Remarks by President Trump after Meeting with

Vice Chairman Kim Yong Chol of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

FOREIGN POLICY

Issued on: June 1, 2018

South Lawn

2:41 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT:  The meeting went very well.  We’ll be meeting on June 12th in Singapore.  It went very well.  It’s really a get-to-know-you kind of a situation.

Mike has spent two days doing this.  We’ve gotten to know their people very well.  And we will — you people are going to have to travel because you’ll be in Singapore on June 12th.

And I think it’ll be a process.  It’s not — I never said it goes in one meeting.  I think it’s going to be a process.  But the relationships are building, and that’s a very positive thing.

Q    Mr. President, what’s your sense of what the North Koreans are willing to do on the issue of denuclearization?  Are they looking at it all at once?

THE PRESIDENT:  Well, I think they want to do that.  I know they want to do that.  They want other things along the line.  They want to develop as a country.  That’s going to happen.  I have no doubt.  Japan is involved, as you know.  And South Korea is very much involved.  We’re involved in terms of getting everything.  Everybody wants the United States.  So we’re going to help in the process very much.  Without us, it wouldn’t happen.

But I think that you see a lot of very positive things, including with China.  I think you see a lot of very positive things happening with President Xi, who has helped me quite a bit with this.  So we’ll see where it leads.

But we’re going to be — June 12th, we’ll be in Singapore.  It will be a beginning.  I don’t say and I’ve never said it happens in one meeting.  You’re talking about years of hostility; years of problems; years of, really, hatred between so many different nations.  But I think you’re going to have a very positive result in the end.  Not from one meeting, but you’re going to have a very positive —

Q    You appeared to question their sincerity in your letter to Kim Jong Un last week.  Have they gone far enough now?  Do you believe they’re sincere?

THE PRESIDENT:  My letter was a response to their letter.  The media forgot that.  You know, the media said, “Oh, you had a meeting, then you cancelled.”  I didn’t cancel the meeting.  I cancelled it in response to a very tough statement.  And I think we’re over that — totally over that.  And now we’re going to deal, and we’re going to really start a process.

We’re meeting with the Chairman on June 12th.  And I think it’s probably going to be a very successful — ultimately, a successful process.  We’ll see.

Remember what I say: We will see what we will see.  But I think it’s going to be a process that we deserve to have.  I mean, we really deserve — they want it.  We think it’s important.  And I think we would be making a big mistake if we didn’t have it.  I think we’re going to have a relationship, and it will start on June 12th.

Q    What can you get done in one meeting?  What can you get done on June 12th?  And why do you think they’re open to denuclearization?

THE PRESIDENT:  Well, this was a very good meeting.  Don’t forget, this was a meeting where a letter was given to me by Kim Jong Un, and that letter was a very nice letter.  Oh, would you like to see what was in that letter?  Would you like it?

Q    Can you tell us?

THE PRESIDENT:  How much?  How much?  How much?

Q    Can you just give us a flavor of what the letter said?

THE PRESIDENT:  Ah, it was a very interesting letter.  And at some point I may be — it may be appropriate, and maybe I’ll be able to give it to you.  Maybe you’ll be able to see it, and maybe fairly soon.

But really, this was a letter presentation that ended up being a two-hour conversation.

Q    Why did it end up going so long, sir?

THE PRESIDENT:  Because we found the whole subject matter very interesting.  And because I really think they want to do something.  And if it’s possible, so do we.

Q    What did he ask you (inaudible)?

THE PRESIDENT:  I think all we’re going to do is be there on June 12th, and we’re going to see what happens.  Mike has been dealing very well.  They have a very good relationship with Mike Pompeo, our Secretary of State.  It was actually very interesting because this was literally going to be the delivery of a letter, and it ended up being a two-hour conversation with the second most powerful man in North Korea.

Q    Did he ask you anything about troop levels in South Korea?

THE PRESIDENT:  We talked about almost everything.  We talked about a lot.  And we talked about sanctions.

Q    (Inaudible) with Kim Jong Un yet?

THE PRESIDENT:  I don’t want to say that.

Q    Did they agree to CVID, sir?

THE PRESIDENT:  We talked about about a lot of things.  We really did.  But the big deal will be on June 12th.  And again, it’s a process.  It doesn’t go — we’re not going to sign a — we’re not going to go in and sign something on June 12th and we never were.  We’re going to start a process.  And I told them today, “Take your time.  We can go fast.  We can go slowly.”  But I think they’d like to see something happen.  And if we can work that out, that will be good.  But the process will begin on June 12th in Singapore.

Q    Do you believe Kim is committed to denuclearization?

THE PRESIDENT:  Yeah, I do think so.  He’d like to see it happen.  He wants to be careful.  He wants to be, you know — he’s not going to run and do things.  But I told him, to be honest with you, look, we have sanctions on; they’re very powerful sanctions.  We would not take sanctions off unless they did that.  But the sanctions are very powerful.  You’ve seen how powerful in other ways.  You’re going to see how powerful sanctions are when it comes to Iran.  You see what that’s doing to Iran.

So we have sanctions on.  And at a certain point, I’ll tell you what, I look forward to the day when I can take the sanctions off of North Korea.

Q    Did you talk about human rights today?  And do you expect to talk about it on —

THE PRESIDENT:  We did not talk about human rights, no.

Q    Do you expect to talk about it on June 12th?

THE PRESIDENT:  Could be.  Yeah.  Could be.  I think we probably will, and maybe in great detail.  We did not talk about human rights.

Q    Did you talk about sanctions?  Did they ask you to make any changes?

THE PRESIDENT:  Yeah, we did.  We talked about it.  Yes, they asked about sanctions.

Q    Is maximum pressure over, sir?

THE PRESIDENT:  Excuse me?

Q    Is maximum pressure over, sir?

THE PRESIDENT:   It’s going to remain what it is now.  I don’t even want to use the term “maximum pressure” anymore because I don’t want to use that term because we’re getting along.  You see the relationship.  We’re getting along.

So it’s not a question of maximum pressure.  It’s staying essentially the way it is.  At some point, hopefully, a deal — for the good of millions of people, a deal will be worked out.

Q    Mr. President, how would you describe the state of relations now between the United States and North Korea after your meetings today?

THE PRESIDENT:  Well, I think they’re okay.  I mean, I think they’re good.  Is it like the relationships we have with a couple of other countries?  Probably not.  Right?  But I think the relationship we have right now with North Korea is as good as it’s been in a long time.

They had no relationship under the previous administration.  There was nothing.  It was nothing.  They were explaining, it was just a “nothing.”  Nothing was done.

Hey, folks, this should not be up to me.  This should have been handled a long time ago.  This got to a very critical point.  This should have been handled many years ago — not only by President Obama, but by other Presidents that preceded me.  This shouldn’t be done now, this should have been done years ago.

Q    Do you plan to offer the North Koreans economic aid at the June 12th summit?

THE PRESIDENT:  Well, what’s going to happen is South Korea will do that.  No, I don’t think the United States is going to have to spend.  I think South Korea will do it.  I think China — I think, frankly, China will help out.

I think that Japan will help out.  No, I don’t see the United States spending a lot of money.  You know, we have three hostages.  How much money did I spend for the hostages?

And, look, we’re very far away.  We are very far away.  Those places are very close.  It’s their neighborhood.  We’re thousands — we’re 6,000 miles away.  So I’ve already told South Korea, I said, “You know, you’re going to have to get ready.”  And Japan, also.

And I think they really want to see something great happen.  Japan does, South Korea does, and I think China does.  But that’s their neighborhood; it’s not our neighborhood.

Q    Mr. President, yesterday you were concerned about the meeting that Lavrov was having with Kim Jong Un.

THE PRESIDENT:  Yeah, I didn’t like it.

Q    Where are you on that today?

THE PRESIDENT:  I didn’t like it, but it could be very positive, too.

I didn’t like the Russian meeting yesterday.  I said, “What’s the purpose of that?”  But, it could be a positive meeting.  If it’s a positive meeting, I love it.  If it’s a negative meeting, I’m not happy.  And it could very well be a positive meeting.

Q    Are you willing to end the South Korean War on June 12th, during the summit?

THE PRESIDENT:  Well, we could — that could happen.  That could happen.  We talked about it.

Q    Tell us more.

THE PRESIDENT:  We talked about ending the war.  And you know, this war has been going on — it’s got to be the longest war — almost 70 years, right?  And there is a possibility of something like that.  That’s more of a signing of a document that it’s very important in one way.  Historically, it’s very important.  But we’ll see.

And we did discuss that — the ending of the Korean War.  Can you believe that we’re talking about the ending of the Korean War?  You’re talking about 70 years.

Q    Has that document been prepared?  Or is it being prepared?

THE PRESIDENT:  Well, we’re going to discuss it prior to the meeting.  That’s something that could come out of the meeting.  I think, really, there’s something that maybe could come out of the meeting.

Q    Where’s China on that?

THE PRESIDENT:  I think China would like to see a very positive result.  I have a lot of good relations with, as you know, Chairman Xi.  He’s a great — he’s really a very wonderful guy.  He’s a man that loves China.  However, he wants to do what’s best for China.  I think China and President Xi would love to see something happen here.

Q    When you say you’re going to guarantee Kim’s security, and the North Korean regime’s security, how will you do that?  How would the United States do that?

THE PRESIDENT:  Well, we’re going to make sure it’s secure.  We’re going to make sure when this is over, it’s over.  It’s not going to be starting up again.

And they have a potential to be a great country.  And I think South Korea is going to help a lot.  Japan is going to help a lot.  I think China is going to help a lot.

Q    How do you envision that working, though?

THE PRESIDENT:  Well, that’s a very complicated question, frankly, but you’ll see that over a period of time.

Q    When you gave your speech in Seoul last November, you talked about the bright promise if North Korea should choose to join the company of nations.  But if you leave Kim in place, can you really have a transformation like that?

THE PRESIDENT:  I really think you can.  And I think it’s going to be very successful.  They’re incredible people.  I think it’s going to be a very great success.  So we’ll see what happens.

But we’ll see you — we will see you on June 12th, but I’m sure we’ll see you a little bit before that.  In the meantime, how is Sarah doing?  Okay?  (Laughter.)

Q    Have you discussed dates for a second or a third summit?

THE PRESIDENT:  The — which one?

Q    Did you discuss dates for a second or a third meeting?

THE PRESIDENT:  I told them, I think that you’re going to have, probably, others.  Hey, wouldn’t it be wonderful if we walked out and everything was settled all of a sudden from sitting down for a couple of hours?  No, I don’t see that happening.  But I see over a period of time.

And frankly, I said, “Take your time.  Take your time.  It’s going to remain as is, but take your time.”

One thing I did do, and it was very important, we had hundreds of new sanctions ready to go on.  And he did not — the director did not ask, but I said I’m not going to put them on until such time as the talks break down.

We have very significant sanctions on now.  But we had hundreds — we have hundreds that are ready to go.  But I said, “I’m not going to.”  But why would I do that when we’re talking so nicely?

Q    Is this first meeting more of a personal diplomacy, part of your “getting to know you” —

THE PRESIDENT:  I think it’s a “getting to know you” meeting, plus.  And that can be a very positive thing.

Q    Mr. President, what was your response to the letter?  Did you send anything back?

THE PRESIDENT:  No, I didn’t.  I haven’t seen the letter yet.  I purposely didn’t open the letter.  I haven’t opened it.  I didn’t open it in front of the director.

I said, “Would you want me to open it?”  He said, “You can read it later.”  I may be in for a big surprise, folks.  (Laughter.)  So long, everybody. Q    What’s the next move on NAFTA, sir?

THE PRESIDENT:  Well, NAFTA — look, it’s been a terrible deal for the United States.  People are starting to see it.  We lose over $100 billion a year with Mexico.  We lose many, many, many billions of dollars with Canada.  Canada doesn’t take — I mean, they’re very restrictive as to taking our agricultural product, and other things.

And, you know, all of these countries, including the European Union, they charge five times the tariff.  We don’t charge tariffs, essentially.  They charge five times what we charge for tariffs.  And I believe in the word “reciprocal.”  You’re going to charge five times?  We’re going to charge five times.  That hasn’t been done.  No other President ever brought it up.  And it’s going to be done now.

So we’re negotiating numerous deals.  We’re talking about NAFTA.  To be honest with you, I wouldn’t see NAFTA — I wouldn’t mind seeing NAFTA, where you’d go by a different name, where you make a separate deal with Canada and a separate deal with Mexico because you’re talking about a very different two countries.

But I wouldn’t mind seeing a separate deal with Canada, where you have one type of product, so to speak, and a separate deal with Mexico.

These are two very difficult countries.  It’s been a lousy deal for the United States from day one.  We lose a lot of money with Canada, and we lose a fortune with Mexico.  And it’s not going to happen like that anymore.

