil
prices hit a record high last week above $110 a barrel,
and many analysts expect prices to continue climbing. .
Conklin & de Decker, an independent aviation research company,
recently recalculated fuel price costs for the Boeing 767-200ER
and the Airbus A330-200, popular commercial twin-aisle aircraft
that are being converted to military aerial refueling tankers.
They fly about the same distance, but the larger, heavier
A330 is less fuel efficient than the 767-200ER. As a result,
the A330-200 consumes 24 percent more fuel per trip than
the 767-200ER.
The
study also factored in estimated costs of refining, transportation,
storage, handling and fueling the aircraft. It concluded
the estimated price per gallon at $3.11 with oil costing
$100 per barrel would cost the Air Force about $25 billion
dollar more over the 40-year service life of 179 Airbus
A330-200 tankers, and $29.8 billion more with oil at $125
a barrel. The Air Force previously estimated that it pays
an additional $600 million a year for each $10 per barrel
increase.
In
January, Boeing funded and released a 53-page study by Conklin
& de Decker that showed Boeing's 767 airplane consumed 24
percent less fuel than the larger A330 and would save about
$14.6 billion in fuel costs over 40 years. The study used
published data to calculate the fuel consumption of flying
a fleet of 179 767-200ER and Airbus A330-200 aircraft over
a 40-year service life. The Air Force's Request for Proposal
called for a highly capable, medium-sized, low-risk and
low-cost refueling tanker to replace its aging fleet of
KC-135 tankers.
On
Feb. 29, the Air Force selected Northrop Grumman-EADS to
build 179 next-generation A330 tankers. In briefing Boeing
on their decision, Air Force evaluators acknowledged that
they placed little value on fuel and maintenance lifecycle
costs, despite paying $6.6 billion on aviation fuel in 2006.
Boeing
has filed a formal protest with the Government Accountability
Office, asking the agency to review the Air Force's decision.
"Based
upon what we have seen, we continue to believe we submitted
the most capable, the lowest risk and lowest cost airplane
as measured against the Air Force's Request for Proposal,"
said Mark McGraw, vice president, Boeing Tanker Programs.
"This latest estimate in increased life-cycle costs for
the Airbus plane adds to our fundamental concerns with the
Air Force's evaluation and decision."
On
March 11, 2008 Boeing filed a formal Protest regarding
the selection by the U.S. Air Force of the Northrop Grumman/European
Aeronautic Defense and Space Company KC-30 Over the Boeing
KC-767 for its KC-X medium-sized tanker program. The decision
to protest was not one made lightly. However, what became
clear in the debriefings following the selection was that
the KC-X acquisition process was flawed. Repeatedly, fundamental
but often unstated changes were made to the bid requirements
and evaluation criteria. These arbitrary changes not only
unfairly skewed the results against Boeing: they penalized
the warfighter and the taxpayer by selecting an airplane that
did not satisfy the Air Force's own bid requirements.
Let's
look at the facts
SIZE
REQUIREMENT. The KC-X Request for Proposal (RFP) sought
to replace aging KC-135s, a medium-sized tanker. A future
program, KC-z, would aim to replace larger KC-10 tanker. In
fact, during the KC-X acquisition process, Boeing was led
to believe that its 767 was the appropriate platform to offer,
since it appeared to answer precisely the Air Force's requirements.
Yet the KC-30 is much larger than the KC-767 and even 27%
Larger than the KC-10. This excess capacity sacrifices fundamental
Air Force requirements of deploy ability and survivability.
It doesn't add up.
MISSION CAPABILITY. In analyzing Mission
Capability, the most important evaluation factor. Boeing received
the highest possible rating, meeting or exceeding all key
A Performance Parameters. Among other measurements, the Air
Force identified positive "discriminators" as well as "weaknesses"
While the KC-30 had 30 discriminators and five weaknesses,
among them its aerial refueling boom, the KC-767 had 98 discriminators
and only one weakness. It doesn't add up.
RISK.
In assessing Risk, Boeing and its competitor received
equal scores. And yet Boeing is an integrated company with
one management team and 75 years of tanker-building experience.
Furthermore, the KC-767 will be built on an existing production
line that has made 767s for years.
By
contrast the KC-30 will be built by
a combination of a U.S. company and a European one, with two
management teams on two continents, with no experience building
tankers together - utilizing numerous production facilities
across Europe and in an American plant that doesn't yet exist.
It doesn't add up.
COST.
