Halting the Progress of Iran’s Program and Rolling Back Key Elements.

Iran has committed to halt enrichment above 5%:

• Halt all enrichment above 5% and dismantle the technical connections required to enrich above 5%.

Iran has committed to neutralize its stockpile of near-20% uranium:

• Dilute below 5% or convert to a form not suitable for further enrichment its entire stockpile of near-20% enriched uranium before the end of the initial phase.

Iran has committed to halt progress on its enrichment capacity:

• Not install additional centrifuges of any type.
   
• Not install or use any next-generation centrifuges to enrich uranium.
   
• Leave inoperable roughly half of installed centrifuges at Natanz and three-quarters of installed centrifuges at Fordow, so they cannot be used to enrich uranium.
   
• Limit its centrifuge production to those needed to replace damaged machines, so Iran cannot use the six months to stockpile centrifuges.
   
• Not construct additional enrichment facilities.

Iran has committed to halt progress on the growth of its 3.5% stockpile:

• Not increase its stockpile of 3.5% low enriched uranium, so that the amount is not greater at the end of the six months than it is at the beginning, and any newly enriched 3.5% enriched uranium is converted into oxide.

Iran has committed to no further advances of its activities at Arak and to halt progress on its plutonium track. Iran has committed to:

• Not commission the Arak reactor.
   
• Not fuel the Arak reactor.
   
• Halt the production of fuel for the Arak reactor
   
• No additional testing of fuel for the Arak reactor.
   
• Not install any additional reactor components at Arak.
   
• Not transfer fuel and heavy water to the reactor site.
   
• Not construct a facility capable of reprocessing. Without reprocessing, Iran cannot separate plutonium from spent fuel.

Unprecedented transparency and intrusive monitoring of Iran’s nuclear program Iran has committed to:

• Provide daily access by IAEA inspectors at Natanz and Fordow. This daily access will permit inspectors to review surveillance camera footage to ensure comprehensive monitoring. This access will provide even greater transparency into enrichment at these sites and shorten detection time for any non-compliance.
   
• Provide IAEA access to centrifuge assembly facilities.
   
• Provide IAEA access to centrifuge rotor component production and storage facilities.
   
• Provide IAEA access to uranium mines and mills.
   
• Provide long-sought design information for the Arak reactor. This will provide critical insight into the reactor that has not previously been available.
   
• Provide more frequent inspector access to the Arak reactor.
   
• Provide certain key data and information called for in the Additional Protocol to Iran’s IAEA Safeguards Agreement and Modified Code 3.1.
  

Verification Mechanism

• The IAEA will be called upon to perform many of these verification steps, consistent with their ongoing inspection role in Iran. In addition, the P5+1 and Iran have committed to establishing a Joint Commission to work with the IAEA to monitor implementation and address issues that may arise. The Joint Commission will also work with the IAEA to facilitate resolution of past and present concerns with respect to Iran’s nuclear program, including the possible military dimension of Iran’s nuclear program and Iran’s activities at Parchin.

Limited, Temporary, Reversible Relief

• In return for these steps, the P5+1 is to provide limited, temporary, targeted, and reversible relief while maintaining the vast bulk of our sanctions, including the oil, finance, and banking sanctions architecture. If Iran fails to meet its commitments, we will revoke the relief. Specifically the P5+1 has committed to:
   
• Not impose new nuclear-related sanctions for six months, if Iran abides by its commitments under this deal, to the extent permissible within their political systems.
   
• Suspend certain sanctions on gold and precious metals, Iran’s auto sector, and Iran’s petrochemical exports, potentially providing Iran approximately $1.5 billion in revenue.
   
• License safety-related repairs and inspections inside Iran for certain Iranian airlines.
   
• Allow purchases of Iranian oil to remain at their currently significantly reduced levels – levels that are 60% less than two years ago. $4.2 billion from these sales will be allowed to be transferred in installments if, and as, Iran fulfills its commitments.
   
• Allow $400 million in governmental tuition assistance to be transferred from restricted Iranian funds directly to recognized educational institutions in third countries to defray the tuition costs of Iranian students.

