SUSTAINING SELECT EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE NATION’S CYBERSECURITY AND AMENDING EXECUTIVE ORDER 13694
AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 14144

 June 6, 2025
 

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (8 U.S.C. 1182(f)), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, it is hereby ordered:

Section 1.  Amendments to Executive Order 14144.  Executive Order 14144 of January 16, 2025 (Strengthening and Promoting Innovation in the Nation’s Cybersecurity), is hereby amended by:

(a)  striking subsections 2(a)-(b) and redesignating subsections 2(c), 2(d), and 2(e) as subsections 2(a), 2(b), and 2(c), respectively;

(b)  striking the first sentence of subsection 2(e);

(c)  striking subsections 3(a)-(b) and redesignating subsections 3(c), 3(d), and 3(e) as subsections 3(a), 3(b), and 3(c), respectively;

(d)  striking from subsection 3(c) the phrase “In Executive Order 14028, I directed the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security to establish procedures to immediately

 share threat information to strengthen the collective defense of Department of Defense and civilian networks.”;

(e)  striking from subsection 3(c)(i)(A) the word “novel”;

(f)  striking subsection 4(b)(iv);

(g)  striking subsections 4(d)(ii)-(iii);

(h)  striking section 5 and redesignating sections 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 as sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10, respectively; and

(i)  striking from subsection 8(c) the phrase “in the areas of intrusion detection, use of hardware roots of trust for secure booting, and development and deployment of security patches.”.

Sec. 2.  Further Amendments to Executive Order 14144.  Executive Order 14144 is hereby amended by:

(a)  striking section 1 and inserting, in lieu thereof, the following:

“Section 1.  Policy.  Foreign nations and criminals continue to conduct cyber campaigns targeting the United States and Americans.  The People’s Republic of China presents the most active and persistent cyber threat to United States Government, private sector, and critical infrastructure networks, but significant threats also emanate from Russia, Iran, North Korea, and others who undermine United States cybersecurity.  These campaigns disrupt the delivery of critical services across the Nation, cost billions of dollars, and undermine Americans’ security and privacy.  More must be done to improve the Nation’s cybersecurity against these threats.  I am ordering additional actions to improve our Nation’s cybersecurity, focusing on defending our digital infrastructure, securing the services and capabilities most vital to the digital domain, and building our capability to address key threats.”;

(b)  striking subsection 2(c) and inserting, in lieu thereof, the following:

“(c)  Relevant executive departments and agencies (agencies) shall take the following actions:

(i)    By August 1, 2025, the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Director of NIST, shall establish a consortium with industry at the National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence to develop guidance, informed by the consortium as appropriate, that demonstrates the implementation of secure software development, security, and operations practices based on NIST Special Publication 800–218 (Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF)).

(ii)   By September 2, 2025, the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Director of NIST, shall update NIST Special Publication 800–53 (Security and Privacy Controls for Information Systems and Organizations) to provide guidance on how to securely and reliably deploy patches and updates.

(iii)  By December 1, 2025, the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Director of NIST, in consultation with the heads of such agencies as the Director of NIST deems appropriate, shall develop and publish a preliminary update to the SSDF.  This preliminary update shall include practices, procedures, controls, and implementation examples regarding the secure and reliable development and delivery of software as well as the security of the software itself.  Within 120 days of publishing the preliminary update, the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Director of NIST, shall publish a final version of the updated SSDF.”;

(c)  striking from subsection 4(b) the phrase “The security of Internet traffic depends on data being correctly routed and delivered to the intended recipient network.  Routing information originated and propagated across the Internet, utilizing the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), is vulnerable to attack and misconfiguration.” and inserting, in lieu thereof, the following:

“Relevant agencies shall take the following actions:”;

(d)  striking subsection 4(f) and inserting, in lieu thereof, the following:

“(f)  A quantum computer of sufficient size and sophistication —  also known as a cryptanalytically relevant quantum computer (CRQC) —  will be capable of breaking much of the public-key cryptography used on digital systems across the United States and around the world.  National Security Memorandum 10 of May 4, 2022 (Promoting United States Leadership in Quantum Computing While Mitigating Risks to Vulnerable Cryptographic Systems), directed the Federal Government to prepare for a transition to cryptographic algorithms that would not be vulnerable to a CRQC.

(i)   By December 1, 2025, the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and in consultation with the Director of the National Security Agency, shall release and thereafter regularly update a list of product categories in which products that support post-quantum cryptography (PQC) are widely available.

(ii)  By December 1, 2025, to prepare for transition to PQC, the Director of the National Security Agency with respect to National Security Systems (NSS), and the Director of OMB with respect to non-NSS, shall each issue requirements for agencies to support, as soon as practicable, but not later than January 2, 2030, Transport Layer Security protocol version 1.3 or a successor version.”;

(e)  striking former section 6 (newly designated section 5) and inserting, in lieu thereof, the following:

“Sec. 5.  Promoting Security with and in Artificial Intelligence.  Artificial intelligence (AI) has the potential to transform cyber defense by rapidly identifying vulnerabilities, increasing the scale of threat detection techniques, and automating cyber defense.

(a)  By November 1, 2025, the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Director of NIST; the Secretary of Energy; the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Under Secretary for Science and Technology; and the Director of the National Science Foundation shall ensure that existing datasets for cyber defense research have been made accessible to the broader academic research community (either securely or publicly) to the maximum extent feasible, in consideration of business confidentiality and national security.