I mean, Mexico has taken our car companies, a big percentage of them.  And we can’t do that.  And, look, the American worker agrees with me.  Obviously, the stock market agrees because when you look at what’s going on with the stocks, they’re starting to see I’m right.

But if you take the European Union and you see the kind of tariff they charge, and then we don’t, that’s called, “not fair trade.”  I want fair trade.  I like free trade, but I want fair trade.  At a minimum, I want fair trade.

And we’re going to have it for our workers and for our companies.  And you know what?  The other side understands it.

To be honest with you, they cannot believe that they’ve gotten away with this for so many decades.

Q    Canada, the UK, some of our closest allies are complaining long and loud about these new tariffs.  What do you say to them?

THE PRESIDENT:  They’re our allies but they take advantage of us economically.  And so I agree — I love Canada.  I love Mexico.  I love them.  But Mexico is making over $100 billion a year and they’re not helping us with our border because they have strong laws and we have horrible laws.  We have horrible border laws.  They have strong — they could solve our border problem if they wanted, but they don’t want to.  And when they want to, then I’ll be happy.

But I think we have a good chance of doing some great trade deals, and we’ll make America great again.  Right?  That’s what we’re doing.  But America has picked up — we’ve made about $8 trillion in value since — you know, we’re double the size of the economy of China.  We’ve picked up a lot of value, a lot of wealth, since I’ve been President.  More than $8 trillion.  And that’s a very low number because we’re talking stock market wealth.  I’m talking about beyond that.

Our companies are doing great, we’re doing great, our military is rebuilding.  We have a lot of great things going.  We’re going to straighten out trade.  The trade is going to be easy.

And other countries understand.  You know, when I talk to them, they look at me — and this is in closed doors, not for you people — and they essentially say, “We can’t believe we’ve gotten away with this for so long.”  It’s like, you guys can’t believe you’ve gotten away with it for so long.

Q    (Inaudible.)

THE PRESIDENT:  I want everyone to watch.  Because I’ll tell you what, we have such a great country.  Right now, at this level, I don’t think we’ve ever been, on an economic scale — you look at the numbers: 3.8 percent.  We have the lowest numbers of unemployment that we’ve had — is it 50 years?  I think it’s 50.  Fifty years, right?  So we have the best — we have some of the best economic numbers we’ve ever had as a nation.  And that goes a long way.  And we’re building something very special.  Just remember, we’re twice the size — our economy — twice the size of China.

Good meeting today.  I think it’s a great start.

Q    What’s on the agenda for Camp David?

THE PRESIDENT:  Just a little relaxation and a lot of work.  We have a lot of calls set up.  I’m calling a lot of the foreign leaders.  I’m negotiating trade deals.  I’m working.  I’m working hard for you people.

Have a good time.  Thank you.

END

US. Sec. of Defense Mattis China Opening Statement at
IISS Shangri-La Dialogue June 2, 2018

;

Remarks by Secretary Mattis at Plenary Session of the 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue

Press Operations

Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis; John Chipman, Director-General and Chief Executive, IISS

June 2, 2018

Q:  You have mentioned the South China Sea quite extensively in your speech, Mr. Secretary.  So my question is related to the U.S.-Philippine alliance.  Because in 2014, President Obama, when he was visiting Manila, was asked twice by a journalist if Philippine-occupied features and Filipino public vessels in the South China Sea are covered by the 1951 U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty.  And twice, he sidelined the question.

When Secretary Hillary Clinton was asked the same question, she said that she does not to discuss hypothetical scenarios.  But let me just ask the same question of you, Mr. Secretary, because I think the answer to this question is very important as to how the Duterte administration is going to move ahead with its own maritime security policy.

So in essence the question is, are Filipino public vessels and Philippine-occupied features in the South China Sea covered by the 1951 U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty?  Thank you.

SEC. MATTIS:  Yes, thank you.  It's good to see someone without my color hair here, young man.  I appreciate that.

The -- let me tell you that when we have discussions on these matters, the reason why public figures do not want to give specific answers is that these are complex issues.  And when you start saying, "yes, no, black, white" -- we have been on the record about international tribunals that say there is no such thing as a nine-dash line, or is no legal basis for this -- we stand by international law.  We stand by international tribunals.  We listen to each nation's concerns.  And to simply turn it into a -- a military or non-military response is -- is a shortchanging of the issue.

This is what diplomacy is all about.  Diplomacy is all about taking contrary perspectives and finding common ground.  And we've got to try to do that in this world.  Those of us who have worn uniforms, those who wear uniforms today, are keenly aware of the cost of war, and there has got to be a commitment, not a, "Well, when it suits me, I'll listen to other nations."  Not, "When it suits me, I'll listen to international tribunals."

It's go to be that we actually want to live by these rules, these rules that have allowed China to recover many people from the depths of poverty and bring up their quality of life; these rules have helped China.  There is a reason why China, I believe, will eventually come to grips with the needs and the expectations of the neighbors around them.

And further, I would just tell you that we maintain confidentiality at times in these efforts, and I -- you know, I mean it's a free and open press here, and I -- I support that, but at the same time, you can often do most of your good work and setting the conditions for a path ahead by not locking yourself into public statements where, understandably, people take each word separately apart and now pretty soon you're -- you're locked into positions that do not allow the diplomats to find common ground.

So I'm not trying to give a -- a civics class here, I just want you to understand why in many cases those who actually carry the responsibility do not go for, "It's my way or the highway," or there's only one position.  That would -- might very well be a going in position, and we stand by our treaty allies, but this is a discussion between the current administration in the Manila and in Washington D.C., and it's not one that can be answered as simply as your question would indicate.

MR. CHIPMAN:  And from Malaysia, Dr. (Ngao Chao Bing ?).

Q:  Hello.  Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.  So the reason the National Security Strategy document and a National Defense Strategy document of the United States government have identified China and Russia as the main concerns, and basically the strategic adversaries in the coming years, I assume, is the position.

As I understand the -- for a long time, the U.S. strategy is trying not to create -- it will have a unifier erosion (inaudible) and try to drive a wedge between China and Russia, but now the documents seem to actually push them to work together even further.  So is that really -- I'm just wondering -- is that really a wise move to put China and Russia and make them actually work much closer in these documents?  Thank you.

SEC. MATTIS:  Yes.  If that's what the documents appear to do -- I've got to go back and read them again, because our view is that with both those nations with great power competition and at levels that we had hoped we'd see be characterized more by cooperation and collaboration -- if the competition is going to grow more strident then that's what we don't want to have happen.

And in terms of their relationship I think it's -- from my review its objective fact that Russia has more in common with Western Europe and the United States than they have in common with China.  I believe China has more in common with Pacific Ocean nations and the United States and India than they have in common with Russia.  I think there's a natural non-convergence of interest.  There may be short-term convergence in the event they want to contradict international tribunals or try muscling their way into certain circumstances but my view -- I would not be wasting my time going to Beijing at the end of the month if I really thought that's the only option between us and China.  What would be the point of it?  I've got more important things to do.

I believe that what we're going to see is at some point in both Moscow and Beijing they are going to recognize the reality of what we see in this room: many different nations all sitting down together all trying to find a way forward with respect for each other's internal dynamics, each other's culture and not finding this as a reason why we cannot work together.  We all know we can work together.

We have worked closely with Russia to defeat fascism and with China to defeat fascism.  We have worked closely with other nations that we had open war with: with Germany, with Japan after World War II.  There is no need for this to go in the direction you're referring to of those two against the world.

There are obviously a lot of nations allied with us.  There's a lot of nations collaborating and partnering with us but those nations and us, combined have a desire for peace and figured out how we can find a way through these disagreements in a positive, productive, relationship that's competitive certainly but does not have to be combative and that we all have to work hard at that.

But I will go back and read the documents again -- after you go through it about 30 times before you sign it you can sometimes start to see the forest for the trees.  So, thanks for bringing that up.  I'll take a look at it.  It's certainly not how we see the world.

MR CHIPMAN:  In about two minutes we will move immediately to the second plenary on the important issue of de-escalating the North Korean crisis, but I hope you all agree with me that we have had just now a very clear statement from the U.S. secretary of defense.  And a tremendous conversation with the secretary of defense in command of the subject matter, the issues, the strategy, and defense diplomatic execution.  And please join me in thanking him for these 45 minutes. (Applause.)

Q:  You have mentioned the South China Sea quite extensively in your speech, Mr. Secretary.  So my question is related to the U.S.-Philippine alliance.  Because in 2014, President Obama, when he was visiting Manila, was asked twice by a journalist if Philippine-occupied features and Filipino public vessels in the South China Sea are covered by the 1951 U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty.  And twice, he sidelined the question.

When Secretary Hillary Clinton was asked the same question, she said that she does not to discuss hypothetical scenarios.  But let me just ask the same question of you, Mr. Secretary, because I think the answer to this question is very important as to how the Duterte administration is going to move ahead with its own maritime security policy.

So in essence the question is, are Filipino public vessels and Philippine-occupied features in the South China Sea covered by the 1951 U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty?  Thank you.

SEC. MATTIS:  Yes, thank you.  It's good to see someone without my color hair here, young man.  I appreciate that.

The -- let me tell you that when we have discussions on these matters, the reason why public figures do not want to give specific answers is that these are complex issues.  And when you start saying, "yes, no, black, white" -- we have been on the record about international tribunals that say there is no such thing as a nine-dash line, or is no legal basis for this -- we stand by international law.  We stand by international tribunals.  We listen to each nation's concerns.  And to simply turn it into a -- a military or non-military response is -- is a shortchanging of the issue.

This is what diplomacy is all about.  Diplomacy is all about taking contrary perspectives and finding common ground.  And we've got to try to do that in this world.  Those of us who have worn uniforms, those who wear uniforms today, are keenly aware of the cost of war, and there has got to be a commitment, not a, "Well, when it suits me, I'll listen to other nations."  Not, "When it suits me, I'll listen to international tribunals."

It's go to be that we actually want to live by these rules, these rules that have allowed China to recover many people from the depths of poverty and bring up their quality of life; these rules have helped China.  There is a reason why China, I believe, will eventually come to grips with the needs and the expectations of the neighbors around them.

And further, I would just tell you that we maintain confidentiality at times in these efforts, and I -- you know, I mean it's a free and open press here, and I -- I support that, but at the same time, you can often do most of your good work and setting the conditions for a path ahead by not locking yourself into public statements where, understandably, people take each word separately apart and now pretty soon you're -- you're locked into positions that do not allow the diplomats to find common ground.

So I'm not trying to give a -- a civics class here, I just want you to understand why in many cases those who actually carry the responsibility do not go for, "It's my way or the highway," or there's only one position.  That would -- might very well be a going in position, and we stand by our treaty allies, but this is a discussion between the current administration in the Manila and in Washington D.C., and it's not one that can be answered as simply as your question would indicate.

MR. CHIPMAN:  And from Malaysia, Dr. (Ngao Chao Bing ?).

Q:  Hello.  Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.  So the reason the National Security Strategy document and a National Defense Strategy document of the United States government have identified China and Russia as the main concerns, and basically the strategic adversaries in the coming years, I assume, is the position.

As I understand the -- for a long time, the U.S. strategy is trying not to create -- it will have a unifier erosion (inaudible) and try to drive a wedge between China and Russia, but now the documents seem to actually push them to work together even further.  So is that really -- I'm just wondering -- is that really a wise move to put China and Russia and make them actually work much closer in these documents?  Thank you.

SEC. MATTIS:  Yes.  If that's what the documents appear to do -- I've got to go back and read them again, because our view is that with both those nations with great power competition and at levels that we had hoped we'd see be characterized more by cooperation and collaboration -- if the competition is going to grow more strident then that's what we don't want to have happen.

And in terms of their relationship I think it's -- from my review its objective fact that Russia has more in common with Western Europe and the United States than they have in common with China.  I believe China has more in common with Pacific Ocean nations and the United States and India than they have in common with Russia.  I think there's a natural non-convergence of interest.  There may be short-term convergence in the event they want to contradict international tribunals or try muscling their way into certain circumstances but my view -- I would not be wasting my time going to Beijing at the end of the month if I really thought that's the only option between us and China.  What would be the point of it?  I've got more important things to do.

I believe that what we're going to see is at some point in both Moscow and Beijing they are going to recognize the reality of what we see in this room: many different nations all sitting down together all trying to find a way forward with respect for each other's internal dynamics, each other's culture and not finding this as a reason why we cannot work together.  We all know we can work together.

We have worked closely with Russia to defeat fascism and with China to defeat fascism.  We have worked closely with other nations that we had open war with: with Germany, with Japan after World War II.  There is no need for this to go in the direction you're referring to of those two against the world.

There are obviously a lot of nations allied with us.  There's a lot of nations collaborating and partnering with us but those nations and us, combined have a desire for peace and figured out how we can find a way through these disagreements in a positive, productive, relationship that's competitive certainly but does not have to be combative and that we all have to work hard at that.