Humanitarian Transaction

• Facilitate humanitarian transactions that are already allowed by U.S. law. Humanitarian transactions have been explicitly exempted from sanctions by Congress so this channel will not provide Iran access to any new source of funds. Humanitarian transactions are those related to Iran’s purchase of food, agricultural commodities, medicine, medical devices; we would also facilitate transactions for medical expenses incurred abroad. We will establish this channel for the benefit of the Iranian people.

Putting Limited Relief in Perspective

• In total, the approximately $7 billion in relief is a fraction of the costs that Iran will continue to incur during this first phase under the sanctions that will remain in place. The vast majority of Iran’s approximately $100 billion in foreign exchange holdings are inaccessible or restricted by sanctions.
   
• In the next six months, Iran’s crude oil sales cannot increase. Oil sanctions alone will result in approximately $30 billion in lost revenues to Iran – or roughly $5 billion per month – compared to what Iran earned in a six month period in 2011, before these sanctions took effect. While Iran will be allowed access to $4.2 billion of its oil sales, nearly $15 billion of its revenues during this period will go into restricted overseas accounts. In summary, we expect the balance of Iran’s money in restricted accounts overseas will actually increase, not decrease, under the terms of this deal.

Maintaining Economic Pressure on Iran and Preserving Our Sanctions Architecture

• During the first phase, we will continue to vigorously enforce our sanctions against Iran, including by taking action against those who seek to evade or circumvent our sanctions.
   
• Sanctions affecting crude oil sales will continue to impose pressure on Iran’s government. Working with our international partners, we have cut Iran’s oil sales from 2.5 million barrels per day (bpd) in early 2012 to 1 million bpd today, denying Iran the ability to sell almost 1.5 million bpd. That’s a loss of more than $80 billion since the beginning of 2012 that Iran will never be able to recoup. Under this first step, the EU crude oil ban will remain in effect and Iran will be held to approximately 1 million bpd in sales, resulting in continuing lost sales worth an additional $4 billion per month, every month, going forward.
   
• Sanctions affecting petroleum product exports to Iran, which result in billions of dollars of lost revenue, will remain in effect.
   
• The vast majority of Iran’s approximately $100 billion in foreign exchange holdings remain inaccessible or restricted by our sanctions.

Other significant parts of our sanctions regime remain intact, including:

• Sanctions against the Central Bank of Iran and approximately two dozen other major Iranian banks and financial actors;
   
• Secondary sanctions, pursuant to the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA) as amended and other laws, on banks that do business with U.S.-designated individuals and entities;
   
• Sanctions on those who provide a broad range of other financial services to Iran, such as many types of insurance; and,
   
• Restricted access to the U.S. financial system.
  
• All sanctions on over 600 individuals and entities targeted for supporting Iran’s nuclear or ballistic missile program remain in effect.
   
• Sanctions on several sectors of Iran’s economy, including shipping and shipbuilding, remain in effect.
   
• Sanctions on long-term investment in and provision of technical services to Iran’s energy sector remain in effect.
   
• Sanctions on Iran’s military program remain in effect.
   
• Broad U.S. restrictions on trade with Iran remain in effect, depriving Iran of access to virtually all dealings with the world’s biggest economy
   
• All UN Security Council sanctions remain in effect.
   
• All of our targeted sanctions related to Iran’s state sponsorship of terrorism, its destabilizing role in the Syrian conflict, and its abysmal human rights record, among other concerns, remain in effect.

A Comprehensive Solution

• During the six-month initial phase, the P5+1 will negotiate the contours of a comprehensive solution. Thus far, the outline of the general parameters of the comprehensive solution envisions concrete steps to give the international community confidence that Iran’s nuclear activities will be exclusively peaceful.With respect to this comprehensive resolution: nothing is agreed to with respect to a comprehensive solution until everything is agreed to. Over the next six months, we will determine whether there is a solution that gives us sufficient confidence that the Iranian program is peaceful. If Iran cannot address our concerns, we are prepared to increase sanctions and pressure.

