The Iranian Regime’s Decades of Terrorism
Against
American Citizens

The White House | March 2, 2026

For nearly half a century, the Islamic Republic of Iran — the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism — has killed and maimed American citizens and service members through its own forces and proxy militias. More Americans have been killed by Iran than any other terrorist regime on Earth.

President Donald J. Trump is doing what Presidents over the last five decades have refused to do — eliminate the threat once and for all. By destroying Iran’s missiles, annihilating their navy, and ensuring they can never obtain a nuclear weapon, the Trump Administration’s bold and decisive action is protecting American lives and advancing American interests.

Here is only a partial record of the Iranian regime’s blood-soaked war on Americans:

• November 1979: Iranian students, backed by the regime, seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran — taking 66 Americans hostage in a 444-day standoff.
  
  
• April 1983: The Islamic Jihad, an Iran-backed terrorist group, carried out a suicide car bombing at the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, killing 17 Americans.
  
  
• October 1983: Iran-backed Hezbollah terrorists killed 241 U.S. military personnel — including 220 U.S. Marines and 21 other service personnel — in a truck bombing at a Marine compound in Beirut.
  
  
• March 1984: Iran-backed Islamic Jihad terrorists kidnapped CIA station chief William Buckley on his way to work in Beirut, ultimately killing him the following year.
  
  
• September 1984: Iran-backed Hezbollah terrorists killed 23 innocent people — including two American service members — in a car bomb attack at the U.S. Embassy annex in Beirut.
  
  
• December 1984: Iran-backed Hezbollah terrorists hijacked Kuwait Airways Flight 221 en route to Pakistan, diverting it to Tehran — where they brutally tortured and killed two American officials.
  
  
• June 1985: Iran-backed Hezbollah terrorists hijacked TWA Flight 847 on its way from Athens to Rome, torturing a U.S. Navy diver before shooting him point blank in the head and tossing his body onto the Beirut airport tarmac.
  
  
• July 1989: Iran-backed Hezbollah terrorists killed U.S. Marine Col. William Higgins after kidnapping him the previous year while serving with a United Nations peacekeeping force in Lebanon.
  
  
• April 1995: Iran-backed Islamic Jihad terrorists killed eight people — including one American citizen — in a car bomb attack in the Gaza Strip.
  
  
• August 1995: An Iran-backed Hamas suicide bomber blew up a bus in Jerusalem, killing an American and three other passengers, and wounding more than 100 others.
  
  
• February 1996: An Iran-backed Hamas suicide bomber blew up another bus in Jerusalem, killing three Americans and wounding three other Americans.
  
  
• March 1996: A suicide bomber linked to the Iran-backed Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad terrorist groups killed 20 people — including two Americans — in a suicide bombing at a Tel Aviv shopping center.
  
  
• May 1996: Iran-backed terrorists killed an American-Israeli dual citizen and wounded another American citizen in the West Bank.
  
  
• June 1996: Iran-backed Hezbollah Al-Hijaz terrorists killed 19 U.S. Airmen and wounded nearly 500 others in a truck bombing at a U.S. Air Force housing complex in Saudi Arabia.
  
  
• September 1997: Iran-backed Hamas suicide bombers blew themselves up at a shopping mall in Jerusalem, killing an American-Israeli dual citizen and wounding seven other American citizens.
  
  
• August 1998: Al-Qaeda suicide bombers, facilitated by Iran-backed Hezbollah, simultaneously bombed U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing 224 people — including a dozen American citizens.
  
  
• August 2001: An Iran-backed Hamas terrorist blew up a Jerusalem pizzeria, killing three Americans.
  
  
• January 2002: An Iran-backed al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade terrorist killed an American-Israeli dual citizen in the West Bank.
  
  
• July 2002: An Iran-backed Hamas terrorist killed five Americans in a bombing at Hebrew University in Jerusalem.
  
  
• June 2003: An Iran-backed Hamas suicide bomber killed 17 people — including an American citizen — on a bus in Jerusalem.
  
  
• October 2003: Iran-backed Popular Resistance Committees terrorists killed three U.S. diplomatic personnel in a bombing in Gaza.
  
  
• Between 2003 and 2011: Iran-backed militias killed at least 603 U.S. troops in Iraq — “roughly one in every six American combat fatalities in Iraq.”
  
  
• August 2003: An Iran-backed Hamas terrorist blew up a bus in Jerusalem, killing five Americans and wounding one other American.
  
  
• August 2006: Iran-backed Hezbollah terrorists killed American citizen and Israel Defense Forces (IDF) soldier Michael Levin during the Second Lebanon War — the only American to die in the conflict.
  
  
• January 2007: A dozen men affiliated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force killed five U.S. soldiers and wounded three others in Karbala, Iraq, after disguising themselves as U.S. soldiers and entering the Provincial Joint Coordination Center.
  
  
• March 2007: Former FBI Agent Robert Levinson disappeared in Iran, likely dying in an Iranian prison.
  
  
• July 2014: Iran-backed Hamas terrorists killed two American citizens serving in the IDF.
  
  
• October 2015: Iran-backed Hamas terrorists killed an American citizen and his wife in a drive-by shooting in the West Bank.
  
  
• December 2019: Iran-backed Kataib Hezbollah terrorists killed an American civilian contractor and wounded several U.S. service members in a rocket attack at K1 Air Base in Kirkuk, Iraq.
  
  
• January 2020: 109 U.S. troops suffered traumatic brain injuries in an Iranian ballistic missile attack on the Ain al-Asad airbase in Iraq.
  
  
• September 2020: U.S. intelligence indicated the Iranian regime was considering a plot to assassinate the U.S. Ambassador to South Africa.
  
  
• February 2021: An Iran-backed militia fired a rocket at coalition forces in Erbil, Iraq, wounding a U.S. service member and four U.S. civilian contractors.
  
  
• July 2021: Iranian-backed militias wounded two U.S. service members in a series of rocket and drone attacks against U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria.
  