But I will go back and read the documents again -- after you go through it about 30 times before you sign it you can sometimes start to see the forest for the trees.  So, thanks for bringing that up.  I'll take a look at it.  It's certainly not how we see the world.

MR CHIPMAN:  In about two minutes we will move immediately to the second plenary on the important issue of de-escalating the North Korean crisis, but I hope you all agree with me that we have had just now a very clear statement from the U.S. secretary of defense.  And a tremendous conversation with the secretary of defense in command of the subject matter, the issues, the strategy, and defense diplomatic execution.  And please join me in thanking him for these 45 minutes. (Applause.)

Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo Remarks at a Press Availability

Spellman Room, Lotte Palace Hotel

New York City

May 31, 2018

SECRETARY POMPEO: Good afternoon, everyone. As you know, in addition to my meeting with Vice Chairman Kim Yong-chol, we have teams in Singapore and at the DMZ working with their North Korean counterparts to prepare for President Trump and Chairman Kim’s expected summit in Singapore. Through these series of meetings, I am confident we are moving in the right direction.   Today, Vice Chairman Kim and I discussed how our countries could come together and take advantage of the unique opportunity that our two leaders have created through their visions of the future that they have so clearly articulated. Vice Chairman Kim Yong-chol is now planning to travel to Washington to deliver a personal letter from Chairman Kim Jong-un. The proposed summit offers a historic opening for President Trump and Chairman Kim to boldly lead the United States and the DPRK into a new era of peace, prosperity, and security. Our two countries face a pivotal moment in our relationship in which it could be nothing short of tragic to let this opportunity go to waste. In my conversations with Chairman Kim Jong-un in Pyongyang and today with Vice Chairman Kim Yong-chol, I have been very clear that President Trump and the United States objective is very consistent and well known: the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. President Trump has also made it clear that if Kim Jong-un denuclearizes, there is a brighter path for North Korea. We envision a strong, connected, and secure, prosperous North Korea that maintains its cultural heritage but is integrated into the community of nations. We think that working together, the people of the United States and North Korea can create a future defined by friendship and collaboration, not by mistrust and fear and threats. We sincerely hope that Chairman Kim Jong-un shares this positive vision for the future. We expect both leaders to enter the summit in Singapore, if it proceeds, with their eyes wide open and with a clear understanding of the possibilities for the future. If these talks are successful, it will truly be historic. It will take bold leadership from Chairman Kim Jong-un if we are able to seize this once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to change the course for the world. President Trump and I believe Chairman Kim is the kind of leader who can make those kinds of decisions, and that in the coming weeks and months we will have the opportunity to test whether or not this is the case. Happy to take a couple questions. MS NAUERT: Our first question – and one question each, please – goes to Nick Wadhams from Bloomberg. Nick, go ahead. QUESTION: Thanks. Mr. Secretary, last night the State Department told us that the U.S. would be looking for a historic commitment from North Korea before the summit would go ahead. Today you ended talks with Kim Yong-chol early. Can you talk about why you did that? Did you get the commitment you sought and do the U.S. and North Korea now agree on what denuclearization would mean? SECRETARY POMPEO: So that’s a (inaudible) matter. We didn’t end the talks early. We had a set series of items that we wanted to make sure we covered, topics which we made sure that we were clear on in terms of what our expectations were and their expectations in return of us. We achieved that. This is a difficult, difficult challenge. Make no mistake about it. There remains a great deal of work to do. And we made progress here as well as at the same time made progress in the other venues that conversations were taking place. We had all the time we needed today to make the progress that was achievable during our time here in New York City. MS NAUERT: Our next question goes to Michael Gordon from The Wall Street Journal. QUESTION: Sir, following up on that, a senior State Department official – same person who spoke to us last night – also indicated that the United States hopes to persuade North Korea that its security doesn’t depend on nuclear weapons. You’ve now had three meetings with them and spent some hours with them. Do you feel that you’ve been successful yet in doing that, or is the difficult in settling this issue the reason why President Trump is now talking about the possibility of having two or three summits and not just trying to break the back of these issues in a single meeting? SECRETARY POMPEO: Yeah, this is – look, make no mistake about it. President Trump, this administration completely understands how hard this problem is. There is a long history where North Korea has viewed its nuclear program as providing the security that it needed for the regime. The effort now is to come to a set of understandings which convince the North Koreans of what President Trump has said. If we’re able to achieve it, if the North Koreans are prepared in fact to denuclearize – this includes all elements of their nuclear program – if we convince them of that, that in fact their security is greater, that in fact the real threat to their security is the continued holding onto of that nuclear weapons program and not the converse. We’ve had lots of conversations around that. The true test, of course, comes when we actually achieve this, but many conversations have been had about how we might proceed, what the path might be forward so that we can achieve both the denuclearization that the world demands of North Korea and the security assurances that would be required for them to allow us to achieve that. MS NAUERT: Next one to Martha Raddatz from ABC News. QUESTION: Secretary Pompeo, you call it a proposed summit. Will we find out whether it’s a go tomorrow? And also, you looked the vice chairman in the eyes. You have been with him in the room. What accounted for the progress? This has been such a roller coaster ride. The summit was off; we’ve gone from fire and fury to this. So talk about what accounted for the change, and do you worry that you could still change back? SECRETARY POMPEO: So Martha, I have had the chance to meet Chairman Kim Jong-un twice and now Kim Yong-chol three times. I’ve spent a great deal of time with each of them. I believe they are contemplating a path forward where they can make a strategic shift, one that their country has not been prepared to make before. This will obviously be their decision. They’ll have to make that. They’ll have to choose – as I just spoke about, they’ll have to choose a path that is fundamentally different than the one that their country has proceeded on for decades. It should not be to anyone’s surprise that there will be moments along the way that this won’t be straightforward, that there’ll be things that look hard and times it appears there’s a roadblock and sometimes, perhaps, even perceived as insurmountable. Our mission is incredibly clear. It is to continue to push forward – the President has directed me to push forward to test the proposition that we can achieve that outcome. So I know everyone’s following this minute by minute and hour by hour. This is going to be a process that will take days and weeks to work our way through. There will be tough moments, there will be difficult times. I’ve had some difficult conversations with them as well. They’ve given it right back to me too. There is – we’re decades into this challenge, and so one not ought to be either surprised or frightened or deterred by moments where it looks like there are challenges and difficulties, things that can’t be bridged. Our mission is to bridge them so that we can achieve this historic outcome. QUESTION: And on the proposed summit, will we know tomorrow whether there will actually be a summit? SECRETARY POMPEO: Don’t know. Don’t know the answer to that. MS NAUERT: And our final question goes to Adam Shapiro with Fox News. SECRETARY POMPEO: Let me just say, Martha, while we may not know tomorrow, I will tell you we’ve made real progress in the last 72 hours toward setting the conditions, right – so your question really goes to what are the conditions. The conditions are putting President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong-un in a place where we think there could be real progress made by the two of them meeting. It does no good if we’re in a place where we don’t think there’s real opportunity to place them together. We’ve made real progress towards that in the last 72 hours. MS NAUERT: And Adam from Fox. QUESTION: Secretary Pompeo, you talk about complete denuclearization of the peninsula, so my question is about this and the impact on our allies. What concern does the United States have about exposing South Korea and our Asian allies, like Japan, to greater, perhaps, Chinese influence if there is as part of a deal in the future a draw-down of U.S. military presence in South Korea? SECRETARY POMPEO: I’m not going to talk about today nor at any time during the negotiations about the elements of what the shape of the agreement looks like. That’s – those are things that ought to be held so that the leaders have all the freedom they need to make the right decision. So with respect to the draw-down, it’s obviously a DOD issue. I’m not going to speak to that today. What I can say is this: I’ve been the Secretary of State now for 30-odd days, I think. There is no daylight between the South Koreans, the Japanese, and the United States with respect to our approach to how we resolve this issue with respect to North Korea. I have spoken to my counterparts there, I’ve spoken to President Moon there. We understand their concerns. We understand the risks that can be posed to them. And an agreement that we reach will provide an outcome that each of those countries can sign on to as well. QUESTION: But is there the potential for the creation, for lack of a better term, of a vacuum that the Chinese could then move in, whether it be economic, political, or militarily? SECRETARY POMPEO: The Chinese are moving all around the world today. Let’s be clear. The risk of that is real everywhere, not just in this particular space. We’re keenly aware of it, and I’m – I am confident that the things we’re talking about with respect to North Korea will not enhance the risk of that to any significant degree. We wouldn’t do that to the South Koreans or the Japanese, two of our most important allies in the region. MS NAUERT: Okay, everyone. Thank you. SECRETARY POMPEO: Thank you very much. MS NAUERT: Thank you so much. Good to see you. QUESTION: Are we going to Singapore?

BREAKING NEWS: Top North Korean official headed to NY for summit talks

May 29, 2018

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Top Stories Today - BREAKING NEWS Out Of North Korea

May 27, 2018

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On May 27, 2018, published

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BREAKING NEWS -  MAY 24, 2018:

ACCORDING TO THE WHITE HOUSE

President Trump Letter to DPRK Chairman Kim Jong Un

President Trump's 'dramatic and positive' achievement

According to the White House May 22nd, 2018: South Korean President Jae-in Moon visited the White House yesterday, speaking with President Trump about recent developments in North Korea. The US-South Korea bilateral comes weeks before President Trump's planned summit with Kim Jong Un in Singapore.

"President Trump has been able to achieve this dramatic and positive change that you see right now," President Moon said. "There have been many agreements between the United States and North Korea previously, but this will be the first time that there will be an agreement between the leaders."

President Trump emphasized that next month's summit is contingent on North Korea's willingness to engage on key issues, including denuclearization. "There are certain conditions that we want, and I think we'll get those conditions. And if we don't, we don't have the meeting," President Trump said. "It has a chance to be a great, great meeting for North Korea and a great meeting for the world."

President Moon of the Republic of Korea Before Bilateral Meeting

FOREIGN POLICY

Issued on: May 22, 2018

Oval Office

12:06 P.M. EDT

PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Thank you very much.  It’s a great honor to have President Moon of South Korea with us.  We’ve become great friends over the years.  And it’s now — we’ve now known each other for quite some time.

We’re working on many things.  Obviously, North Korea is the big one.  No matter how big trade is, North Korea, in this case, is the big one.  And we’ll be discussing that.  We’ll also be discussing trade.  We have a very big trade arrangement that we’re renegotiating right now with South Korea.  They’ve been excellent people to work with for the Trump administration.  And we will have some pretty good news, I think, on trade.  And we’ll be discussing other things.

But the big topic will be Singapore and the meeting.  See what happens, whether or not it happens.  If it does, that will be great.  It will be a great thing for North Korea.  And if it doesn’t, that’s okay too.  Whatever it is, it is.

But I look forward to spending quite a bit of time with the President.  And I think a lot of good things will happen.  I want to thank everybody for being here.

Mr. President, it’s a great honor.  Thank you.

PRESIDENT MOON:  (As interpreted.)  Well, I’d like to thank you, Mr. President, for your warm hospitality and for sharing much of your time with me.  I know you have a very busy domestic calendar, as well as the all-important U.S.-North Korea summit approaching.

I heard the tragic news that many innocent lives were lost due to the shootings in a Texas high school a few days ago.  So I’d like to convey my condolences to you and the American people.

On a brighter note, I would like to congratulate you for the safe return of the American citizens who had been detained in North Korea.  Thanks to your vision of achieving peace through strength, as well as your strong leadership, we’re looking forward to the first-ever U.S.-North Korea summit.  And we find ourselves standing one step closer to the dream of achieving complete denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula and world peace.

All this was possible because of you, Mr. President.  And I have no doubt that you will be able to complete — accomplish a historic feat that no one had been able to achieve in the decades past.

I have to say that the fate and the future of the Korean Peninsula hinge on this.  And as such, I’ll spare no effort to the end to support the success of the upcoming U.S.-North Korea summit, and stand with you all along the way, Mr. President.

PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Thank you very much.

Q    Mr. President, do you think President Kim is serious about denuclearization?

PRESIDENT TRUMP:  I do think he’s serious.  I think he would like to see that happen.  At the same time, he’s going into a future that’s different from what they’ve had.  But I think he’s absolutely very serious.  Yes.

Q    Do you think the summit is going to happen?

PRESIDENT TRUMP:  One second.  Go ahead.  Go ahead, John.

Q    Can you give us an update, sir, just on where things stand with the summit?  President Moon’s national security advisor, on the way here, seemed to think that things are on track and that this will indeed happen.

PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Well, we’re moving along.  And we’ll see what happens.  There are certain conditions that we want, and I think we’ll get those conditions.  And if we don’t, we don’t have the meeting.  And frankly, it has a chance to be a great, great meeting for North Korea and a great meeting for the world.  If it doesn’t happen, maybe it will happen later.  Maybe it will happen at a different time.  But we will see.