Conclusion

• In sum, this first step achieves a great deal in its own right. Without this phased agreement, Iran could start spinning thousands of additional centrifuges. It could install and spin next-generation centrifuges that will reduce its breakout times. It could fuel and commission the Arak heavy water reactor. It could grow its stockpile of 20% enriched uranium to beyond the threshold for a bomb's worth of uranium. Iran can do none of these things under the conditions of the first step understanding.
   
• Furthermore, without this phased approach, the international sanctions coalition would begin to fray because Iran would make the case to the world that it was serious about a diplomatic solution and we were not. We would be unable to bring partners along to do the crucial work of enforcing our sanctions. With this first step, we stop and begin to roll back Iran's program and give Iran a sharp choice: fulfill its commitments and negotiate in good faith to a final deal, or the entire international community will respond with even more isolation and pressure.
   
• The American people prefer a peaceful and enduring resolution that prevents Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon and strengthens the global non-proliferation regime. This solution has the potential to achieve that. Through strong and principled diplomacy, the United States of America will do its part for greater peace, security, and cooperation among nations.

Nuclear program in Iran is still one of the main issues between the US-Iran relations in the current Obama Administration. US government does not recognize Iran's right to nuclear power, it has been persistently trying to stop the program’s advancement using sanctions to isolate the Iranian economy by stopping monetary flow. All attempts to defuse the tensions were stopped by US unconditional demand to stop uranium enrichment, which is unacceptable to Iranians. (In 2010, According to Global Security Newswire (NIT)http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/iran-seen-loosening-restrictions-on-al-qaeda/ Tehran is cognizant of Washington's concerns about the handling of senior al-Qaeda members in its custody, a high-level U.S. counterterrorism official said. Releasing such an individual would breach a U.N. resolution, according to AP (Goldman/Apuzzo, Associated Press/Google News, May 13). Nevertheless, Iran continued its program and in 2010, the Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced that Iran was now a "nuclear state," producing uranium enriched to up to 20%. (According to Nw York Times, Reuters, 2010: Iran made New Enrichment Claim which Iran is now able to enrich uranium to more than 80 percent purity, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said on Thursday, coming close to levels experts say would be needed for a nuclear bomb.) Since fall 2012, American and Iranian officials have hinted the possibility of negotiations occurring on this matter. The Iranians will not confirm negotiations until the election is passed. Published on Mar 5, 2013 According to ABC News via Youtube: John Kerry Says Iran Is Moving Closer to Possessing Nuclear Weapon Published on Mar 5, 2013 All the years Israel said an Iranian nuke was imminent... Timeline of Israeli warnings on Iranian nukes 1984: West German intelligence sources claim that Iran's production of a bomb "is entering its final stages." US Senator Alan Cranston claims Iran is seven years away from making a weapon. 1992: Israeli parliamentarian Benjamin Netanyahu tells his colleagues that Iran is 3 to 5 years from being able to produce a nuclear weapon - and that the threat had to be "uprooted by an interantional front headed by the US." 1992: Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres tells French TV that Iran was set to have nuclear warheads by 1999.  Peres says, "Iran is the greatest threat and greatest problem in the Midlle East" 1995: The New York Times reports that US and Israeli officials fear "Iran is much closer to producing nuclear weapons than previously thought" -- less than five years away. Netanyahu claims the time frame is three to five years. 1996: Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres claims Iran will have nuclear weapons in four years. 1998:  The New York Times reports that "Israel was less safe as a result of the launch of an Iranian medium-range of missile even though Israel alone ain the Middle East possessed both nuclear weapons and long-range missiles.' "The major reaction to this is going to be from Israel, and we have to worry what action the Israelis will take , " The Times quoted a former intelligence official.  An unidentified expert said:  This test shows Iran is bent on acquiring nuclear weapons, because no one builds an 800 mile missile to deliver conventional warheads". 1998:  The same week:former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld reports to Congress that Iran could build an intercontinental balistic missile that could reach the U.S. by 2003. 1999: An Israeli military official claims that Iran will have a nuclear weapon within five years. 2001: The Israeli Minister of Defence claims that Iran will be ready to launch a nuclear weapon in less than four years. 2002: Prime Minister Netanyahu convinced that he believed Saddam Hussein was making nuclear weapons and requested to U.S.A support for this matter. (Ref:  C-SPAN 91177info).  USA convincing for study this matter. 2002: The CIA warns that the danger of nuclear weapons from Iran is higher than during the Cold War, because its missile capability has grown more quickly than expected since 2000 -- putting it on par with North Korea. 