  
• September 2022: An Iranian rocket attack killed an American citizen in Iraqi Kurdistan.
  
  
• November 2022: An IRGC captain orchestrated the killing of an American citizen in Baghdad.
  
  
• March 2023: An Iranian drone attack killed an American contractor and wounded five U.S. service members and another contractor in a strike on a coalition base in Syria.
  
  
• October 2023: Iran-backed Hamas terrorists killed 46 Americans and kidnapped at least 12 Americans in the October 7th massacre.
  
  
• December 2023: Iran-backed militias wounded three U.S. service members in an attack on Erbil Air Base in Iraq.
  
  
• January 2024: Iran-backed Kataib Hezbollah terrorists killed three U.S. service members and wounded more than 40 other service members in a drone attack against the Tower 22 military base in Jordan.
  
  
• Between October 2023 and November 2024: Iran and its proxies conducted more than 180 attacks against U.S. forces in the Middle East, wounding more than 180 U.S. service members and killing three service members.
  
  
• November 2024: An Iranian national and IRGC asset was charged for plotting to assassinate President Trump.
  
  
• June 2025: Iran-backed militias attacked at least three U.S. bases in Syria and two U.S. bases in Iraq.

US and Iran Continue....in talking to resolve....

 

February 5th, 2026

 

In February 2026, following the heightened tensions in January,Iran and the United States held a new round of diplomatic talks in Muscat, Oman, with Oman acting as a mediator. The discussions primarily focused on Iran's nuclear program and the potential easing of economic sanctions. The Iranian delegation was led by Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, while the U.S. delegation included senior officials from the State Department.

 

During the talks, the United States reportedly sought to address Iran's missile program and regional activities, whereas Iran emphasized that negotiations should remain limited to nuclear issues and sanctions relief. Both sides expressed commitment to continuing diplomatic engagement, though no immediate agreement was announced.

 

 

 

SUNDAY SHOW:
President Trump’s Pursuit of Peace
Through Strength in Iran

The White House

June 22, 2025

 

This morning, key leaders of the Trump Administration were out across the airwaves with a clear message: the world is safer today because of President Donald J. Trump’s highly successful precision strikes against the Iranian regime’s key nuclear facilities — and that what happens next is up to them.

Here’s what you missed:

Vice President JD Vance on Meet the Press

• On the precision strikes: “We’re not at war with Iran … We destroyed the Iranian nuclear program … and we did it without endangering the lives of American pilots. That’s an incredible thing.”
• On achieving peace: “We do not want war with Iran. We actually want peace, but we want peace in the context of them not having a nuclear weapons program — and that’s exactly what the President accomplished last night.”
• On diplomacy: “They weren’t taking this seriously. They were trying to draw this process out as long as possible so they could rebuild their nuclear weapons program without the threat of American action … We didn’t blow up the diplomacy. The diplomacy never was given a real chance by the Iranians.”
• On potential retaliation: “We’re prepared in the event the that the Iranians do retaliate, but … if the Iranians want to enlarge this by attacking American troops, I think that would be a catastrophic mistake.”
• On further conflict: “We have no interest in a protracted conflict. We have no interest in boots on the ground. The President has actually been one of the fiercest critics of 25 years of failed foreign policy in the Middle East, which is why he did what he did — a very precise, a very surgical strike tailored to an American national interest.”
• On regime change: “Our view has been very clear that we don’t want a regime change … We want to end their nuclear program, and then we want to talk to the Iranians about a long-term settlement.”

Vice President JD Vance on This Week

• On Iranian nuclear capabilities: “I can say to the American people with great confidence that [Iran is] much further away from a nuclear program today than they were 24 hours ago. That was the objective of the mission.”
• On the nature of the precision strikes: “If the Iranians attack us, they’re going to be met with overwhelming force … We did not attack the nation of Iran. We did not attack any civilian targets. We didn’t even attack military targets outside of the three nuclear weapons facilities.”
• On a peaceful solution: “We believe the way that you achieve peace is through strength … You can’t sit there and allow the Iranians to achieve a nuclear weapon and expect that’s going to lead to peace … The President — more than anybody — is worried about protracted military conflicts. That is NOT what we’re getting ourselves involved in.”

Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Face the Nation

• On what happens next: “What happens next will now depend on what Iran chooses to do next. If they choose the path of diplomacy, we’re ready. We can do a deal that’s good for them, the Iranian people, and good for the world. If they choose another route, then there’ll be consequences.”
• On the reality of Iran’s nuclear development: “They had everything they need to build nuclear weapons. Why would you bury things in a mountain 300 feet under the ground? Why do they have 60% enriched uranium? … The only countries in the world that have uranium at 60% are countries that have nuclear weapons because they can quickly make it 90%.”
• On a peaceful resolution: “We’ll defend our people … but let’s hope they don’t choose that route. Let’s all hope that they actually decide, ‘let’s go negotiate’ because we want a diplomatic and peaceful solution.”
• On diplomacy: “This is very simple. The President wants to resolve this diplomatically and peacefully. He gave them a chance to do that … What happens next is up to the regime.”

Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Sunday Morning Futures

• On President Trump’s decision: “[Iran] tried to play him along the way they’ve played every American president for the last 35 years and the President told them if we don’t get a deal — which is what we wanted — then I’ll have to have to handle it differently … We didn’t make that choice, they did.”
• On U.S. military might: “The President said very clearly, ‘We have 60 days to make progress on a deal and if we don’t, I’m going to deal with it differently’ … [Our military] went in, they did what they needed to do with precision and skill that no other military in the world can do, and they left.”
• On President Trump’s leadership: “They thought they could do with President Trump what they’ve done with presidents in the past and get it away with it — and they found out last night that they can’t … This is a President that tells you what he’s going to do and then he does it.”
• On the evil of the Iranian regime: “Why did Hezbollah exist? Because of Iran. Why does Hamas exist? Because of Iran. How do the Houthis exist? Because of Iran. Who built the IEDs that maimed and killed American soldiers in Iraq? Iran. They’re behind every problem in this region. They are the sole source of instability in the entire Middle East … Imagine those people having a nuclear weapon … That is unacceptable.”
• On the Strait of Hormuz: “If they do that, it will be another terrible mistake. It’s economic suicide for them if they do it, and we retain options to deal with that.”