But we are talking.  The meeting is scheduled, as you know, on June 12th in Singapore.  And whether or not it happens, you’ll be knowing pretty soon.  But we’re talking right now.

Q    Do you have an idea of how denuclearization would take place?  Would it be all at once?

PRESIDENT TRUMP:  I do.  I have a very strong idea how it takes place.  And it must take place.  That’s what we’re talking about.  It must take place.

But I have a very strong idea, and I have very strong opinions on the subject.  I also have very strong opinions that North Korea has a chance to be a great country, and it can’t be a great country under the circumstances that they’re living right now.  But North Korea has a chance, really, to be a great country.  And I think they should seize the opportunity.  And we’ll soon find out whether or not they want to do that.

Yes.

Q    Mr. President, have you spoken to Kim Jong-un?

PRESIDENT TRUMP:  I don’t want to say that.  I don’t want —

Q    Do you trust Kim Jong-un, going into these meetings?

PRESIDENT TRUMP:  There’s no reason to discuss that.  I can say this: That for a short period of time, we’ve been dealing with North Korea, and it’s been a, you know, good experience.  We have three hostages back.  They’re home.  They’re living with their families.  They’re very, very happy.  And so I can only speak for a very short period of time.  But it’s been a relationship that seems to be working, and we’ll see how long it continues to work.  Hopefully it’s going to work for a long time.

Q    Unrelated, Mr. President, can you tell us more about your meeting with Rod Rosenstein and Director Wray yesterday?

PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Well, it was just a very routine meeting.  As you know, the Congress would like to see documents opened up.  A lot of people are saying they had spies in my campaign.  If they had spies in my campaign, that would be a disgrace to this country.  That would be one of the biggest insults that anyone has ever seen, and it would be very illegal, aside from everything else.  It would make, probably, every political event ever look like small potatoes.

So we want to make sure that there weren’t.  I hope there weren’t, frankly.  But some man got paid — based on what I read in the newspapers and on what you reported, some person got paid a lot of money.  That’s not a normal situation, the kind of money you’re talking about.  So hopefully that would be — and I think the Department of Justice wants to get down to it.  And I can tell you Congress does.

So hopefully they’ll all be able to get together.  General Kelly is going to be setting up a meeting between Congress and the various representatives, and they’ll be able to open up documents, take a look, and find out what happened.  But if they had spies in my campaign, during my campaign, for political purposes, that would be unprecedented in the history of our country.

Yes.

Q    Can you give us an update on trade talks with China?  Is there a deal about ZTE?

PRESIDENT TRUMP:  No.

Q    And what specifically have you agreed?

PRESIDENT TRUMP:  No.  President Xi and I have a great relationship, as President Moon can attest.  But there is no deal.  We will see what happens.  We are discussing deals.  We’re discussing various deals.  We can do a 301.  We can do — where we don’t need China, where we can just say, look, this is what we want, this is what we think is fair.  That’s always a possibility if a negotiated deal doesn’t work out.

As I said, we lost $500 billion a year for many years.  And then it varied from $100 billion to $500 billion.  When you’re losing $500 billion a year, you can’t lose in terms of a negotiation.  It’s really easy to win.  But I want this to be a great deal for the United States, and I want it to be a very good deal for China, too, if that’s possible.  It may not be possible.

As far as ZTE is concerned, the President asked me to look into it, and I am doing that.  And don’t forget, for the ones who say, oh, gee, maybe Trump is getting a little bit easy — ZTE, we closed it.  It wasn’t another administration.  It was this administration that closed it.  It’s a phone company, for those that don’t know.  A very large phone company.  But it’s also a phone company that buys a large portion of its parts that make up these phones that are sold all over the world from American companies.

So when you do that, you’re really hurting American companies, also.  So I’m looking at it.  But we were the ones that closed it.  It wasn’t done by previous administrations.  It was done by us.  So we’ll see what happens.

But as a favor to the President, I am absolutely taking a look at it.  A lot of the stories on trade were incorrectly written, and I’m not saying that’s the reporter’s fault; I’m saying that I’m not talking about the trade deal.  I don’t like to talk about deals until they’re done.  So we’ll see what happens.  But that deal — I will say, that deal could be much different from the deal that finally emerges.  And it may be a much better deal for the United States.

Q    Mr. President, do you have confidence in Rod Rosenstein?

PRESIDENT TRUMP:  What’s your next question, please?

Q    I’m a reporter from —

PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Excuse me, I have the President of South Korea here, okay?

Q    Yes, I have a question on —

PRESIDENT TRUMP:  He doesn’t want to hear these questions, if you don’t mind.

Q    President Trump, I’m a reporter from South Korea.  How much confidence and trust do you have in my President in playing the mediator role in resolving this North Korea issue and the denuclearization process?

PRESIDENT TRUMP:  I have great confidence in your President.  I think that he’s brought a different perspective to the talks with North Korea.  He wants to be able to make a deal.  Now, you’ve had some very hardline administrations, and you have President Moon, and you’ve had others before President Moon, who also had more or less this attitude.

I think he’s a very capable person.  I think he’s an extremely competent man.  I think he’s a very good person.  And I think he wants to have what’s good for the Korean Peninsula, not just North or South — for the entire Korean Peninsula.

So I have tremendous confidence in President Moon.  And I think that his way — the way he is — really is helping us to potentially make a deal.  Whether the deal gets made or not, who knows.  It’s a deal.  Who knows.  You never know about deals.  If you go into deals that are 100 percent certain, it doesn’t happen.  If you go into deals that have no chance, and it happens, and sometimes happens easily.  I’ve made a lot of deals.  I know deals, I think, better than anybody knows deals.  You never really know.  And that’s why I say to you.

But I will tell you, this is a good man and he is a very capable man.  And I think South Korea is very lucky to have him.  Do you want to interpret that for him, so he can hear?  Because, you know, he’s not hearing what we’re doing here.  Go ahead.

Wait, we’ll just let that be interpreted.

Q    He might surprise you, Mr. President.

PRESIDENT TRUMP:  He probably does.  He probably knows better than we do.

Did I do a good job?  (Laughter.)  Huh?  I can’t do better than that.  That’s called an A-plus rating, right?  I can’t do better —

Okay, we’ll take a couple more.  Go ahead.

Q    Mr. President, what are your conditions for meeting with Kim Jong-un?  You said you had —

PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Well, I’d rather not say.  But we are working on something.  And, you know, there’s a chance that it will work out.  There’s a chance; there’s a very substantial chance it won’t work out.  I don’t want to waste a lot of time, and I’m sure he doesn’t want to waste a lot of time.  So there’s a very substantial chance that it won’t work out, and that’s okay.  That doesn’t mean it won’t work out over a period of time.  But it may not work out for June 12th.  But there’s a good chance that we’ll have the meeting.

Q    Mr. President, if I could ask you and President Moon this question.  In terms of denuclearization, should it be an all-in-one?  Or could it be incremental, with incentives along the way for Kim Jong-un to denuclearize?

PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Well, all in one would be nice, I can tell you.  I’m not going to go beyond that.  It would certainly be better if it were all in one.  Does it have to be?  I don’t think I want to totally commit myself.  But all in one would be a lot better.  Or at least for physical reasons, over a very short period of time.  You know, you do have some physical reasons that it may not be able to do exactly that.  So for physical reasons, over a very short period of time.  Essentially, that would be all in one.

Q    President Trump, I’m a reporter from South Korea.  If North Korea and Kim Jong-un decide CVID, will you literally guarantee the safety of the regime of North Korea?

PRESIDENT TRUMP:  I will guarantee his safety.  Yes, we will guarantee his safety.  And we’ve talked about that from the beginning.  He will be safe.  He will be happy.  His country will be rich.  His country will be hardworking and very prosperous.  They’re very great people.  They’re hardworking, great people.

Look at what happened with South Korea.  Don’t forget, we helped South Korea.  We have spent trillions of dollars — not billions — trillions of dollars over many, many years.  We helped South Korea.  And South Korea is one of the most incredible countries in terms of what they do.  You know that.  That’s what you are.  That’s where you’re from.  Same people.  Same people.

So, yeah, I think that he will be extremely happy if something works out.  And if it doesn’t work out, honestly, he can’t be happy.  But he has a chance to do something that maybe has never been done before.  And I think it would be — if you look 25 years into the future, 50 years into the future, he will be able to look back and be very proud of what he did for North Korea and, actually, for the world.  But he will be very proud of what he did for North Korea.

And just to finish that, because it’s a very important question, South Korea, China, and Japan — and I’ve spoken to all three — one I happen to have right here — they will be willing to help and, I believe, invest very, very large sums of money into helping to make North Korea great.

Q    Mr. President, what do you want to hear from President Moon about his own summit with Kim Jong-un?  What can he tell you as you’re preparing for the meeting in Singapore?

PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Well, that’s what we’re here for.  He’s going to tell me.  He’s got his own meetings that he’s had.  We’re going to discuss that.  He may have a meeting coming up; he may not.  The word is that he may not.  It may be directly with us.  It may go directly to us in Singapore, or it may be at a later date.  But that’s one of the reasons that he’s here, to talk about that.

Q    Is there is anything you want to ask him specifically that you can tell us?

PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Nothing.  No.  We speak a lot on the phone.  This should not be that long a meeting, actually.

Q    You mean President Moon may have a meeting with Kim Jong-un instead of yourself?

PRESIDENT TRUMP:  He may or may not.  He may or may not.  Right now he doesn’t know whether or not he has a meeting.  But he may or may not have a meeting with Kim Jong-un.

Q    Mr. President, are you pleased with how the trade talks with China went?

PRESIDENT TRUMP:  No, not really.  I think that they’re a start, but we need something — look, China has been — I really call it a dereliction of duties.  That if you look at it — it’s called — in the military, they’d say it’s dereliction of duty.  What happened to our country, that our representatives allowed other countries — and I’m not just talking about China; China is the big one — to take advantage of us on trade the way we’ve been taken advantage of.  So China, as an example, has made a fortune.  I mean, a transfer of wealth like nobody has ever seen in history.  They’re the big one.  They’re almost all bad, but China is the big one.

So, no, I’m not satisfied, but we’ll see what happens.  We have a long way to go.  But I wanted to go fairly quickly.  You know, you’re talking about numbers like that; you’re talking about billions of dollars a week.  Okay?  So when they say, “Oh, let’s meet in a couple of weeks” — oh, that’s $2 billion, right?  I view it that way.  You know, we’re talking about billions of dollars a week that we suffer, we lose.  And so we’re looking to go quickly.

I will say I’m a little disappointed, because when Kim Jong-un had the meeting with President Xi, in China, the second meeting — the first meeting we knew about — the second meeting — I think there was a little change in attitude from Kim Jong-un.  So I don’t like that.  I don’t like that.  I don’t like it from the standpoint of China.

Now, I hope that’s not true, because we have — I have a great relationship with President Xi.  He’s a friend of mine.  He likes me.  I like him.  We have — I mean, that was two of the great days of my life being in China.  It was — I don’t think anybody has ever been treated better in China — ever in their history.  And I just think it was — many of you were there — it was an incredible thing to witness and see.  And we built a very good relationship.  We speak a lot.

But there was a difference when Kim Jong-un left China the second time.  And I think they were dedicating an aircraft carrier that the United States paid for.  Okay?  Because we paid for it.

Q    Do you think China had a role in that?

PRESIDENT TRUMP:  That was built in China.

Q    Do you think China maybe discouraged Kim from having the summit?

PRESIDENT TRUMP:  No, but I think that President Xi is a world-class poker player.  And I’d probably, maybe, doing the same thing that he would do.  But I will say this: There was a somewhat different attitude after that meeting, and I’m a little surprised.  Now, maybe nothing happened.  I’m not blaming anybody, but I’m just saying, maybe nothing happened and maybe it did.

But there was different attitude by the North Korean folks when — after that meeting.  So I don’t think it was a great meeting.  Nobody knew about the meeting, and all of a sudden it was reported that he was in China a second time.  The first time everybody knew about.  The second time it was like a surprise.

And I think things changed after that meeting.  So I can’t say that I’m happy about it.  Okay?

Now, President Moon may have a different opinion.  I would like to have your opinion on that — what you thought of the second meeting with President Xi.  What is your feeling?  You may have an opinion.

And I don’t want to get him in trouble.  He lives right next to China.  You know, he’s not too far away.

PRESIDENT MOON:  (As interpreted.)  Well, first of all, I am very much aware that there are many skeptical views within the United States about whether the upcoming U.S.-North Korea summit will truly be successful and whether the complete denuclearization of North Korea will be realized.

But I don’t think there will be positive developments in history if we just assume that because it all failed in the past, it will fail again.

There have been many agreements between the United States and North Korea previously, but this will be the first time that there will be an agreement between the leaders.