2003: A high-ranking Israeli military officer tells the Knesset that Iran will have the bomb by 2005 — 17 months away. 2006: A State Department official claims that Iran may be capable of building a nuclear weapon in 16 days. 2008: An Israeli general tells the Cabinet that Iran is "half-way" to enriching enough uranium to build a nuclear weapon and will have a working weapon no later than the end of 2010. 2009: Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak estimates that Iran is 6-18 months away from building an operative nuclear weapon. 2010: Israeli decision-makers believe that Iran is at most 1-3 years away from being able to assemble a nuclear weapon. 2011: IAEA report indicates that Iran could build a nuclear weapon within months. 2013: Israeli intelligence officials claim that Iran could have the bomb by 2015 or 2016. At the end of his first overseas trip as Secretary of State, John Kerry acknowledged that despite the continued diplomacy and tough sanctions being leveled against Iran, the regime continues to get closer to possessing a nuclear weapon. The following youtube shows the making the yellow cake for producing the Uranium and enrichment production including for the nuclear powerpoint in Feb 6, 2009 video obtained by NBC News in 2005 and transcribed and translated by ISIS which is a several years ago, but it is for references in regards of uranium: (Reporter Note via youtube: It is a promotional video produced by Iran and it contains much propaganda. For instance, the narrator repeats the assertion that the technology underpinning Iran's nuclear program is indigenous--but much of it was and is procured from outside the country. And when the narrator discusses the Fuel Manufacturing Plant at Esfahan in Part 2 of the video, he only mentions the fuel's potential use in power reactors for electricity production (like at Bushehr)--and makes no mention of its potential use in the Arak heavy water reactor currently under construction. When operating optimally, the reactor at Arak will produce about 9 kilograms of plutonium annually, or enough for about two nuclear weapons each year, should Iran choose to separate plutonium from the reactor's irradiated fuel. Furthermore, Part 1 contains a tour of the Saghand uranium mine and the narration would lead the viewer to think that the Saghand mine is operational, but it is not. Also in Part 1 is a description of the Aradakan Yellow Cake Production Plant that implies that the facility is nearing completion, if not already operational. In reality, the facility is still under construction, and recent commercial satellite imagery indicates that little progress has been made over the last four years.): ISIS report shows that In reality, the facility is still under construction, and recent commercial satellite imagery indicates that little progress has been made over the last four years. Part III The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) is a non-profit, non-partisan institution dedicated to informing the public about science and policy issues affecting international security. Its primary focus is on stopping the spread of nuclear weapons and related technology to other nations and terrorists, bringing about greater transparency of nuclear activities worldwide, strengthening the international non-proliferation regime, and achieving deep cuts in nuclear arsenals. ISIS is widely recognized both as a source of authoritative information on nuclear programs in states that seek or possess nuclear weapons and an important contributor to efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. ISIS’s projects integrate technical, scientific, and policy research in order to build a sound foundation for a wide variety of efforts to reduce the threat posed by nuclear weapons to U.S. and international security. David Albright, M.Sc., is the founder of the non-governmental Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), its current president, and author of several books on proliferation of atomic weapons. Albright holds a Master of Science in physics from Indiana University and a M.Sc. in mathematics from Wright State University. He has taught physics at George Mason University in Virginia. From 1990 to 2001, Albright was a member of the Colorado State Health Advisory Panel, participating in its assessment of the toxicological and radiological effects on the population near the Rocky Flats atomic weapons production site. Prior to founding ISIS, he worked as a Senior Staff Scientist at the Federation of American Scientists and as a member of the research staff of Princeton University’s Center for Energy and Environmental Studies. In the early 1980s, he taught physics at George Mason University in Virginia. He has served as a consultant or contractor to the Environmental Policy Institute, the Congressional Research Service, the International Task Force on Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism, Los Alamos National Laboratory, and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Meanwhile, During the six-month initial phase, the P5+1 will negotiate the contours of a comprehensive solution with peaceful and deplomatic approach and continue to resolve the cases until everything is agreed to. Over the next six months, Obama Administration will determine whether there is a solution that gives sufficient confidence that the Iranian program is peaceful hoping to resolve the nuclear issues. Dave Albright reported that On November 11, 2013, Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) signed a Joint Statement on a Framework for Cooperation whereby “Iran and the IAEA will cooperate further with respect to verification activities to be undertaken by the IAEA to resolve all present and past issues.” As a first step, Iran and