  

 

 

President Trump
Has Always Been Clear:
Iran Cannot Have a Nuclear Weapon


White House

   June 17, 2025

 

President Donald J. Trump has never wavered in his stance that Iran cannot be allowed to have a nuclear weapon — a pledge he has made repeatedly, both in office and on the campaign trail.

Since taking office, President Trump has clearly stated no fewer than a dozen times that Iran cannot be allowed to have a nuclear weapon:

• “Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon. It’s very simple — you don’t have to go to too deep into it. They just can’t have a nuclear weapon.” (6/17/25)
• “I want to see no nuclear weapon in Iran and we’re well on our way to making sure that happens.” (6/16/25)
• “You can’t have peace if Iran has a nuclear weapon.” (6/14/25)
• “They can’t have a nuclear weapon. Very simple. They can’t have a nuclear weapon. We’re not going to allow that.” (6/11/25)
• “You have to view them as people and I don’t want it to be a violent thing, but they’re not going to have a nuclear weapon.” (5/16/25)
• “I want them to succeed. I want them to end up being a great country, frankly, but they can’t have a nuclear weapon.” (5/15/25)
• “I want to make a deal with Iran, I want to do something if it’s possible, but for that to happen, it must stop sponsoring terror, halt its bloody proxy wars, and permanently and verifiably cease its pursuit of nuclear weapons.” (5/14/25)
• “Iran can have a much brighter future — but we’ll never allow America and its allies to be threatened with terrorism or a nuclear attack. The choice is theirs to make. We really want them to be a successful country … but they cannot have a nuclear weapon.” (5/13/25)
• “We want it to be a great country. Let it be a tremendously successful, rich country … but they can’t have a nuclear weapon.” (5/6/25)
• “I want Iran to be really successful, really great, really fantastic — the only thing they can’t have is a nuclear weapon. If they want to be successful, that’s OK. I want them to be so successful and, you know, the Iranian people are incredible — I just don’t want them to have a nuclear weapon because the world will be destroyed.” (5/4/25)
• “Iran can’t have a nuclear weapon.” (4/17/25)
• “Iran has to get rid of the concept of a nuclear weapon. They cannot have a nuclear weapon.” (4/14/25)
• “I want Iran to be a wonderful, great, happy country — but they can’t have a nuclear weapon.” (4/11/25)
• “You cannot allow [Iran] to have a nuclear weapon.” (2/10/25)
• “It’s very simple: Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon.” (2/4/25)

President Trump made the same pledge no fewer than 40 times on the campaign trail and even earlier:

• “Iran can’t have a nuclear weapon. Nuclear weapons are the greatest single threat to our country, but to the entire world.” (11/3/24)
• “I would have been very good to Iran. They — I had to have one thing, no nuclear weapons. You can’t have nuclear weapon. Nuclear weapons are the greatest danger to our country going forward, to the world going forward.” (10/29/24)
• “And all I wanted was Iran can’t have a nuclear weapon … That’s all I wanted. Very simple. You can’t have a nuclear weapon.” (10/28/24)
• “We don’t want Iran to have a nuclear weapon.” (10/23/24)
• “I didn’t want much. I wanted Iran to be very successful. I just don’t want them to have a nuclear weapon.” (10/16/24)
• “You can’t let them have a nuclear weapon.” (10/14/24)
• “I just don’t want them to have a nuclear weapon. It’s very simple.” (10/10/24)
• “I only wanted one thing. You can’t have a nuclear weapon. You cannot let them have a nuclear weapon.” (10/7/24)
• “No, they can’t have nukes. No, they can’t have nukes.” (10/7/24)
• “They can’t have a nuclear weapon — and now they’re very close to having one and it’s very dangerous for the world, very dangerous for the world … The biggest problem today, in my opinion, the biggest risk is the nuclear weapons.” (10/1/24)
• “All I want them to do is not have a nuclear weapon. They can’t have a nuclear weapon.” (9/30/24)
• “The only thing is [Iran] cannot have nuclear weapons.” (9/26/24)
• “I wanted one thing from Iran — no nuclear weapon. I didn’t want much — no nuclear weapon. And now they’re very close to getting it, and you can’t let that happen.” (9/19/24)
• “All we want is we don’t want them to have a nuclear weapon. Very simple. That’s all we want. We don’t want you to have a nuclear weapon.” (9/17/24)
• “They can’t have a nuclear weapon. We just can’t let them have a nuclear weapon. I’ll say this. If they do have a nuclear weapon, Israel is gone. It’ll be gone.” (8/27/24)
• “I don’t want them to have a nuclear weapon.” (8/23/24)
• “I just wanted to have a deal with Iran, very simple deal — can’t have a nuclear weapon. That’s it.” (8/23/24)
• “They can’t have a nuclear weapon. They can’t have a nuclear weapon. And we were all set to make sure that they don’t have a nuclear weapon. Because once they do, it’s a whole different world, it’s a whole different negotiation.” (8/15/24)
• “Iran can’t have a nuclear weapon — it’s very simple.” (8/8/24)
• “They can’t have a nuclear weapon. It’s very simple. They can’t have a nuclear weapon. You cannot let Iran have a nuclear weapon.” (8/5/24)
• “Iran should not have a nuclear weapon … Iran should never be allowed to have a nuclear weapon.” (7/10/24)
• “The main thing is Iran can’t have a nuclear weapon. That was my main thing. The deal was a simple deal. Iran can’t have a nuclear. You know, it can’t have a missile, it can’t have a nuclear missile. It cannot have that nuclear capability.” (6/20/24)
• “We have a very hostile country that wants nuclear weapons. You can’t let that happen.” (6/15/24)
• “Iran should not be allowed to have a nuclear weapon. They would never have had even close to a nuclear weapon. They are very close to getting a nuclear weapon. You cannot let that happen.” (5/15/24)
• “Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon — very simple. They cannot have a nuclear weapon.” (5/1/24)
• “You can’t let Iran have nuclear weapons.” (4/30/24)
• “Iran wanted to make a deal, and what the deal — 90% of the deal that I want to make is no nuclear weapon. That’s 90% — almost 100%. It might be 100%. That’s all I want. No nuclear weapon for Iran” (3/25/24)
• “I want everybody to be happy. They just can’t have a nuclear weapon.” (2/23/24)
• “I just didn’t want Iran to have a nuclear weapon. I said, ‘You know, we’re going to make a great deal. Everybody’s going to be happy. You’re going to be rich as hell again. Everything’s going to be great, but you cannot have a nuclear weapon.’” (1/20/24)
• “They cannot have a nuclear weapon. That was the only thing — the one thing I said, ‘You cannot have.’” (1/5/24)
• “I just don’t want them to have a nuclear weapon.” (1/5/24)
• “They will have, within a short period of time, nuclear weapons — and that is never something that can be allowed to happen.” (12/30/23)
• “No nuclear weapons. You can’t have nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons are the single greatest threat to this world.” (11/9/23)
• “They can’t have a nuclear weapon. That’s all. They can’t have nuclear weapons. It’s too destructive, too powerful. They can’t have it.” (10/29/23)
• “Don’t let Iran have nuclear weapons. That’s my only thing I have to tell you today. Don’t let them have it.” (10/16/23)
• “No nuclear weapons. You can’t give [Iran] nuclear weapons.” (7/15/23)
• “You cannot let Iran have a nuclear weapon. You cannot let it happen because bad things will happen if that happens.” (6/24/23)
• “IRAN WILL NEVER HAVE A NUCLEAR WEAPON!” (1/6/20)
• “Iran cannot have Nuclear Weapons!” (6/22/19)
• “We can’t let Iran get a nuclear weapon. We can’t do it. Can’t do it. We cannot let that happen.” (1/24/15)
• “We can’t allow Iran to go nuclear.” (11/4/11)