And, moreover, the person who is in charge is President Trump.  And President Trump has been able to achieve this dramatic and positive change that you see right now.  And I have every confidence that President Trump will be able to achieve a historic feat of making the upcoming U.S.-North Korea summit successful and end the Korean War that had been lasting for the past 65 years, and also, along the way, achieve complete denuclearization of North Korea, establish a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, and also normalize relations between the United States and North Korea.  I have every confidence that he will be able to make a historic turnaround in this sense.  And I will spare no effort to provide all necessary support.

And I believe that all of this will lead to a great thing, that it will also guarantee the security of the North Korean regime, and also promise peace and prosperity for North Korea as well.

Q    Mr. President, do you believe that President Xi is committed to peace and committed to North Korea’s denuclearization?

PRESIDENT TRUMP:  I would like to think so.  I hope so.  I mean, we’re dealing mostly on trade.  But you see, when I’m dealing on trade, I have many other things in mind also.  Every time I talk to China about trade, I’m thinking about the border.  Because that border is a very important element in what we’re doing.  It has been cut off largely, but it’s been opened up a little bit lately.  I don’t like that.  I don’t like that.

So we have a very powerful hand on trade.  And when I’m thinking about trade –you know, I read you folks, and you say, “Well, why doesn’t he” — there’s a much bigger picture that I have in mind.  Trade has always been a very important element in my life, in talking about other countries ripping off the United States.  I’ve been watching them do it for 35 years.  I’ve been watching them do that for so many years.

And nothing has changed, other than over the last 15, 20 years it’s gotten worse.  And it’s not just China.  But when I think of trade with China, I’m also thinking about what they’re doing to help us with peace with North Korea.  That’s a very important element.  So we’ll see how it all works out.

But in the end, it will work out.  Can’t tell you exactly how or why, but it always does.  It’s going to work out.  Okay?

Thank you all.  John, you have one more?  Go ahead.

Q    One more, sir.  I’m just wondering, what is your vision for the long game with North Korea?  Is it two Koreas peacefully coexisting?  Or would you like to see reunification at some point down the road?

PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Well, I think what’s going to happen is you’ll start off, certainly, with two Koreas.  And then it’s going to be largely up to them as to whether or not they get together.  You know, that border was artificially imposed many, many years ago — and imposed, to a certain extent and to a very large extent, by us.  It’s an artificial border, but it’s a border that nevertheless, it took seed, and that’s what you have.

I would say that we are looking, certainly, right now, at two Koreas.  Two very successful Koreas.  You’re going to have a very, very successful North Korea, and you’re going to have a very successful — and you already do — South Korea.  I mean, South Korea was in condition that was as bad as North Korea many years ago, when they started this great experiment that worked out so well for them.

Now, you look at Samsung and LG, and the ships that they’re building, and what they’re doing.  It’s incredible.  When I was over there, I flew over plants that are incredible.  What they have done is incredible.  So I see two Koreas, and then ultimately, maybe someday in the future — it wouldn’t be now — but someday in the future, maybe they’ll get together and you’ll go back to one Korea.  And that would be okay with me, too, as long as they both wanted that.

Okay?  Thank you all very much.  Thank you.

Yeah, go ahead.

Q    You mentioned that you were looking into ZTE, as a favor to President Xi.

PRESIDENT TRUMP:  I am, yes.

Q    How do you anticipate that ending up?

PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Well, again, ZTE buys a tremendous amount of equipment and parts for their telephones.  They’re, as you know, the fourth largest in the world.  And they buy them from American companies.  So immediately, when I looked at it, it was my administration that closed them down.  But when I looked at it, I said, “You know, they can pay a big price without necessarily damaging all of these American companies,” which they are, because, you know, you’re talking about tremendous amounts of money and jobs to American companies.

So I envision a very large fine.  I envision, perhaps, new management, new board of directors, very tight security rules.  But we caught them doing bad things.  We caught them — not anybody else.  We caught them doing bad things, and we essentially made it so difficult that it was shut down.

By shutting them down, we’re hurting a lot of American companies, really good American companies.  Don’t — and I will tell you, don’t think that we didn’t hear from them by shutting down this massive phone company.

So what I envision is a very large fine of more than a billion dollars.  Could be a billion-three.  I envision a new management, a new board, and very, very strict security rules.  And I also envision that they will have to buy a big percentage of their parts and equipment from American companies.

Okay?  Thank you all very much.  Thank you.  Thank you.

Q    (Speaks Korean.)  (No translation provided.)

PRESIDENT TRUMP:  He’s a friendly reporter.  They’re friends.  So let them — like you.  Except he kills me.  For a friendly reporter, he kills me.

PRESIDENT MOON:  (Speaks Korean.)  (No translation provided.)

PRESIDENT TRUMP:  And I don’t have to hear the translation because I’m sure I’ve heard it before.  (Laughter.)

Goodbye, everybody.  Thank you.

END

12:42 P.M. EDT

;

---------
 

President Donald Trump dismisses 'Libya model'
for North Korea's denuclearization

According to Aririnag News, Dated May 16th, 2018

U.S. President Donald Trump has ruled out the so-called 'Libya model' for dismantling North Korea's nuclear weapons program, instead offering strong security guarantees to Pyongyang in return for its denuclearization.

He pledged that the U.S. would grant the North such a guarantee if a satisfactory deal is struck.

"But the model, if you look at that model with Gaddafi, that was a total decimation. We went in there to beat him. Now that model would take place if we don't make a deal, most likely. But if we make a deal, I think Kim Jong Un is going to be very, very happy."

The Libyan model, which has been pushed on U.S. news networks by President Trump's National Security Adviser, John Bolton, calls for a quick dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear program with no guarantee of benefits to the regime in the process.

Pushing back against Bolton's remarks, Trump insisted protection for Kim and his regime would be very strong if the regime fully denuclearizes.

"We're willing to do a lot. And he's willing to, I think, do a lot also. And I think we'll actually have a good relationship, assuming we have the meeting and assuming something comes of it. And he'll get protections that will be very strong."

With all signs pointing to Bolton's mentioning of the 'Libya model' being the reason behind North Korea's recent 180-degree turn, the White House has been stressing that's not the model they are incorporating, saying instead a "President Trump model" will be used.

Will Trump's security guarantee be enough to ensure North Korea falls back in line?

With the North Korea-U.S.summit set for June 12th in Singapore, the U.S. and South Korea certainly hope it will be.

Lee Seung-jae, Arirang News.

Dated May 16th, 2018, Breaking its day-long silence since North Korea abruptly called off a high-level dialogue within hours of the scheduled time and threatened to pull out of next month's historic summit between its leader

Kim Jong-un and U.S. President Donald Trump South Korea's presidential Blue House says it will actively perform the role of a mediator to bridge the gap between the two as they appear to have "some difference in stance" ahead of their planned summit.

"The members of the National Security Council standing committee decided to closely coordinate through various channels between South Korea and the U.S. and South and North Korea so that the upcoming North Korea-U.S. summit will be held successfully in the manner of mutual respect."

President Moon is traveling to the U.S. next week for a bilateral summit with his U.S counterpart on the 22nd during which a Blue House official said the South Korean president plans to convey what he and his chief aides have discerned about Pyongyang's position and attitude and vice versa upon return from his U.S trip.

The Blue House and President Moon's key security officials do believe, however, that both North Korea and the U.S. are still serious and sincere about making the June 12th summit happen and

intends to continue discussions with North Korea to hold high-level talks that it cancelled on Wednesday.

"Members of the NSC standing committee reaffirmed their stance that the Panmunjom Declaration reached at the April 27 inter-Korea summit must be carried out without any disruption and agreed to continue consulting with the North to hold the high-level talks at an early date.

"As important and symbolic the April inter-Korean summit was to the South Korean president and his vision for peace on the Korean peninsula, the North Korea, U.S. summit is actually THE meeting where Mr. Moon has been placing his bet on in the grand denuclearization and peace building process on the peninsula.

So, it appears the president who pretty much laid the groundwork up until this point couldn't just step back and watch Pyongyang and Washington drift any further and away from such hard-won opportunity.

Moon Connyoung, Arirang News, the Blue House."

Reporter :jenmoon@arirang.co.kr

Remarks by President Trump at Swearing-
In Ceremony of Mike Pompeo as Secretary of State

May 2nd, 2018

l consequences on Russia for its acts of aggression. And we will soon move our embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, years ahead of schedule. (Applause.)

We are bringing fairness and reciprocity to our economic relationship with China, and protecting our intellectual property from them as well. (Applause.)

And we saw, in your meetings last week with President Macron and Chancellor Merkel, we continue to uphold strength in our time-honored alliances.

But there’s one more thing. Right now, we have an unprecedented opportunity to change the course of history on the Korean Peninsula. I underscore the word “opportunity.” We’re in the beginning stages of the work, and the outcome is certainly yet unknown. But one thing is certain: This administration will not repeat the mistakes of the past. Our eyes are wide open. It’s time to solve this once and for all. A bad deal is not an option. The American people are counting on us to get this right.

We are committed to the permanent, verifiable, irreversible dismantling of North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction program, and to do so without delay.

To my colleagues here, when I say we’re going to do this, I mean “we.” This is a team effort at the State Department and the whole of the United States government.

Mr. President, when you offered me the job to be the Director of CIA, I was honored to lead the world’s finest intelligence corps, and I am incredibly honored and humbled by the opportunity to lead the world’s finest diplomatic corps now. (Applause.)

Mr. President, you read one of — a great quote from the greatest President ever from Kansas. (Laughter.) It was a historic quote, but frankly, things haven’t changed much since then. I’ve been an Army officer, a congressman, the Director of the CIA, now here at State. We have much to do. But in every position I’ve had, I’ve witnessed the skills, expertise, and patriotism of our foreign affairs professionals, whether civil servants or Foreign Service Officers, political appointees or locally employed staff, you all lay it on the line to make sure that America is safe and prosperous and free. Thank you for that. (Applause.)

As I’ve said, and I’ll elaborate more, I want the State Department to get its swagger back. (Laughter.) We need our men and women out at the frontlines, executing American diplomacy with great vigor and energy, and to represent the finest nation in the history of civilization. We should be proud of that, and I’m counting on you all to help communicate in every corner of the world.

Mr. President, I have full confidence that my team here in Washington and around the world under your leadership can and will execute that mission for the benefit of the American people. And I’m eager to work with you all to get that job done.

You all know this is essential work. That’s why you’re here. It’s why I’m here. I look forward to doing this together. Thank you all so much for the warm welcome I have received in these first days. I can’t wait to get after this with you. Thank you again, Mr. President, for your trust and your leadership and your faith in me. Thank you. (Applause.)

END

11:52 A.M. EDT

WASHINGTON (AP, Reuters) — President Donald Trump is trying to hit reset at the State Department on the eve of a critical decision on the Iran nuclear deal and a potential summit with North Korean leader Kim JongUn.

Trump made his first visit to the department on Wednesday for the ceremonial swearing-in of Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, highlighting his relationship with the head of a Cabinet agency he largely neglected during the tenure of Rex Tillerson. The former Exxon Mobil CEO was unceremoniously dumped by Trump as the top U.S. diplomat in March after months of personality and policy clashes.

Tillerson felt undercut in the job and was viewed overseas as an unreliable emissary for the mercurial Trump. Tillerson went unmentioned during Wednesday’s brief ceremony, but Pompeo’s contrasting status was on full display. The former CIA director is personally close to the president and gained stature abroad after his secret visit to North Korea last month to meet with Kim.

“That’s more spirit than I’ve heard from the State Department in a long time,” Trump said as he took the podium to applause from the crowd on ornate seventh floor.

It was a tacit acknowledgement that department morale had suffered under Tillerson, who undertook an unpopular restructuring of the department before he was fired. Pompeo has repeatedly promised to reinvigorate the department.

“I want the State Department to get its swagger back,” he said.

Trump’s visit put a spotlight on his close ties with Pompeo. Tillerson and Trump rarely saw eye to eye on policy, and Trump felt little chemistry with the fellow former business executive.

After a heated debate at the Pentagon over Afghanistan policy last summer, Tillerson reportedly called Trump a “moron” to other officials — and the revelation of the comment in the media irreparably damaged his rapport with the president.

Pompeo, by contrast, developed a strong relationship with Trump in large part through his regular attendance at the president’s daily intelligence briefing at the White House. Trump developed a personal liking for Pompeo during the 2016 campaign, when the then-GOP congressman from Kansas was one of his earliest Washington endorsers.

Pompeo was the top graduate of his West Point class and an Army tank officer, and his credentials and blunt demeanor fit the mold for a top national security aide in Trump’s mind, White House officials said.

At the CIA, Pompeo oversaw a secret back channel to the North Korean government, and on April 1, weeks after his State Department nomination, Pompeo made a secret trip to Pyongyang to meet with Kim in advance of a potential meeting with Trump.