the IAEA agreed to a set of six measures listed in an Annex to the statement, and Iran agreed to implement these measures within three months from the date of the Statement. In an interview with Reuters on November 13, Director General Yukiya Amano said that the initial measures are “an important first step towards clarifying outstanding issues.” But it should be emphasized that the bulk of the work, thus many more measures, remain to be negotiated. Amano also told Reuters that the actual implementation of the statement “would be key.” On November 23rd, 2013, Obama Administration took the importance of first step, according to ISIS dated November 26, 2013, Next step is While important, the implementation of the initial measures are still only a first step. They remain far from being enough to satisfy the IAEA’s concerns. As of late November, moreover, the next measures have not been agreed to or announced. The IAEA writes in its most recent Iran safeguards report (bolding for emphasis): In the Framework for Cooperation, the Agency and Iran agreed to cooperate further with respect to verification activities to be undertaken by the Agency to resolve all present and past issues and that Iran will implement the initial practical measures within three months. The outstanding issues that are not addressed by the practical measures….including those issues identified in previous reports of the Director General to the Board of Governors, will be addressed in subsequent steps.   Subsequent measures that the IAEA will need to implement in cooperation with Iran include addressing the key outstanding issues that involve its concerns about past and possibly on-going nuclear weapons work and other alleged military dimensions. For instance, Iran will need to provide the IAEA with far more information and allow IAEA access to sites in question including the Parchin site and likely workshops associated with the manufacture of mock re-entry vehicles used in Iran’s alleged work on nuclear weapons prior to 2004. Iran will need to provide procurement information related to these alleged military activities, including those by the Physics Research Center, a military entity which evidence supports conducted in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s parallel military nuclear activities involving extensive foreign procurement activities. Overall, Iran will need to provide far more cooperation on all these issues than it has done so far. According to ISIS, David Albright, Key Goals stressed for negotiations which some of the metrix and graphic photo expressions are available in below: Stopping the advance of Iran's centrifuge and Arak reactor programs Extending breakout times. Capping the Iranian centrifuge program and ensuring that it will not expand beyond this cap (in terms of enrichment output) during the next 5-15 years. Ensuring that Iran is not building another centrifuge plant and increasing the chance of finding a secret centrifuge or plutonium separation plant.  How to establish adequate transparency in general, including Iran addressing the IAEA's concerns about Iran's past and possibly on-going nuclear weapons efforts? How to trade Iranian concessions for sanctions relief?  In the longer term, what incentives package is appropriate and how to increase Iran's supply of medical isotopes and nuclear electricity?  These questions, while vital, are not addressed here. The United States anticipates obtaining an interim agreement followed several months later by a long-term agreement that will verifiably ensure that Iran will not build nuclear weapons. What are minimal conditions to look for in an interim deal? Meanwhile, achieving the above conditions in an interim agreement would address the most pressing issues involving breakout timelines and undeclared centrifuge programs.   These conditions would allow time for negotiating a longer term agreement that would comprehensively ensure that Iran will not build nuclear weapons. In essence these conditions amount to a freeze in Iran's centrifuge and Arak reactor programs plus small reductions in the scale of the centrifuge program, some modest declarations, and a few additional transparency and disablement steps. A longer term agreement would need to include far more detailed conditions on the scope and timing of Iran's nuclear program, far more intrusive inspection arrangement, and much more detailed declarations about Iran's nuclear programs. Continue to freez to Halting further construction of the Arak reactor, including the manufacturing of its fuel. -Preliminary steps aimed at helping ensure Iran is not building another centrifuge plant and increasing the chance of detecting a secret centrifuge plant:  *Implementation of early notification of construction of new facilities (code 3.1 of comprehensive safeguards agreement).     *Developing a baseline of information about Iran's gas centrifuge program, including a detailed declaration of any centrifuge plants under construction or planned for construction; a declaration of its centrifuge research development, assembly and manufacturing complex; and a declaration of Iran's total inventory of centrifuges.     *Other verification measures, such as the Additional Protocol and the monitoring of uranium mines and miles and of the centrifuge complex, would be implemented later.   -Ensuring that Iran agrees that future sanctions relief requires that Iran address fully and cooperatively the IAEA's concerns about Iran's alleged past and possibly on-going work on nuclear weapons. Sources: White House, Immediately, Youtube, New York Times, NBC News, ISIS, Reuters, and IAEA. catch4all.com, Sandra Englund, November 27,  2013, Rev. Nov. 28th, 2013, Nov. 30th, 2013.