 

 

_______________________
On June 13 2025 Israel initiated Operation Rising Lion, a large‑scale aerial assault targeting Iranian nuclear facilities, missile factories, military sites, and commanders across cities including Tehran and Natanz. Among the targets were also Revolutionary Guard commander Hossein Salami and other senior IRGC leaders were reportedly killed. Iranian state media also confirm deaths of nuclear scientists and claim civilian casualties in Tehran.

 

According to IAEA, a May 2025 report, several undeclared locations in Iran remain at the center of its investigation into Iran's past nuclear activities. These include Turquzabad, first identified publicly in 2018 when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu claimed it was a secret nuclear warehouse. Inspectors later detected man-made uranium particles there in 2019.[101] Two other sites, Varamin and Marivan, also yielded traces of undeclared nuclear material when IAEA inspectors were granted access in 2020.  A fourth site, Lavisan-Shian, has been under scrutiny as well, though inspectors were never able to visit it because it was demolished after 2003. IAEA concluded that these locations, and possibly others too, were part of an undeclared nuclear program conducted by Iran up until the early 2000s.

On 12 June 2025, Iran announced the activation of a third uranium enrichment site following the IAEA's first formal censure of Iran in two decades. While the location has not been disclosed, Iranian officials described it as "secure and invulnerable."

-------------------

RELATED ARTICLE

US withdraws some diplomats and military families from Middle East amid Iran tensions.

Uranium is a nuclear fuel that, when highly enriched, can be used to make a bomb. Iran maintains that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes.  Tehran condemned the US, the United Kingdom, France and Germany for tabling the resolution and said it has “no option but to respond.”

 

Parameters for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran's Nuclear Program Archived 22 April 2018 at the Wayback Machine, U.S. Department of State (April 2, 2015).

 

SUSTAINING SELECT EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE NATION’S CYBERSECURITY AND AMENDING EXECUTIVE ORDER 13694
AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 14144

 June 6, 2025
 

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (8 U.S.C. 1182(f)), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, it is hereby ordered:

Section 1.  Amendments to Executive Order 14144.  Executive Order 14144 of January 16, 2025 (Strengthening and Promoting Innovation in the Nation’s Cybersecurity), is hereby amended by:

(a)  striking subsections 2(a)-(b) and redesignating subsections 2(c), 2(d), and 2(e) as subsections 2(a), 2(b), and 2(c), respectively;

(b)  striking the first sentence of subsection 2(e);

(c)  striking subsections 3(a)-(b) and redesignating subsections 3(c), 3(d), and 3(e) as subsections 3(a), 3(b), and 3(c), respectively;

(d)  striking from subsection 3(c) the phrase “In Executive Order 14028, I directed the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security to establish procedures to immediately

 share threat information to strengthen the collective defense of Department of Defense and civilian networks.”;

(e)  striking from subsection 3(c)(i)(A) the word “novel”;

(f)  striking subsection 4(b)(iv);

(g)  striking subsections 4(d)(ii)-(iii);

(h)  striking section 5 and redesignating sections 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 as sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10, respectively; and

(i)  striking from subsection 8(c) the phrase “in the areas of intrusion detection, use of hardware roots of trust for secure booting, and development and deployment of security patches.”.