“Right now we have unprecedented opportunity to change the course of history on the Korean Peninsula,” Pompeo said Wednesday, as Trump and Kim move closer to finalizing details on a summit.

Trump has been particularly disdainful of the work done by the State Department during the Obama administration. He has savaged the Iran nuclear deal, which was largely negotiated by former Secretary of State John Kerry, and is expected to pull out of the agreement later this month.

Trump announced that the U.S. would withdraw from the Paris climate accord, another Kerry achievement. And Trump routinely excoriated Hillary Clinton and the department she led for her use of a private email server and the response to the 2012 attack on U.S. facilities In Benghazi, Libya.

Trump’s scorn has continued in office. Trump’s budget proposals have sought to slash the department’s funding by some 30 percent and reduce its ranks. Many officials were shocked and saddened when the president, with Tillerson at his side last year, thanked Russia for expelling U.S. diplomats because it would save money. The White House later said Trump had been joking.

The department has many vacancies at senior positions and has reduced the intake of new diplomats since Trump took office. Although he has complained about the slow pace of Senate confirmations for ambassadorial and senior posts, Trump has not yet formally nominated people for numerous top positions, only three of nine of which are currently occupied.

Pompeo was confirmed last Thursday, and was officially sworn-in hours later by Supreme Court Justice Samuel Alito before he embarked on his first foreign trip as secretary.

President Donald J. Trump spoke today with President Moon Jae-in of the Republic of Korea to discuss the April 27 meeting between President Moon and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. President Trump thanked President Moon for the close coordination between the Republic of Korea and the United States in the lead-up to his meeting, and committed to remain in close contact in the coming weeks. The two leaders agreed that the unprecedented pressure applied by the United States, the Republic of Korea, and the international community through the global Maximum Pressure Campaign has led to this significant moment. President Trump and President Moon emphasized that a peaceful and prosperous future for North Korea is contingent upon its complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization.

STATEMENTS & RELEASES

Readout of President Donald J. Trump’s Call
with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan

FOREIGN POLICY

Issued on: April 28, 2018

President Donald J. Trump spoke today with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan. The leaders affirmed their commitment to achieving the permanent and verifiable denuclearization of North Korea and to continuing their close coordination in advance of talks between the United States and North Korea. They also reiterated the need for North Korea to abandon all weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs. Finally, President Trump noted that he will urge North Korea to promptly resolve its abductions of Japanese citizens.

end main

STATEMENTS & RELEASES

Statement from Vice President Mike Pence on the Inter-Korean Summit

FOREIGN POLICY

Issued on: April 27, 2018

The fact that North Korea has come to the table without the United States making any concessions speaks to the strength of President Trump’s leadership and is a clear sign that the intense pressure of sanctions is working. The Korean peace agreement is a step toward denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, but it is just one step. Any talks, promises, and assurances from North Korea will be met with reservation, vigilance, and verification. Planning for the United States and North Korea Summit continues, but as we’ve said before – the pressure campaign will continue unabated.

WTAS: Support For The Confirmation Of Secretary Of State Mike Pompeo

Issued on: April 27, 2018

House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Ed Royce (R-CA): “From North Korea’s nuclear threats to Iran’s aggression, Mike’s confirmation as Secretary of State comes at a critical time for U.S. foreign policy. In times such as these, it’s clear that we need a stronger, more vibrant State Department to work with and lead our other national security agencies. I’m confident Secretary Pompeo will steer the Department in the right direction, and I look forward to partnering with him to advance America’s interests overseas.”

----------------------

Sen. Johnny Isakson (R-GA): “I’m pleased the Senate has confirmed Mike Pompeo to lead the State Department, where he will have an important opportunity to bolster U.S. diplomatic leadership, provide purposeful direction for the department, and boost the morale of our dedicated Foreign Service officers… Given his experiences as CIA director, Mike Pompeo possesses critical knowledge of how to best leverage our assets at a significant moment in history, especially as our country continues to face threats from North Korea.”

----------------------

Sen. David Perdue (R-GA): “Mike Pompeo is highly qualified and will make our country proud as Secretary of State. Through years of service to our country, he has gained a deep understanding of the complex threats we face across the globe. President Trump is coming up on a critical meeting with North Korea and will need top-notch counsel as he tackles the challenges presented by ISIS, Iran, and our multifaceted relationships with China and Russia. Mike Pompeo is the right man for the job. President Trump and the American people will be well-served with him as our chief diplomat.”

------------------------

Sen. Marco Rubio (R-FL): “I applaud today’s Senate confirmation of Director Mike Pompeo to be Secretary of State. Based on his experience as CIA Director, an Army officer, a congressman, and his proven leadership on national security matters, he is eminently qualified to serve as our nation’s top diplomat. It is a shame that his nomination encountered partisan headwinds at a time when the U.S. and our allies face mounting national security threats. I look forward to working him and I am confident that he will successfully advance U.S. interests abroad, including the promotion of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.”

------------------------

Sen. Chuck Grassley (R-IA): “In a time when we are facing serious international challenges, from Russian meddling, to North Korean saber-rattling, to an increasingly assertive China, it is essential that the President have a qualified Secretary of State who he trusts on the job. Mike Pompeo unquestionably understands the international challenges we face and is more than capable of doing the job. When I talk to our allies, they are anxious to see him on the job.”

STATEMENTS & RELEASES

Statement from the Press Secretary on the Inter-Korean Summit

FOREIGN POLICY

Issued on: April 26, 2018

On the occasion of Republic of Korea President Moon Jae-in’s historic meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, we wish the Korean people well. We are hopeful that talks will achieve progress toward a future of peace and prosperity for the entire Korean Peninsula. The United States appreciates the close coordination with our ally, the Republic of Korea, and looks forward to continuing robust discussions in preparation for the planned meeting between President Donald J. Trump and Kim Jong Un in the coming weeks.

Arirang News Lee Ji-won, Arirang News: Dated April 27, 2018

Leaders of S. Korea, N. Korea announce joint declaration that includes complete denuclearization of Korean Peninsula

The pressure and work-related stress was palpable in the summit press center, but there was also laughter and overwhelming emotions.

"It was a mixed atmosphere. I noticed that everybody is busy and exhausted in someway but still everyone is excited to witness this historic event in a way."

Other than the actual summit talks, the two leaders did a lot of activities together, and even surprised many with off the script gestures.

"I think everyone would agree that the first moment they met was the most impressive. It's the first time a North Korean leader crossed the border since the Korean War, AND on top of their unprecedented meeting, President Moon stepped on to the North's soil simply after a quick chat with Kim Jong-un. That shows how close and near the two Koreas actually are."

"When they walked on that bridge and sat down, this was probably a moment they would name in history. When you saw the faces, they were really serious. They had something to talk about. Usually summits are just more or less pleasantries because everything has been decided in advance, but during that time they talked about something that is not clear yet for both."

Kim Jong-un's smiles and small chats with President Moon also gave viewers an opportunity to appreciate a never before seen aspect of the North Korean leader.

"He's got a sense of humor. I think his attitude is very active, or aggressive in a way but not so offensive so it was a surprise to me. I heard that he is strong and determined, not in a kind way. For me, this summit really changed my opinion on him."

Those who covered previous inter-Korean summits say the atmosphere between the leaders was much softer this time.

"The atmosphere was certainly different. I think nowadays, there is much more trust. President Moon has four more years in office, this is a good point. He has time to implement what has been decided at this summit."

But in terms of creating a new image for Kim on the international stage, some say there's still much do be done.

"Kim gave off a positive image through the summit, but honestly, he wasn't really trusted by the international community until now. So it will take more time and effort to change his image. But I do think it will get better from now on."

"Though perspectives on the 2018 Inter-Korean summit varied from individual to individual, the general consensus among this international pool of journalists seems to be that the summit was a success. Lee Ji-won, Arirang News."

U.S. President Donald Trump, the United States wants to see concrete actions from North Korea

Phase I

1956: The Soviet Union begins training North Korean scientists and engineers, giving them "basic knowledge" to initiate a nuclear program.

1958: The U.S. deploys nuclear armed Honest John missiles and 280 mm atomic cannons to South Korea.

1959: North Korea and the USSR sign a nuclear cooperation agreement.

1962: The Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center opens.

1965: The Yongbyon IRT-2000 research reactor reaches a power rating of 2 MW.

1974: The Yongbyon IRT-2000 research reactor reaches a power rating of 4 MW.

Between the late 1970s and early 1980s North Korea begins uranium mining operations at various locations near Sunchon and Pyongsan.

Phase II

1980–1985: North Korea builds a factory at Yongbyon to refine yellowcake and produce fuel for reactors.

1984: The DPRK completes construction of a "Radiochemical laboratory", which is actually a reprocessing plant used to separate plutonium from spent nuclear fuel at the Yongbyon site.

1984–1986: North Korea completes construction on a 5 MWe gas-cooled, graphite-moderated nuclear reactor for plutonium production. North Korea also commences with the construction of a second 50 MWe nuclear reactor.

1987: The Yongbyon IRT-2000 research reactor reaches a power rating of 8 MW.

1989: Soviet control of communist governments throughout Europe begins to weaken, and the Cold War comes to a close. Post-Soviet states emerge in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. As the USSR's power declines, North Korea loses the security guarantees and economic support that had sustained it for 45 years.

Through satellite photos, the U.S. learns of new construction at a nuclear complex near the North Korean town of Yongbyon. U.S. intelligence analysts suspect that North Korea, which had signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985 but had not yet allowed inspections of its nuclear facilities, is in the early stages of building a nuclear bomb.

In response, the U.S. pursues a strategy in which North Korea's full compliance with the NPT would lead to progress on other diplomatic issues, such as the normalization of relations.

December 1990: North Korea conducts 70–80 high-explosives tests at its Yongbyon facility.

1991: The U.S. withdrew its last nuclear weapons from South Korea in December 1991, though U.S. affirmation of this action was not clear, resulting in rumors persisting that nuclear weapons remained in South Korea. The U.S. had deployed nuclear weapons in South Korea since January 1958, peaking in number at about 950 warheads in 1967.

1992: In May, for the first time, North Korea allows a team from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Agency inspection finds inconsistencies with North Korea declarations. Hans Blix, head of the IAEA, and the U.S. suspect that North Korea is secretly using its five-megawatt reactor and reprocessing facility at Yongbyon to turn spent fuel into weapons-grade plutonium. Before leaving, Blix arranges for fully equipped inspection teams to follow.

The inspections do not go well. Over the next several months, the North Koreans repeatedly block inspectors from visiting two of Yongbyon's suspected nuclear waste sites, and IAEA inspectors find evidence that the country is not revealing the full extent of its plutonium production.

1993: In March, North Korea threatens to withdraw from the NPT. Facing heavy domestic pressure from Republicans who oppose negotiations with North Korea, President Bill Clinton appoints Robert Gallucci to start a new round of negotiations. After 89 days, North Korea announces it has suspended its withdrawal. (The NPT requires three months notice before a country can withdraw.)

In December, IAEA Director-General Blix announces that the agency can no longer provide "any meaningful assurances" that North Korea is not producing nuclear weapons.

12 October 1994: the United States and North Korea signed the "Agreed Framework": North Korea agreed to freeze its plutonium production program in exchange for fuel oil, economic cooperation, and the construction of two modern light-water nuclear power plants. Eventually, North Korea's existing nuclear facilities were to be dismantled, and the spent reactor fuel taken out of the country.

26 October 1994: IAEA Chairman Hans Blix tells the British House of Commons'Foreign Affairs Select Committee the IAEA is "not very happy" with the Agreed Framework because it gives North Korea too much time to begin complying with the inspections regime.

Phase III

18 March 1996: Hans Blix tells the IAEA's Board of Governors North Korea has still not made its initial declaration of the amount of plutonium they possess, as required under the Agreed Framework, and warned that without the declaration IAEA would lose the ability to verify North Korea was not using its plutonium to develop weapons.

October 1997: spent nuclear fuel rods were encased in steel containers, under IAEA inspection.

31 August 1998: North Korea launched a Paektusan-1 space launch vehicle in a launch attempt of its Kwangmyŏngsŏng-1satellite. U.S. military analysts suspect satellite launch is a ruse for the testing of an ICBM. This missile flew over Japan causing the Japanese government to retract 1 billion in aid for two civilian light-water reactors.

2002

29 January: U.S. PresidentGeorge W. Bush in his State of the Union Address named North Korea as part of the axis of evil, aiming to threaten the peace of the world and posing a grave danger.

7 August: "First Concrete" pouring at the construction site of the light-water nuclear power plants being built by the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization under the 1994 Agreed Framework. Construction of both reactors was many years behind the agreement's target completion date of 2003.

17 September: Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi becomes the first Japanese prime minister to visit Pyongyang, making a number of political and cooperative offers.