The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) is a non-profit, non-partisan institution dedicated to informing the public about science and policy issues affecting international security. Its primary focus is on stopping the spread of nuclear weapons and related technology to other nations and terrorists, bringing about greater transparency of nuclear activities worldwide, strengthening the international non-proliferation regime, and achieving deep cuts in nuclear arsenals. ISIS is widely recognized both as a source of authoritative information on nuclear programs in states that seek or possess nuclear weapons and an important contributor to efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. ISIS’s projects integrate technical, scientific, and policy research in order to build a sound foundation for a wide variety of efforts to reduce the threat posed by nuclear weapons to U.S. and international security.

David Albright, M.Sc., is the founder of the non-governmental Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), its current president, and author of several books on proliferation of atomic weapons. Albright holds a Master of Science in physics from Indiana University and a M.Sc. in mathematics from Wright State University. He has taught physics at George Mason University in Virginia.

From 1990 to 2001, Albright was a member of the Colorado State Health Advisory Panel, participating in its assessment of the toxicological and radiological effects on the population near the Rocky Flats atomic weapons production site.

Prior to founding ISIS, he worked as a Senior Staff Scientist at the Federation of American Scientists and as a member of the research staff of Princeton University’s Center for Energy and Environmental Studies. In the early 1980s, he taught physics at George Mason University in Virginia. He has served as a consultant or contractor to the Environmental Policy Institute, the Congressional Research Service, the International Task Force on Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism, Los Alamos National Laboratory, and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Meanwhile, During the six-month initial phase, the P5+1 will negotiate the contours of a comprehensive solution with peaceful and deplomatic approach and continue to resolve the cases until everything is agreed to. Over the next six months, Obama Administration will determine whether there is a solution that gives sufficient confidence that the Iranian program is peaceful hoping to resolve the nuclear issues.

Dave Albright reported that On November 11, 2013, Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) signed a Joint Statement on a Framework for Cooperation whereby “Iran and the IAEA will cooperate further with respect to verification activities to be undertaken by the IAEA to resolve all present and past issues.” As a first step, Iran and the IAEA agreed to a set of six measures listed in an Annex to the statement, and Iran agreed to implement these measures within three months from the date of the Statement. In an interview with Reuters on November 13, Director General Yukiya Amano said that the initial measures are “an important first step towards clarifying outstanding issues.” But it should be emphasized that the bulk of the work, thus many more measures, remain to be negotiated. Amano also told Reuters that the actual implementation of the statement “would be key.”