Sec. 2.  Further Amendments to Executive Order 14144.  Executive Order 14144 is hereby amended by:

(a)  striking section 1 and inserting, in lieu thereof, the following:

“Section 1.  Policy.  Foreign nations and criminals continue to conduct cyber campaigns targeting the United States and Americans.  The People’s Republic of China presents the most active and persistent cyber threat to United States Government, private sector, and critical infrastructure networks, but significant threats also emanate from Russia, Iran, North Korea, and others who undermine United States cybersecurity.  These campaigns disrupt the delivery of critical services across the Nation, cost billions of dollars, and undermine Americans’ security and privacy.  More must be done to improve the Nation’s cybersecurity against these threats.  I am ordering additional actions to improve our Nation’s cybersecurity, focusing on defending our digital infrastructure, securing the services and capabilities most vital to the digital domain, and building our capability to address key threats.”;

(b)  striking subsection 2(c) and inserting, in lieu thereof, the following:

“(c)  Relevant executive departments and agencies (agencies) shall take the following actions:

(i)    By August 1, 2025, the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Director of NIST, shall establish a consortium with industry at the National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence to develop guidance, informed by the consortium as appropriate, that demonstrates the implementation of secure software development, security, and operations practices based on NIST Special Publication 800–218 (Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF)).

(ii)   By September 2, 2025, the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Director of NIST, shall update NIST Special Publication 800–53 (Security and Privacy Controls for Information Systems and Organizations) to provide guidance on how to securely and reliably deploy patches and updates.

(iii)  By December 1, 2025, the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Director of NIST, in consultation with the heads of such agencies as the Director of NIST deems appropriate, shall develop and publish a preliminary update to the SSDF.  This preliminary update shall include practices, procedures, controls, and implementation examples regarding the secure and reliable development and delivery of software as well as the security of the software itself.  Within 120 days of publishing the preliminary update, the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Director of NIST, shall publish a final version of the updated SSDF.”;

(c)  striking from subsection 4(b) the phrase “The security of Internet traffic depends on data being correctly routed and delivered to the intended recipient network.  Routing information originated and propagated across the Internet, utilizing the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), is vulnerable to attack and misconfiguration.” and inserting, in lieu thereof, the following:

“Relevant agencies shall take the following actions:”;

(d)  striking subsection 4(f) and inserting, in lieu thereof, the following:

“(f)  A quantum computer of sufficient size and sophistication —  also known as a cryptanalytically relevant quantum computer (CRQC) —  will be capable of breaking much of the public-key cryptography used on digital systems across the United States and around the world.  National Security Memorandum 10 of May 4, 2022 (Promoting United States Leadership in Quantum Computing While Mitigating Risks to Vulnerable Cryptographic Systems), directed the Federal Government to prepare for a transition to cryptographic algorithms that would not be vulnerable to a CRQC.

(i)   By December 1, 2025, the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and in consultation with the Director of the National Security Agency, shall release and thereafter regularly update a list of product categories in which products that support post-quantum cryptography (PQC) are widely available.

(ii)  By December 1, 2025, to prepare for transition to PQC, the Director of the National Security Agency with respect to National Security Systems (NSS), and the Director of OMB with respect to non-NSS, shall each issue requirements for agencies to support, as soon as practicable, but not later than January 2, 2030, Transport Layer Security protocol version 1.3 or a successor version.”;

(e)  striking former section 6 (newly designated section 5) and inserting, in lieu thereof, the following:

“Sec. 5.  Promoting Security with and in Artificial Intelligence.  Artificial intelligence (AI) has the potential to transform cyber defense by rapidly identifying vulnerabilities, increasing the scale of threat detection techniques, and automating cyber defense.

(a)  By November 1, 2025, the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Director of NIST; the Secretary of Energy; the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Under Secretary for Science and Technology; and the Director of the National Science Foundation shall ensure that existing datasets for cyber defense research have been made accessible to the broader academic research community (either securely or publicly) to the maximum extent feasible, in consideration of business confidentiality and national security.

(b)  By November 1, 2025, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with appropriate officials within the Executive Office of the President, to include officials within the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the Office of the National Cyber Director, and the Director of OMB, shall incorporate management of AI software vulnerabilities and compromises into their respective agencies’ existing processes and interagency coordination mechanisms for vulnerability management, including through incident tracking, response, and reporting, and by sharing indicators of compromise for AI systems.”;

(f)  striking section 7 and inserting, in lieu thereof, the following:

“Sec. 7.  Aligning Policy to Practice.  Agencies’ policies must align investments and priorities to improve network visibility and security controls to reduce cyber risks.  In consultation with the National Cyber Director, agencies shall take the following actions:

(a)  Within 3 years of the date of this order, the Director of OMB shall issue guidance, including any necessary revision to OMB Circular A–130, to address critical risks and adapt modern practices and architectures across Federal information systems and networks.

(b)  Within 1 year of the date of this order, the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Director of NIST; the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Director of CISA; and the Director of OMB shall establish a pilot program of a rules-as- code approach for machine-readable versions of policy and guidance that OMB, NIST, and CISA publish and manage regarding cybersecurity.

(c)  Within 1 year of the date of this order, agency members of the FAR Council shall, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law, jointly take steps to amend the FAR to adopt requirements for agencies to, by January 4, 2027, require vendors to the Federal Government of consumer Internet-of-Things products, as defined by 47 CFR 8.203(b), to carry United States Cyber Trust Mark labeling for those products.”; and

(g)  striking subsection 8(a) and inserting, in lieu thereof, the following:

“(a)  Except as specifically provided for in subsection 4(f) of this order, sections 1 through 7 of this order shall not apply to Federal information systems that are NSS or are otherwise identified by the Department of Defense or the Intelligence Community as debilitating impact systems.”.

Sec. 3.  Amendments to Executive Order 13694.  Executive Order 13694 of April 1, 2015 (Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities), as amended by Executive Order 13757 of December 28, 2016 (Taking Additional Steps to Address the National Emergency With Respect to Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities), Executive Order 13984 of January 19, 2021 (Taking Additional Steps to Address the National Emergency With Respect to Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities), and Executive Order 14144, is hereby further amended by:

(a)  striking from subsection 1(a)(ii) the phrase “any person” and inserting in lieu thereof “any foreign person”; and

(b)  striking from subsection 1(a)(iii) the phrase “any person” and inserting in lieu thereof “any foreign person.”.