The RFP made clear that the Most Probable Life Cycle
Cost (MPLCC) was the key Cost/Price metric for source selection.
The MPLCC not only includes the cost of acquisition: It includes
the cost of operation and maintenance. In its evaluation the
Air Force discounted the weight of the MPLCC and inflated
Boeing's costs by billions of dollars, even though Boeing's
proposed cost data was in full compliance with the Federal
Acquisition Regulation. As a result, the Air Force and taxpayers
will pay billions more for the Northrop Grumman/EADS airplane.
It doesn't add up
PAST
PERFORMANCE. Past Performance was rated "Satisfactory
Confidence" for both Boeing and Northrop Grumman/EADS, despite
the enormous disparity of experience between the two in building
tankers and military derivatives of commercial aircraft Older
and outdated Contractor Performance Assessment Ratings were
used for Boeing while KC-X evaluators ignored or failed to
adequately account for numerous troubled programs from its
competitor (some examples include the Australian tanker, the
A400M Airlifter, and E-2D SDD). Additionally, Boeing has certified
and delivered to Japan two of the most advanced tanker aircraft
in existence, a critical achievement that received insignificant
credit. It doesn't add up.
The
bottom line is that the selection process for the KC-X was
flawed by countless irregularities. In the evaluation, selection
criteria were misapplied, the RFP was disregarded and the
requirements of the Federal Acquisition Regulation were not
adhered to-resulting in the selection of a much larger, more
vulnerable, less capable and ultimately more costly offering.
It's a decision that doesn't add up: not for the warfighter
or the taxpayer. And one that should not stand .
Boeing
KC-767 Tanker Determined More Survivable in U.S. Air Force
Evaluation
ST. LOUIS, April 11, 2008 -- Boeing [NYSE: BA] today said
the U.S. Air Force's decision to award a contract for the
next aerial refueling airplane to the team of Northrop Grumman
and the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS)
is at odds with the fact that the Northrop/EADS team's KC-30
is less survivable and more vulnerable to attack than the
Boeing KC-767 Advanced Tanker.
The
Air Force evaluation cited the Boeing offering to be more
advantageous in the critical area of survivability. The
evaluators found the KC-767 tanker had almost five times
as many survivability discriminators as its competitor.
Speaking this week at the Aerial Refueling Systems Advisory
Group (ARSAG) Conference in Orlando, Fla., former U.S. Air
Force Chief of Staff and retired Gen. Ronald Fogleman stressed
that survivability greatly enhances the operational utility
of a tanker.
"When I saw the Air Force's assessment of both candidate
aircraft in the survivability area, I was struck by the
fact that they clearly saw the KC-767 as a more survivable
tanker," Fogleman told the ARSAG audience in his role as
a consultant to Boeing's tanker effort. "To be survivable,
tanker aircraft must contain systems to identify and defeat
threats, provide improved situational awareness to the aircrew
to avoid threat areas, and protect the crew in the event
of attack. The KC-767 has a superior survivability rating
and will have greater operational utility to the joint commander
and provide better protection to aircrews that must face
real-world threats."
On Feb. 29, the Air Force selected Northrop/EADS' Airbus
A330 derivative over Boeing's 767 derivative. Boeing subsequently
asked the Government Accountability Office to review the
decision, citing numerous irregularities and a flawed process
that included deviations from the evaluation and award criteria
established by the service for the competition.
During the Air Force debrief, the Boeing team discovered
the KC-767 outranked the KC-30 in the critical survivability
category. The KC-767 achieved a total score of 24 positive
discriminators -- including 11 described as major -- while
the KC-30 scored five, none of which were major.
Major survivability discriminators for the Boeing KC-767
included:
More robust surface-to-air missile defense systems
Cockpit displays that improve situational awareness to
enable flight crews to better see and assess the threat
environment
Better Electro-Magnetic Pulse (EMP) hardening -- the KC-767
is better able to operate in an EMP environment compared
with the KC-30
Automatic route planning/rerouting and steering cues to
the flight crew to avoid threats once they are detected
Better armor-protection features for the flight crew and
critical aircraft systems Better fuel-tank-explosion protection
features.
Boeing's
KC-767 Advanced Tanker will be equipped with the latest
and most reliable integrated defensive equipment to protect
the aircraft and crew by avoiding, defeating or surviving
threats, resulting in unprecedented tanker survivability
-- far superior to all current Air Force tankers as well
as the Northrop/EADS KC-30. The Boeing KC-767 also includes
a comprehensive set of capabilities that enables unrestricted
operations while providing maximum protection for the tanker
crew.