On November 23rd, 2013, Obama Administration took the importance of first step, according to ISIS dated November 26, 2013, Next step is While important, the implementation of the initial measures are still only a first step. They remain far from being enough to satisfy the IAEA’s concerns. As of late November, moreover, the next measures have not been agreed to or announced. The IAEA writes in its most recent Iran safeguards report (bolding for emphasis):

In the Framework for Cooperation, the Agency and Iran agreed to cooperate further with respect to verification activities to be undertaken by the Agency to resolve all present and past issues and that Iran will implement the initial practical measures within three months. The outstanding issues that are not addressed by the practical measures….including those issues identified in previous reports of the Director General to the Board of Governors, will be addressed in subsequent steps.

Subsequent measures that the IAEA will need to implement in cooperation with Iran include addressing the key outstanding issues that involve its concerns about past and possibly on-going nuclear weapons work and other alleged military dimensions. For instance, Iran will need to provide the IAEA with far more information and allow IAEA access to sites in question including the Parchin site and likely workshops associated with the manufacture of mock re-entry vehicles used in Iran’s alleged work on nuclear weapons prior to 2004. Iran will need to provide procurement information related to these alleged military activities, including those by the Physics Research Center, a military entity which evidence supports conducted in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s parallel military nuclear activities involving extensive foreign procurement activities. Overall, Iran will need to provide far more cooperation on all these issues than it has done so far.

According to ISIS, David Albright, Key Goals stressed for negotiations which some of the metrix and graphic photo expressions are available in below:

Stopping the advance of Iran's centrifuge and Arak reactor programs

Extending breakout times.

Capping the Iranian centrifuge program and ensuring that it will not expand beyond this cap (in terms of enrichment output) during the next 5-15 years.

Ensuring that Iran is not building another centrifuge plant and increasing the chance of finding a secret centrifuge or plutonium separation plant.  How to establish adequate transparency in general, including Iran addressing the IAEA's concerns about Iran's past and possibly on-going nuclear weapons efforts?

How to trade Iranian concessions for sanctions relief?  In the longer term, what incentives package is appropriate and how to increase Iran's supply of medical isotopes and nuclear electricity?  These questions, while vital, are not addressed here.

The United States anticipates obtaining an interim agreement followed several months later by a long-term agreement that will verifiably ensure that Iran will not build nuclear weapons.

What are minimal conditions to look for in an interim deal?

Meanwhile, achieving the above conditions in an interim agreement would address the most pressing issues involving breakout timelines and undeclared centrifuge programs.  

These conditions would allow time for negotiating a longer term agreement that would comprehensively ensure that Iran will not build nuclear weapons.

In essence these conditions amount to a freeze in Iran's centrifuge and Arak reactor programs plus small reductions in the scale of the centrifuge program, some modest declarations, and a few additional transparency and disablement steps.

A longer term agreement would need to include far more detailed conditions on the scope and timing of Iran's nuclear program, far more intrusive inspection arrangement, and much more detailed declarations about Iran's nuclear programs.

Continue to freez to Halting further construction of the Arak reactor, including the manufacturing of its fuel.

-Preliminary steps aimed at helping ensure Iran is not building another centrifuge plant and increasing the chance of detecting a secret centrifuge plant:

 *Implementation of early notification of construction of new facilities (code 3.1 of comprehensive safeguards agreement).
 

  *Developing a baseline of information about Iran's gas centrifuge program, including a detailed declaration of any centrifuge plants under construction or planned for construction; a declaration of its centrifuge research development, assembly and manufacturing complex; and a declaration of Iran's total inventory of centrifuges.
 

  *Other verification measures, such as the Additional Protocol and the monitoring of uranium mines and miles and of the centrifuge complex, would be implemented later.
 

-Ensuring that Iran agrees that future sanctions relief requires that Iran address fully and cooperatively the IAEA's concerns about Iran's alleged past and possibly on-going work on nuclear weapons.

Sources: White House, Immediately, Youtube, New York Times, NBC News, ISIS, Reuters, and IAEA. catch4all.com, Sandra Englund, November 27,  2013, Rev. Nov. 28th, 2013, Nov. 30th, 2013.