Sec. 4.  General Provisions.  (a)  Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

(i)   the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or

(ii)  the functions of the Director of OMB relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

(b)  This order shall be implemented in a manner consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.

(c)  This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

(d)  The costs for publication of this order shall be borne by the Department of Homeland Security.

                             DONALD J. TRUMP

THE WHITE HOUSE,

    June 6, 2025.

Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Restricts the Entry of Foreign Nationals to Protect the United States from Foreign Terrorists and Other National Security and Public Safety Threats
 

June 4, 2025
 

COMBATING TERRORISM THROUGH COMMON SENSE SECURITY STANDARDS: Today, President Donald J. Trump signed a Proclamation to protect the nation from foreign terrorist and other national security and public safety threats from entry into the United States.

• Pursuant to President Trump’s Executive Order 14161, issued on January 20, 2025, titled “Protecting the United States from Foreign Terrorists and Other National Security and Public Safety Threats,” national security agencies engaged in a robust assessment of the risk that countries posed to the United States, including regarding terrorism and national security.
• In Trump v. Hawaii, the Supreme Court upheld the President’s authority to use section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act to protect the United States through entry restrictions.
• The Proclamation fully restricts and limits the entry of nationals from 12 countries found to be deficient with regards to screening and vetting and determined to pose a very high risk to the United States: Afghanistan, Burma, Chad, Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Haiti, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen.
• The Proclamation partially restricts and limits the entry of nationals from 7 countries who also pose a high level of risk to the United States: Burundi, Cuba, Laos, Sierra Leone, Togo, Turkmenistan, and Venezuela.
• The Proclamation includes exceptions for lawful permanent residents, existing visa holders, certain visa categories, and individuals whose entry serves U.S. national interests.

SECURING OUR BORDERS AND INTERESTS: The restrictions and limitations imposed by the Proclamation are necessary to garner cooperation from foreign governments, enforce our immigration laws, and advance other important foreign policy, national security, and counterterrorism objectives.

• It is the President’s sacred duty to take action to ensure that those seeking to enter our country will not harm the American people.
• After evaluating a report submitted by the Secretary of State, in coordination with other cabinet officials, President Trump has determined that the entry of nationals from certain countries must be restricted or limited to protect U.S. national security and public safety interests.
• The restrictions are country-specific in order to encourage cooperation with the subject countries in recognition of each country’s unique circumstances.
• Some of the named countries have inadequate screening and vetting processes, hindering America’s ability to identify potential security threats before entry.
• Certain countries exhibit high visa overstay rates, demonstrating a disregard for U.S. immigration laws and increasing burdens on enforcement systems.
• Other countries lack cooperation in sharing identity and threat information, undermining effective U.S. immigration vetting.
• Some countries have a significant terrorist presence or state-sponsored terrorism, posing direct risks to U.S. national security.
• Several countries have historically failed to accept back their removable nationals, complicating U.S. efforts to manage immigration and public safety.

MAKING AMERICA SAFE AGAIN: President Trump is keeping his promise to restore the travel ban and secure our borders.

• President Trump: “We will restore the travel ban, some people call it the Trump travel ban, and keep the radical Islamic terrorists out of our country that was upheld by the Supreme Court.”
• In his first term, President Trump successfully implemented a travel ban that restricted entry from several countries with inadequate vetting processes or significant security risks.
• The Supreme Court upheld the travel ban, ruling that it “is squarely within the scope of Presidential authority” and noting that it is “expressly premised on legitimate purposes.”
• This Proclamation builds on President Trump’s first-term travel ban, incorporating an updated assessment of current global screening, vetting, and security risks.

JUSTIFICATION FOR FULL SUSPENSION BY COUNTRY

Afghanistan

• The Taliban, a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) group, controls Afghanistan.  Afghanistan lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents and it does not have appropriate screening and vetting measures.  According to the Fiscal Year 2023 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Entry/Exit Overstay Report (“Overstay Report”), Afghanistan had a business/tourist (B1/B2) visa overstay rate of 9.70 percent and a student (F), vocational (M), and exchange visitor (J) visa overstay rate of 29.30 percent.

Burma

• According to the Overstay Report, Burma had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 27.07 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 42.17 percent.  Additionally, Burma has historically not cooperated with the United States to accept back their removable nationals.

Chad

• According to the Overstay Report, Chad had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 49.54 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 55.64 percent.  According to the Fiscal Year 2022 Overstay Report, Chad had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 37.12 percent.  The high visa overstay rate for 2022 and 2023 is unacceptable and indicates a blatant disregard for U.S. immigration laws.  

Republic of the Congo

• According to the Overstay Report, the Republic of the Congo had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 29.63 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 35.14 percent.

Equatorial Guinea

• According to the Overstay Report, Equatorial Guinea had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 21.98 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 70.18 percent.

Eritrea

• The United States questions the competence of the central authority for issuance of passports or civil documents in Eritrea. Criminal records are not available to the United States for Eritrean nationals.  Eritrea has historically refused to accept back its removable nationals.  According to the Overstay Report, Eritrea had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 20.09 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 55.43 percent.

Haiti

• According to the Overstay Report, Haiti had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 31.38 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 25.05 percent.  Additionally, hundreds of thousands of illegal Haitian aliens flooded into the United States during the Biden Administration.  This influx harms American communities by creating acute risks of increased overstay rates, establishment of criminal networks, and other national security threats. As is widely known, Haiti lacks a central authority with sufficient availability and dissemination of law enforcement information necessary to ensure its nationals do not undermine the national security of the United States. 

Iran

• Iran is a state sponsor of terrorism.  Iran regularly fails to cooperate with the United States Government in identifying security risks, is the source of significant terrorism around the world, and has historically failed to accept back its removable nationals. 