3–5 October: On a visit to the North Korean capital Pyongyang, US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly presses the North on suspicions that it is continuing to pursue a nuclear energy and missiles programme. Mr Kelly says he has evidence of a secret uranium-enriching program carried out in defiance of the 1994 Agreed Framework. Under this deal, North Korea agreed to forsake nuclear ambitions in return for the construction of two safer light water nuclear power reactors and oil shipments from the US.

16 October: The US announces that North Korea admitted in their talks to a "clandestine nuclear-weapons" program.

17 October: Initially the North appears conciliatory. Leader Kim Jong-il says he will allow international weapons inspectors to check that nuclear facilities are out of use.

20 October: North-South Korea talks in Pyongyang are undermined by the North's nuclear program "admission". US Secretary of State Colin Powell says further US aid to North Korea is now in doubt. The North adopts a mercurial stance, at one moment defiantly defending its "right" to weapons development and at the next offering to halt nuclear program in return for aid and the signing of a non-aggression pact with the US. It argues that the US has not kept to its side of the Agreed Framework, as the construction of the light water reactors—due to be completed in 2003—is now years behind schedule.

14 November: US President George W Bush declares November oil shipments to the North will be the last if the North does not agree to put a halt to its weapons ambitions.

18 November: Confusion clouds a statement by North Korea in which it initially appears to acknowledge having nuclear weapons. A key Korean phrase understood to mean the North does have nuclear weapons could have been mistaken for the phrase "entitled to have", Seoul says.

27 November: The North accuses the US of deliberately misinterpreting its contested statement, twisting an assertion of its "right" to possess weapons into an "admission" of possession.

December: South Korean presidential election. The Grand National Party, who opposed the Sunshine Policy, made much of the North Korean situation, although it eventually lost the election.

4 December: The North rejects a call to open its nuclear facilities to inspection.

11 December: North Korean-made Scud missiles are found aboard a ship bound for Yemen. The US illegally detains the ship, but is later forced to allow the ship to go, conceding that neither country has broken any law.

12 December: The North pledges to reactivate nuclear facilities for energy generation, saying the Americans' decision to halt oil shipments leaves it with no choice. It claims the US wrecked the 1994 pact.

13 December: North Korea asks the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to remove seals and surveillance equipment – the IAEA's "eyes and ears" on the North's nuclear status—from its Yongbyon power plant.

22 December: The North begins removing monitoring devices from the Yongbyon plant.

24 December: North Korea begins repairs at the Yongbyon plant. North-South Korea talks over reopening road and rail border links, which have been struggling on despite the increased tension, finally stall.

25 December: It emerges that North Korea had begun shipping fuel rods to the Yongbyon plant which could be used to produce plutonium.

26 December: The IAEA expresses concern in the light of UN confirmation that 1,000 fuel rods have been moved to the Yongbyon reactor.

27 December: North Korea says it is expelling the two IAEA nuclear inspectors from the country. It also says it is planning to reopen a reprocessing plant, which could start producing weapons grade plutonium within months.

Phase IV

2003

2 January: South Korea asks China to use its influence with North Korea to try to reduce tension over the nuclear issue, and two days later Russia offers to press Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear programme.

6 January: The IAEA passes a resolution demanding that North Korea readmit UN inspectors and abandon its secret nuclear weapons programme "within weeks", or face possible action by the UN Security Council.

7 January: The US says it is "willing to talk to North Korea about how it meets its obligations to the international community". But it "will not provide quid pro quos to North Korea to live up to its existing obligations".

9 January: North Korea sends diplomats to meet with New MexicogovernorBill Richardson about the nuclear crisis;North Korea also agrees to hold cabinet-level talks with South Korea on 21 January.

10 January: North Korea announces it will withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

20 January: US Secretary of State Colin Powell calls on the IAEA to refer the North Korean nuclear issue to the United Nations Security Council for resolution.

21 January: Diplomatic talks commence between cabinet-level officials from both North Korea and South Korea; the North is represented by Kim Ryong Song.

24 January: Cabinet-level talks between North and South Korea end without making progress.South Korean President-elect Roh Moo-hyun proposes face-to-face meeting with Kim Jong-il.

28 January: In his annual State of the Union address, President Bush alleges North Korea is "an oppressive regime [whose] people live in fear and starvation". He accuses North Korea of deception over its nuclear ambitions and says "America and the world will not be blackmailed".

29 January: North Korea says President Bush's speech is an "undisguised declaration of aggression to topple the DPRK system" and dubs him a "shameless charlatan". At the same time, however, it reiterates its demand for bilateral talks on a non-aggression pact.

31 January: Unnamed American officials are quoted as saying that spy satellites have tracked movement at the Yongbyon plant throughout January, prompting fears that North Korea is trying to reprocess plutonium for nuclear bombs.

White House spokesman Ari Fleischer delivers a stern warning that North Korea must not take "yet another provocative action... intended to intimidate and blackmail the international community".

4 February: The United States says it is considering new military deployments in the Pacific Ocean to back up its forces in South Korea, as a deterrent against any North Korean aggression that might arise in the event that the US initiated a new military campaign in Iraq.

5 February: North Korea says it has reactivated its nuclear facilities and their operations are now going ahead "on a normal footing".

6 February: North Korea warns the United States that any decision to build up its troops in the region could lead the North to make a pre-emptive attack on American forces.

12 February: The IAEA finds North Korea in breach of nuclear safeguards and refers the matter to the UN security council.

16 February: Kim Jong-il celebrates his 61st birthday, but state media warns North Korean citizens to be on "high alert".

17 February: The US and South Korea announce that they will hold joint military exercises in March.

24 February: North Korea fires a missile into the sea between South Korea and Japan.

25 February: Roh Moo-hyun sworn in as South Korean president.

2 March: Four North Korean fighter jets intercept a US reconnaissance plane in international air space and shadow it for 22 minutes.

10 March: North Korea fires a second missile into the sea between South Korea and Japan in as many weeks.

22 March: As a blistering bombing campaign pounds the Iraqi capital, and South Korean and US forces perform military exercises on its doorstep, a jumpy North denounces their "confrontational posture" and calls off talks with the South.1

1 April: The US announces that "stealth" fighters sent to South Korea for a training exercise are to stay on once the exercises end.

7 April: Ministerial talks between North and South Korea are cancelled after Pyongyang fails to confirm they would take place.

9 April: The United Nations Security Council expresses concern about North Korea's nuclear programme, but fails to condemn Pyongyang for pulling out of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.

12 April: In a surprise move, North Korea signals it may be ready to end its insistence on direct talks with the US, announcing that "if the US is ready to make a bold switchover in its Korea policy for a settlement of the nuclear issue, [North Korea] will not stick to any particular dialogue format".

18 April: North Korea announces that it has started reprocessing its spent fuel rods. The statement is later amended to read that Pyongyang has been "successfully going forward to reprocess" the rods.

23 April: Talks begin in Beijing between the US and North Korea, hosted by China. The talks are led by the US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian affairs, James Kelly, and the deputy director general of North Korea's American Affairs Bureau, Li Gun.

24 April: American officials say Pyongyang has told them that it now has nuclear weapons, after the first direct talks for months between the US and North Korea in Beijing end a day early.

25 April: Talks end amid mutual recrimination, after the US says North Korea had made its first admission that it possessed nuclear weapons.

28 April: US Secretary of State Colin Powell says North Korea made an offer to US officials, during the talks in Beijing, to scrap its nuclear programme in exchange for major concessions from the United States. He does not specify what those concessions are, but reports say that Pyongyang wants normalised relations with the US and economic assistance. Mr Powell says Washington is studying the offer.

5 May: North Korea demands the US respond to what it terms the "bold proposal" it made during the Beijing talks.

12 May: North Korea says it is scrapping a 1992 agreement with the South to keep the peninsula free from nuclear weapons – Pyongyang's last remaining international agreement on non-proliferation.

15 May: South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun meets US President George W Bush in Washington for talks on how to handle North Korea's nuclear ambitions.

2 June: A visiting delegation of US congressmen led by Curt Weldon says North Korean officials admitted the country had nuclear weapons and had "just about completed" reprocessing 8,000 spent fuel rods which would allow it to build more.

9 June: North Korea says publicly that it will build a nuclear deterrent, "unless the US gives up its hostile policy".

13 June: South Korea's Yonhap News Agency says North Korean officials told the US on 30 June that it had completed reprocessing the fuel rods.

18 June: North Korea says it will "put further spurs to increasing its nuclear deterrent force for self-defence".

9 July: South Korea's spy agency says North Korea has started reprocessing a "small number" of the 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods at Yongbyon.

1 August: North Korea agrees to six-way talks on its nuclear programme, South Korea confirms. The US, Japan, China and Russia will also be involved.

27–29 August: Six-nation talks in Beijing on North Korea's nuclear programme. The meeting fails to bridge the gap between Washington and Pyongyang. Delegates agree to meet again.

2 October: North Korea announces publicly it has reprocessed the spent fuel rods.

16 October: North Korea says it will "physically display" its nuclear deterrent.

30 October: North Korea agrees to resume talks on the nuclear crisis, after saying it is prepared to consider the US offer of a security guarantee in return for ending its nuclear programme.

21 November: Kedo, the international consortium formed to build 'tamper-proof' nuclear power plants in North Korea, decides to suspend the project.

9 December: North Korea offers to "freeze" its nuclear programme in return for a list of concessions from the US. It says that unless Washington agrees, it will not take part in further talks. The US rejects North Korea's offer. President George W Bush says Pyongyang must dismantle the programme altogether.

27 December: North Korea says it will take part in a new round of six-party talks on its nuclear programme in early 2004.

2004

2 January: South Korea confirms that the North has agreed to allow a group of US experts, including a top nuclear scientist, visit Yongbyon nuclear facility.

10 January: The unofficial US team visits the North's "nuclear deterrent" facility at Yongbyon.

22 January: US nuclear scientist Siegfried Hecker tells Congress that the delegates visiting Yongbyon were shown what appeared to be weapons-grade plutonium, but he did not see any evidence of a nuclear bomb.

3 February: North Korea reports that the next round of six-party talks on the nuclear crisis will be held on 25 February.

25 February: Second round of six nation talks end without breakthrough in Beijing.

23 May: The UN atomic agency is reported to be investigating allegations that North Korea secretly sent uranium to Libya when Tripoli was trying to develop nuclear weapons.

23 June: Third round of six nation talks held in Beijing, with the US making a new offer to allow North Korea fuel aid if it freezes then dismantles its nuclear programmes.

2 July: US Secretary of State Colin Powell meets the North Korean Foreign Minister, Paek Nam-sun, in the highest-level talks between the two countries since the crisis erupted.

24 July: North Korea rejects US suggestions that it follow Libya's lead and give up its nuclear ambitions, calling the US proposal a daydream.

3 August: North Korea is in the process of developing a new missile system for ships or submarines, according to a report in Jane's Defence Weekly.

23 August: North Korea describes US President George W Bush as an "imbecile" and a "tyrant that puts Hitler in the shade", in response to comments President Bush made describing the North's Kim Jong-il as a "tyrant".

12 September: Clinton Former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright admits North Korean "cheating" on the Agreed Framework occurred during the "Clinton Watch."[1]

28 September: North Korea says it has turned plutonium from 8,000 spent fuel rods into nuclear weapons. Speaking at the UN General Assembly, Vice Foreign Minister Choe Su-hon said the weapons were needed for "self-defence" against "US nuclear threat".

2005

14 January: North Korea says it is willing to restart stalled talks on its nuclear programme, according to the official KCNA news agency. The statement says North Korea "would not stand against the US but respect and treat it as a friend unless the latter slanders the former's system and interferes in its internal affairs".

19 January: Condoleezza Rice, President George W Bush's nominee as secretary of state, identifies North Korea as one of six "outposts of tyranny" where the US must help bring freedom.

10 February: North Korea says it is suspending its participation in the talks over its nuclear programme for an "indefinite period", blaming the Bush administration's intention to "antagonise, isolate and stifle it at any cost". The statement also repeats North Korea's assertion to have built nuclear weapons for self-defence.

18 April: South Korea says North Korea has shut down its Yongbyon reactor, a move which could allow it to extract more fuel for nuclear weapons.

1 May: North Korea fires a short-range missile into the Sea of Japan (East Sea of Korea), on the eve of a meeting of members of the international Non-Proliferation Treaty.

11 May: North Korea says it has completed extraction of spent fuel rods from Yongbyon, as part of plans to "increase its nuclear arsenal".

16 May: North and South Korea hold their first talks in 10 months, with the North seeking fertilizer for its troubled agriculture sector.

25 May: The US suspends efforts to recover the remains of missing US servicemen in North Korea, saying restrictions placed on its work were too great.