Boeing
KC-767 Tanker Adds Up to Best Value for Warfighter, Taxpayers
ST.
LOUIS, April 15, 2008 --
The Boeing [NYSE: BA] KC-767 Advanced Tanker would save
billions of dollars over the anticipated lifetime of the
aircraft compared with the larger Airbus-based KC-30. Nonetheless,
the U.S. government selected the larger air tanker from
the team of Northrop Grumman and the European Aeronautic
Defence and Space Company (EADS).
Due
to irregularities in the competition, such as the cost comparison,
Boeing has protested the decision and asked the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) to determine if the tanker acquisition
process, including the cost analysis, was unfair and flawed.
As the GAO reviews the decision, Boeing is also calling
on policymakers to question why the comparison of full costs
of the new tanker fleet failed to reflect that the Airbus
KC-30 tanker is larger, heavier, less fuel-efficient and
-- according to the Northrop/EADS team itself -- more costly
to operate.
"As
Americans pay their taxes this week, it's essential that
they consider how effectively those dollars will be spent
to equip U.S. warfighters," said Sen. Sam Brownback of Kansas.
"It's especially important to think about the total cost
of developing, producing, operating and maintaining vital
defense assets that must be ready to fly at least two generations
of American military men and women."
In
evaluating the two tanker offerings, the U.S. government
determined that the Boeing KC-767 and the Northrop/EADS
KC-30 were nearly equal at a cost of $108 billion to buy
and operate 179 tankers over 25 years. Boeing contends that
a realistic comparison of life-cycle costs -- what the Air
Force calls Most Probable Life-Cycle Costs (MPLCC) -- should
have resulted in a significantly higher price tag for the
Airbus KC-30 when considering the biggest cost drivers:
fuel, maintenance costs and infrastructure.
Fuel: Using commercial aviation data, a Conklin & deDecker
Aviation Information fuel study funded by Boeing indicated
that with the price of oil between $100-125 per barrel,
the larger, heavier and less fuel-efficient KC-30 would
cost $30 billion more in fuel costs than the Boeing KC-767
over an anticipated 40-year service life.
Maintenance: Based on the requirements for a smaller aircraft,
the KC-767 would be approximately 22 percent less costly
than the KC-30. Military Construction: The larger KC-30
would require approximately $2 billion to build or upgrade
hangars, ramps, access roads and other facilities at tanker
bases, while existing facilities that are sized for the
current fleet of KC-135 tankers will be able to accommodate
the smaller KC-767 with substantially less costly improvements
required.
Additional Infrastructure Costs: To accommodate Air National
Guard and Air Force Reserve units -- which operate primarily
from civilian airfields and have 60 percent of the Air
Force tanker fleet -- further costly investment would
be required to upgrade facilities where KC-30s would be
based.
THE
BOTTOM LINE, SEE THE TRUE QUALITY AND YEARS OF EXPERIENCES
YOU DO NOT WANT THE WORSE OR LIKE BEFORE.
BUSH
ADMINISTRATION / AIRFORCE
NEED YOUR ATTENTION
ALL THE TRUE FACTS ARE THERE AND THE METRIC SHOWS ALL
THE
BOEING COMPANY RETAINS THE USA ECONOMY AND
GLOBAL WORLD ECONOMY FOR MORE THAN 75 YEARS AND CONTINUES
TO GO FORWARD VISION 2016.
Dr.
Sohn Chang Mook's presentation
at the University of Washington Academic Administrators
Workshop Year 2002.
Dr. Sohn was executive director of the Washington
State Office of the Forecast Council, since 1984.
Chang Mook Sohn, Ph.D., prepares and presents the
quarterly forecast of economic activities in Washington
and Washington's General Fund revenue until year
2007
His predictions about the economy have affected
billions of dollars in government spending, which
in turn have affected the services and tax rates
of thousands of businesses and millions of state
residents.
Fuel Capacity -- The historical average offload on a tanker
mission is 60,000 to 70,000 pounds of fuel. The Air Force
fuel offload requirement was set at 94,000 pounds of fuel
at 1,000 nautical miles, comfortably above the historical
average. The KC-767 exceeded the 94,000-pound requirement
by 20 percent while remaining within the optimum size for
medium tanker operations. The KC-30 fuel capacity exceeded
that requirement by 50 percent -- meaning more than half of
its fuel load would be unused during an average mission. The
result: a large tanker that burns more fuel and requires significantly
higher costs in maintenance and support. 