Libya

• There is no competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents in Libya.  The historical terrorist presence within Libya’s territory amplifies the risks posed by the entry into the United States of its nationals.

Somalia

• Somalia lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents and it does not have appropriate screening and vetting measures.  Somalia stands apart from other countries in the degree to which its government lacks command and control of its territory, which greatly limits the effectiveness of its national capabilities in a variety of respects.  A persistent terrorist threat also emanates from Somalia’s territory.  The United States Government has identified Somalia as a terrorist safe haven.  Terrorists use regions of Somalia as safe havens from which they plan, facilitate, and conduct their operations.  Somalia also remains a destination for individuals attempting to join terrorist groups that threaten the national security of the United States.  The Government of Somalia struggles to provide governance needed to limit terrorists’ freedom of movement.  Additionally, Somalia has historically refused to accept back its removable nationals.

Sudan

• Sudan lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents and it does not have appropriate screening and vetting measures.  According to the Overstay Report, Sudan had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 26.30 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 28.40 percent. 

Yemen

• Yemen lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents and it does not have appropriate screening and vetting measures.  The government does not have physical control over its own territory.  Since January 20, 2025, Yemen has been the site of active U.S. military operations.

JUSTIFICATION FOR PARTIAL SUSPENSION BY COUNTRY (Immigrants and Nonimmigrants on B-1, B-2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J Visas)

Burundi

• According to the Overstay Report, Burundi had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 15.35 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 17.52 percent. 

Cuba

• Cuba is a state sponsor of terrorism.  The Government of Cuba does not cooperate or share sufficient law enforcement information with the United States.  Cuba has historically refused to accept back its removable nationals.  According to the Overstay Report, Cuba had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 7.69 percent and a F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 18.75 percent.

Laos

• According to the Overstay Report, Laos had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 34.77 percent and a F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 6.49 percent.  Laos has historically failed to accept back its removable nationals. 

Sierra Leone

• According to the Overstay Report, Sierra Leone had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 15.43 percent and a F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 35.83 percent.  Sierra Leone has historically failed to accept back its removable nationals. 

Togo

• According to the Overstay Report, Togo had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 19.03 percent and a F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 35.05 percent. 

Turkmenistan

• According to the Overstay Report, Turkmenistan had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 15.35 percent and a F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 21.74 percent. 

Venezuela

• Venezuela lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents and it does not have appropriate screening and vetting measures.  Venezuela has historically refused to accept back its removable nationals.  According to the Overstay Report, Venezuela had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 9.83 percent.

NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM/NSPM-2

FEBRUARY 4, 2025

 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
              THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
              THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
              THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
              THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
              THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
              THE SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY
              THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CHIEF OF STAFF
              THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
              THE UNITED STATES PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS
              THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
              THE DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
             THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
             
              THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
               
              THE COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT
              THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR ECONOMIC POLICY
               
              THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
              THE DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF  INVESTIGATION
                

SUBJECT: Imposing Maximum Pressure on the Government of
       the Islamic Republic of Iran, Denying Iran All
       Paths to a Nuclear Weapon, and Countering Iran’s
       Malign Influence


As President, my highest priority is to ensure the safety and security of the United States and the American people.  Since its inception in 1979 as a revolutionary theocracy, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has declared its hostility to the United States and its allies and partners.  Iran remains the world’s leading state sponsor of terror and has aided Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, the Taliban, al-Qa’ida, and other terrorist networks.  The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is itself a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization.

The Iranian Government, including the IRGC, is using agents and cyber-enabled means to target United States nationals living in the United States and other countries around the world for attacks, including assault, kidnapping, and murder.  Iran has also directed its proxy groups, including Hezbollah’s Islamic Jihad Organization, to embed sleeper cells in the Homeland to be activated in support of this terrorist activity.   

Iran bears responsibility for the horrific Hamas massacres committed on October 7, 2023, and bears responsibility for continued Houthi attacks against the United States Navy, allied navies, and international commercial shipping in the Red Sea.  Since April 2024, the regime has twice demonstrated its willingness to launch ballistic and cruise missile attacks against the State of Israel. 

Iran commits grievous human rights abuses and arbitrarily detains foreigners, including United States citizens, on spurious charges without due process of law, subjecting them to abuse.  The United States stands with the women of Iran who face daily abuse by the regime. 

Iran’s nuclear program, including its enrichment- and reprocessing-related capabilities and nuclear-capable missiles, poses an existential danger to the United States and the entire civilized world.  A radical regime like this can never be allowed to acquire or develop nuclear weapons, or to extort the United States or its allies through the threat of nuclear weapons acquisition, development, or use.  Iran today stands in breach of its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations by concealing undeclared nuclear sites and material as required by its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).  Iran has obstructed IAEA access to its military sites or sites tied to the Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research, also known as SPND, and to interview nuclear weapons scientists still employed by SPND.  Public reports indicating that Iran may now be engaged in computer modeling related to nuclear weapons development raise immediate alarm.  We must deny Iran all paths to a nuclear weapon and end the regime’s nuclear extortion racket. 

Iran’s behavior threatens the national interest of the United States.  It is therefore in the national interest to impose maximum pressure on the Iranian regime to end its nuclear threat, curtail its ballistic missile program, and stop its support for terrorist groups. 

Section 1.  Policy.  It is the policy of the United States that Iran be denied a nuclear weapon and intercontinental ballistic missiles; that Iran’s network and campaign of regional aggression be neutralized; that the IRGC and its surrogates be disrupted, degraded, or denied access to the resources that sustain their destabilizing activities; and to counter Iran’s aggressive development of missiles and other asymmetric and conventional weapons capabilities. 