7 June: China's envoy to the UN says he expects North Korea to rejoin the six-nation talks "in the next few weeks".

22 June: North Korea requests more food aid from the South during ministerial talks in Seoul, the first for a year.

9 July: North Korea says it will rejoin nuclear talks, as US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice begins a tour of the region.

12 July: South Korea offers the North huge amounts of electricity as an incentive to end its nuclear weapons programme.

25 July: Fourth round of six-nation talks begins in Beijing.

7 August: The talks reach deadlock and a recess is called.

13 September: Talks resume. North Korea requests the building of the light-water reactors promised in the Agreed Framework, but the U.S. refuses, prompting warnings of a "standoff" between the parties.

19 September: In what is initially hailed as an historic joint statement, North Korea agrees to give up all its nuclear activities and rejoin the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, while the US says it had no intention of attacking.

20 September: North Korea says it will not scrap its nuclear programme until it is given a civilian nuclear reactor, undermining the joint statement and throwing further talks into doubt.

7 December: A senior US diplomat brands North Korea a "criminal regime" involved in arms sales, drug trafficking and currency forgery.

20 December: North Korea says it intends to resume building nuclear reactors, because the US had pulled out of a key deal to build it two new reactors.

2006

Main article: 2006 North Korean nuclear test

12 April: A two-day meeting aimed at persuading North Korea to return to talks on its nuclear program fails to resolve the deadlock.

26 June: A report by the Institute for Science and International Security estimates that current North Korea plutonium stockpiles is sufficient for four to thirteen nuclear weapons.

3 July: Washington dismisses a threat by North Korea that it will launch a nuclear strike against the US in the event of an American attack, as a White House spokesman described the threat as "deeply hypothetical".

4 July: North Korea test-fires at least six missiles, including a long-range Taepodong-2, despite repeated warnings from the international community.

5 July: North Korea test-fires a seventh missile, despite international condemnation of its earlier launches.

6 July: North Korea announces it would continue to launch missiles, as well as "stronger steps", if other countries were to apply additional pressure as a result of the latest missile launches, claiming it to be their sovereign right to carry out these tests. A US television network also reports that they have quoted intelligence sources in saying that North Korea is readying another Taepodong-2 long-range missile for launch.

3 October: North Korea announces plans to test a nuclear weapon in the future, blaming "hostile US policy". Their full text can be read at BBC News.

5 October: A US envoy directly threatens North Korea as to the upcoming test, stating "It (North Korea) can have a future or it can have these (nuclear) weapons, it cannot have them both." The envoy also mentions that any attempt to test a nuclear device would be seen as a "highly provocative act".

6 October: The United Nations Security Council issues a statement declaring, "The Security Council urges the DPRK not to undertake such a test and to refrain from any action that might aggravate tension, to work on the resolution of non-proliferation concerns and to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution through political and diplomatic efforts. Later in the day, there are unconfirmed reports of the North Korean government successfully testing a nuclear bomb."

9 October: North Korea announces that it has performed its first-ever nuclear weapon test. The country's official Korean Central News Agency said the test was performed successfully, and there was no radioactive leakage from the site. South Korea's Yonhap news agency said the test was conducted at 10:36 a.m. (01:36 GMT) in Hwaderi near Kilju city, citing defense officials. The USGS detected an earthquake with a preliminary estimated magnitude of 4.2 at 41.311°N, 129.114°E . The USGS coordinate indicates that the location in much north of Hwaderi, near the upper stream of Oran-chon, 17 km NNW of Punggye-Yok, according to analysts reports. In an interview on The Daily Show with Jon Stewart, former Secretary of StateJames Baker let it slip that North Korea “ had a rudimentary nuclear weapon way back in the days when I was Secretary of State, but now this is a more advanced one evidently.” He was Secretary of State between 1989 and 1992.

10 October: Some western scientists had doubts as to whether the nuclear weapon test that took place on 9 October 2006 was in fact successful. The scientists cite that the measurements recorded only showed an explosion equivalent to 500 metric tons of TNT, as compared to the 1998 nuclear tests that India and Pakistan conducted which were 24–50 times more powerful.This could indicate that the test resulted in a fizzle. Some also speculated that the test may be a ruse using conventional explosives and nuclear material.

14 October: The United Nations Security Council passed U.N. Resolution 1718, imposing sanctions on North Korea for its announced nuclear test on 9 October 2006 that include largely symbolic steps to hit the North Korea's nuclear and missile programs, a reiteration of financial sanctions that were already in place, as well as keeping luxury goods away from its leaders, for example French wines and spirits or jet skis. However, the sanctions do not have the full support of China and Russia. The resolution was pushed in large part by the administration of George W. Bush, whose party at the time was engaged in an important mid-term election.

27 October: Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuhisa Shiozaki, based upon U.S. intelligence, announces, "We reached the conclusion that the probability that North Korea conducted a nuclear test is extremely high."[45] He continued on to admit that Japanese aircraft could not confirm the U.S. and South Korean reports.

18 December: The six-party talks resume in what is known as the fifth round, second phase. After a week of negotiations, the parties managed to reaffirm the 19 September declaration, as well as reiterate their parties' stances. For more information, see six-party talks.

2007

13 January: North Korean official Song Il-ho was reported to have told his Japanese counterpart Taku Yamasaki that whether the North Koreans conduct a second nuclear test depends on "US actions in the future".[46]

16 January: In-between-round talks between North Korea and the US are held in Berlin, Germany. Certain areas of agreement have been reached, as confirmed by both sides. North Korea claims these were bilateral negotiations; the US claims these "set the groundwork for the next round of six-party talks".[46]

26 January: On 26 January 2007, Russian chief negotiator Alexander Losyukov told reporters that the third phase was most likely to take place in late January or early February 2007, most likely 5–8 February 2007, before the Lunar New Year.[47]

10 February: Reports emanating from Washington suggest that the CIA reports in 2002 that North Korea was developing uranium enrichment technology overstated or misread the intelligence. U.S. officials are no longer making this a major issue in the six-party talks.

13 February: The fifth round of the six-party talks conclude with an agreement. Pyongyang promises to shut down the Yongbyon reactor in exchange for 50,000 metric tons of fuel aid, with more to follow upon verification that the site has been permanently disabled. IAEA inspectors will be re-admitted, and the United States will begin the process of normalizing relations with North Korea.

19 March: The sixth round of six-party talks commences in Beijing.

25 June: North Korea announces resolution of the banking dispute regarding US$25 million in DPRK assets in Macau's Banco Delta Asia.

14 July: North Korea announces it is shutting down the Yongbyon reactor after receiving 6,200 tons in South Korean fuel oil aid.

17 July: A 10-person team of IAEA inspectors confirms that North Korea has shut down its Yongbyon reactor, a step IAEA Director Mohamed ElBaradei said was "a good step in the right direction". On the same day, a second shipment of 7,500 tons of oil aid was dispatched from South Korea for the North Korea city of Nampo, part of the 50,000 tons North Korea is due to receive in exchange for shutting down the reactor, according to the February 13 agreement.

11–13 September: Inspectors from the United States, China and Russia conduct a site visit at Yongbyon reactor to determine ways to permanently disable the reactor. U.S. delegation leader, Sung Kim, declared they "saw everything they had asked to see," State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said.

2008

25 February: CNN chief international correspondent Christiane Amanpour toured North Korea's nuclear plant. CNN was one of only two U.S. news organizations at the facility.

10 May: Sung Kim, the U.S. State Department's top Korea specialist, returned to South Korea by land across the heavily fortified border after collecting approximately 18,000 secret papers of Yongbyon nuclear reactor activities during a three-day visit to Pyongyang.

26 June: North Korea hands over 60 pages of documents detailing its capabilities in nuclear power and nuclear weapons

27 June: North Korea destroys a cooling tower at Yongbyon's main atomic reactor.

11 October: The US removes North Korea from its State Sponsors of Terrorism list.

2009

5 April: North Korea's launch of its Kwangmyŏngsŏng-2 satellite, intended to broadcast "immortal revolutionary songs," ends in failure.

14 April: Following a UN resolution denouncing its missile launch, North Korea says that it "will never again take part in such [six party] talks and will not be bound by any agreement reached at the talks." North Korea expelled nuclear inspectors from the country and also informed the IAEA that they would resume their nuclear weapons program.

25 April: North Korea says it has reactivated its nuclear facilities.

25 May: North Korea tests its second nuclear device.

2012

April: North Korea prepares to test its third nuclear device.

13 April: North Korea's launch of its Kwangmyŏngsŏng-3 satellite which fails shortly after launch. It is intended to mark the centenary of Kim Il Sung's 100th birthday and the satellite will estimate crop yields and collect weather data as well as assess the country's forest coverage and natural resources.

12 December: North Korea's launch of its Kwangmyŏngsŏng-3 Unit 2 satellite that is meant to replace the failed Kwangmyŏngsŏng-3 satellite, and became the 10th space power that is capable of putting satellites in orbit using its own launch vehicles. The launch came during the period when the DPRK was commemorating the first anniversary of the death of former leader Kim Jong-il and just before the first South Korean domestic launch of a satellite and the South Korean presidential election on 19 December 2012.

2013

5 February: South Korea's President warned that North Korea could be planning "multiple nuclear tests at two places or more".

12 February: North Korea tests its third nuclear device.

March–April: North Korea crisis (2013)

2015

20 May: North Korea claims to have nuclear weapons capable of hitting the United States.

December: In early December, North Korea leader Kim Jong-un claimed that the country was prepared to detonate a hydrogen bomb, however significant doubts surround the claim.

2016

6 January: North Korea conducts its fourth nuclear test. Although the government claims it to be its first hydrogen bomb,the claim was met with significant skepticism.

6 July: A high-level DPRK Government spokesman’s statement was made defining a more precise meaning of "denuclearization", as covering the whole Korean peninsula and its vicinity, signalling a willingness to continue negotiations on the topic.

9 September: North Korea conducts its fifth underground nuclear test. With an estimate yield of over 10kt, it would make it the most powerful North Korean nuclear test thus far.

26 October: United States Director of National IntelligenceJames Clapper said during a speech that persuading North Korea to abandon its program is "probably a lost cause" since, to North Korea, it was "their ticket to survival" and any discussions about ending their nuclear ambitions would be a "non-starter".

2017

6 March: North Korea launched four ballistic missiles, three of which landed 200 miles off Japan’s coastline. Supreme leader Kim Jong-un promised that the country will eventually have nuclear-armed, intercontinental ballistic missiles that can reach the continental United States, thus challenging the Trump Administration of the United States to review its policy options, including preemptive strikes or further isolation of the North Korean economy.

15 April: at the yearly major public holiday Day of the Sun, North Korea staged a massive military parade to commemorate the 105th birth anniversary of Kim Il-sung, the country’s founder and grandfather of current leader, Kim Jong-un. The parade took place amid hot speculation in the United States, Japan, and South Korea that the country would look to also potentially test a sixth nuclear device, which it did not do.

3 September: At 3:31 AM UTC, the United States Geological Survey reported that it had detected a magnitude 6.3 earthquake in North Korea near the Punggye-ri test site. Given the shallow depth of the quake and its proximity to North Korea's primary nuclear weapons testing facility, experts concluded that the country had conducted a sixth nuclear weapon test (2017 North Korean nuclear test). North Korea claimed that they had tested a hydrogen bomb capable of being mounted on an ICBM. The independent seismic monitoring agency NORSAR initially estimated that the blast had a yield of around 120 kilotons but subsequently revised to 250 kilotons of TNT (1,000 TJ) based on a tremor of 6.1M. According to State TV, USGS reported 6.3M.

According to 38 North exclusive with analysis by Frank V. Pabian, Joseph S. According to Bermudez Jr. and Jack Liu, On April 21, 2018 the state-run Korean Central News Agency (c), quoted North Korean leader Kim Jong Un as saying,

“under the proven condition of complete nuclear weapons, we no longer need any nuclear tests, mid-range and intercontinental ballistic rocket tests, and that the nuclear test site in northern area has also completed its mission.”

Commercial satellite imagery of the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site from April 20, the day before the site’s closure was announced, shows some unusual activity. Most notably, approximately one dozen mining carts—at least eight connected in a long train—could be observed in an unusual arrangement on the spoil pile in the area closest to the West Portal. It is too early to conclude whether this display is related to Kim Jong Un’s announcement.

Satellite Surveillance Detects Unusual Activity At North Korean Nuclear Site!lite

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Sources: FAS (Federation of American Scientists), Arirang News, Day Break, Go News, Youtube Mania, Military News, CNN, Fox, web archive. google, War and S tate Terrorism, 38 North, Washington Post, nukestarat.com, BBC, AFP IAEA, Newyork times, UN, Fox news, ABC News, Reuters, Yahoo. Wikipedia, Youtube DOD news, RT, News Trust, Bing, Yonhap News, USA Today, Satellite, Earthquake-Report, Google, Moxnews
catch4all.com, Sandra Englund, April 24, 2018, Rev April 26, 2018