Sec. 2.  Enacting Maximum Pressure on the Islamic Republic of Iran.  (a)  The Secretary of the Treasury shall:

              (i)    immediately impose sanctions or appropriate enforcement remedies on all persons for which the Department has evidence of activity in violation of one or more Iran-related sanctions;

              (ii)   implement a robust and continual sanctions enforcement campaign with respect to Iran that denies the regime and its terror proxies access to revenue;

              (iii)  review for modification or rescission any general license, frequently asked question, or other guidance that provides Iran or any of its terror proxies any degree of economic or financial relief;

              (iv)   issue updated guidance to all relevant business sectors including shipping, insurance, and port operators, about the risks to any person that knowingly violates United States sanctions with respect to Iran or an Iranian terror proxy; and

              (v)    maintain countermeasures against Iran at the Financial Action Task Force, evaluate beneficial ownership thresholds to ensure sanctions deny Iran all possible illicit revenue, and evaluate whether financial institutions should adopt a “Know Your Customer’s Customer” standard for Iran-related transactions to further prevent sanctions evasion. 

(b)  The Secretary of State shall:

              (i)    modify or rescind sanctions waivers, particularly those that provide Iran any degree of economic or financial relief, including those related to Iran’s Chabahar port project;

              (ii)   implement a robust and continual campaign, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury and other relevant executive departments or agencies (agencies), to drive Iran’s export of oil to zero, including exports of Iranian crude to the People’s Republic of China;

              (iii)  lead a diplomatic campaign to isolate Iran throughout the world, including within international organizations, including the denial of freedom of movement or safe haven to the IRGC or any terror proxy of Iran wherever such may operate outside Iran’s borders; and

              (iv)   take immediate steps, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury and other relevant agencies, to ensure that the Iraqi financial system is not utilized by Iran for sanctions evasion or circumvention, and that Gulf countries are not used as sanctions evasion transshipment points. 

(c)  The United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations shall:

              (i)    work with key allies to complete the snapback of international sanctions and restrictions on Iran;

              (ii)   hold Iran accountable for its breach of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; and

              (iii)  regularly convene the United Nations Security Council to highlight the myriad threats posed by Iran to international peace and security. 

(d)  The Secretary of Commerce shall conduct a robust and continuous export control enforcement campaign to restrict the flow of technology and components used by the regime for military purposes.   

(e)  The Attorney General shall:

              (i)    pursue all available legal steps to investigate, disrupt, and prosecute financial and logistical networks, operatives, or front groups inside the United States that are sponsored by Iran or an Iranian terror proxy;

              (ii)   pursue all available legal steps to impound illicit Iranian oil cargoes;

              (iii)  pursue all available legal steps to identify Iranian governmental assets in the United States and overseas, and help American victims of terrorism, including Gold Star Families, collect on Federal judgments against Iran;

              (iv)   pursue all available legal steps to indict and prosecute the leaders and members of Iranian-funded terrorist groups and proxies that have captured, harmed, or killed American citizens and, where possible and in coordination with the Secretary of State, seek their arrest and extradition to the United States; and   

              (v)    use all criminal, regulatory, and cyber authorities and tools to vigorously investigate, prosecute, and disrupt efforts by the Iranian government to conduct espionage or obtain military, intelligence, government, or other sensitive information, compromise the Homeland and our critical infrastructure, evade sanctions and export controls, obtain material support for terrorism, exert foreign malign influence, and threaten harm and infringe on First Amendment-protected speech, including efforts designed to sow anti-Semitism.

  Sec. 3.  General Provisions.  (a)  Nothing in this memorandum shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

              (i)   the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or

              (ii)  the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.   

     (b)  This memorandum shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.   

     (c)  This memorandum is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

   

FACT SHEET:

PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP

RESTORES MAXIMUM PRESSURE ON IRAN

FEBRUARY 4, 2025
 

RESTORING MAXIMUM PRESSURE ON IRAN: Today, President Donald J. Trump signed a National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM) restoring maximum pressure on the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, denying Iran all paths to a nuclear weapon, and countering Iran’s malign influence abroad.

• The NSPM establishes that:
• Iran should be denied a nuclear weapon and intercontinental ballistic missiles;
• Iran’s terrorist network should be neutralized; and
• Iran’s aggressive development of missiles, as well as other asymmetric and conventional weapons capabilities, should be countered.
• The NSPM directs the Secretary of the Treasury to impose maximum economic pressure on the Government of Iran, including by sanctioning or imposing enforcement mechanisms on those acting in violation of existing sanctions.
• The Treasury Secretary will also issue guidance for all relevant business sectors – including shipping, insurance, and port operators – about the risks to any person that knowingly violates U.S. sanctions with respect to Iran or an Iranian terror proxy.
• The Secretary of State will also modify or rescind existing sanctions waivers and cooperate with the Secretary of Treasury to implement a campaign aimed at driving Iran’s oil exports to zero.
• The United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations will work with key allies to complete the snapback of international sanctions and restrictions on Iran.

PROTECTING THE HOMELAND FROM IRAN: The previous Administration’s tolerance of Iran’s threats to American citizens and companies ends now.

• The Attorney General will pursue all available legal steps to investigate, disrupt, and prosecute financial and logistical networks, operatives, or front groups inside the United States that are sponsored by Iran or an Iranian terror proxy.
• The Attorney General will prosecute leaders and members of Iranian-funded terrorist groups that have captured, harmed, or killed American citizens and seek their arrest and extradition to the United States.

TAKING IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM OFF THE TABLE: President Trump will not tolerate Iran possessing a nuclear weapons capability, nor will he stand for their sustained sponsorship of terrorism, especially against U.S. interests.

• In 2020, President Trump declared that “as long as [he is] President of the United States, Iran will never be allowed to have a nuclear weapon.”
• Today’s NSPM fulfills the President’s 2020 vow to contend with Iran’s pernicious influence across the globe:
• “For far too long — all the way back to 1979, to be exact — nations have tolerated Iran’s destructive and destabilizing behavior in the Middle East and beyond.  Those days are over.  Iran has been the leading sponsor of terrorism, and their pursuit of nuclear weapons threatens the civilized world.  We will never let that happen.”
•