(b)  By November 1, 2025, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with appropriate officials within the Executive Office of the President, to include officials within the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the Office of the National Cyber Director, and the Director of OMB, shall incorporate management of AI software vulnerabilities and compromises into their respective agencies’ existing processes and interagency coordination mechanisms for vulnerability management, including through incident tracking, response, and reporting, and by sharing indicators of compromise for AI systems.”;

(f)  striking section 7 and inserting, in lieu thereof, the following:

“Sec. 7.  Aligning Policy to Practice.  Agencies’ policies must align investments and priorities to improve network visibility and security controls to reduce cyber risks.  In consultation with the National Cyber Director, agencies shall take the following actions:

(a)  Within 3 years of the date of this order, the Director of OMB shall issue guidance, including any necessary revision to OMB Circular A–130, to address critical risks and adapt modern practices and architectures across Federal information systems and networks.

(b)  Within 1 year of the date of this order, the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Director of NIST; the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Director of CISA; and the Director of OMB shall establish a pilot program of a rules-as- code approach for machine-readable versions of policy and guidance that OMB, NIST, and CISA publish and manage regarding cybersecurity.

(c)  Within 1 year of the date of this order, agency members of the FAR Council shall, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law, jointly take steps to amend the FAR to adopt requirements for agencies to, by January 4, 2027, require vendors to the Federal Government of consumer Internet-of-Things products, as defined by 47 CFR 8.203(b), to carry United States Cyber Trust Mark labeling for those products.”; and

(g)  striking subsection 8(a) and inserting, in lieu thereof, the following:

“(a)  Except as specifically provided for in subsection 4(f) of this order, sections 1 through 7 of this order shall not apply to Federal information systems that are NSS or are otherwise identified by the Department of Defense or the Intelligence Community as debilitating impact systems.”.

Sec. 3.  Amendments to Executive Order 13694.  Executive Order 13694 of April 1, 2015 (Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities), as amended by Executive Order 13757 of December 28, 2016 (Taking Additional Steps to Address the National Emergency With Respect to Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities), Executive Order 13984 of January 19, 2021 (Taking Additional Steps to Address the National Emergency With Respect to Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities), and Executive Order 14144, is hereby further amended by:

(a)  striking from subsection 1(a)(ii) the phrase “any person” and inserting in lieu thereof “any foreign person”; and

(b)  striking from subsection 1(a)(iii) the phrase “any person” and inserting in lieu thereof “any foreign person.”.

Sec. 4.  General Provisions.  (a)  Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

(i)   the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or

(ii)  the functions of the Director of OMB relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

(b)  This order shall be implemented in a manner consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.

(c)  This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

(d)  The costs for publication of this order shall be borne by the Department of Homeland Security.

                             DONALD J. TRUMP

THE WHITE HOUSE,

    June 6, 2025.

Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Restricts the Entry of Foreign Nationals to Protect the United States from Foreign Terrorists and Other National Security and Public Safety Threats
 

June 4, 2025
 

COMBATING TERRORISM THROUGH COMMON SENSE SECURITY STANDARDS: Today, President Donald J. Trump signed a Proclamation to protect the nation from foreign terrorist and other national security and public safety threats from entry into the United States.

• Pursuant to President Trump’s Executive Order 14161, issued on January 20, 2025, titled “Protecting the United States from Foreign Terrorists and Other National Security and Public Safety Threats,” national security agencies engaged in a robust assessment of the risk that countries posed to the United States, including regarding terrorism and national security.
• In Trump v. Hawaii, the Supreme Court upheld the President’s authority to use section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act to protect the United States through entry restrictions.
• The Proclamation fully restricts and limits the entry of nationals from 12 countries found to be deficient with regards to screening and vetting and determined to pose a very high risk to the United States: Afghanistan, Burma, Chad, Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Haiti, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen.
• The Proclamation partially restricts and limits the entry of nationals from 7 countries who also pose a high level of risk to the United States: Burundi, Cuba, Laos, Sierra Leone, Togo, Turkmenistan, and Venezuela.
• The Proclamation includes exceptions for lawful permanent residents, existing visa holders, certain visa categories, and individuals whose entry serves U.S. national interests.

SECURING OUR BORDERS AND INTERESTS: The restrictions and limitations imposed by the Proclamation are necessary to garner cooperation from foreign governments, enforce our immigration laws, and advance other important foreign policy, national security, and counterterrorism objectives.

• It is the President’s sacred duty to take action to ensure that those seeking to enter our country will not harm the American people.
• After evaluating a report submitted by the Secretary of State, in coordination with other cabinet officials, President Trump has determined that the entry of nationals from certain countries must be restricted or limited to protect U.S. national security and public safety interests.
• The restrictions are country-specific in order to encourage cooperation with the subject countries in recognition of each country’s unique circumstances.
• Some of the named countries have inadequate screening and vetting processes, hindering America’s ability to identify potential security threats before entry.
• Certain countries exhibit high visa overstay rates, demonstrating a disregard for U.S. immigration laws and increasing burdens on enforcement systems.
• Other countries lack cooperation in sharing identity and threat information, undermining effective U.S. immigration vetting.
• Some countries have a significant terrorist presence or state-sponsored terrorism, posing direct risks to U.S. national security.
• Several countries have historically failed to accept back their removable nationals, complicating U.S. efforts to manage immigration and public safety.

MAKING AMERICA SAFE AGAIN: President Trump is keeping his promise to restore the travel ban and secure our borders.

• President Trump: “We will restore the travel ban, some people call it the Trump travel ban, and keep the radical Islamic terrorists out of our country that was upheld by the Supreme Court.”
• In his first term, President Trump successfully implemented a travel ban that restricted entry from several countries with inadequate vetting processes or significant security risks.
• The Supreme Court upheld the travel ban, ruling that it “is squarely within the scope of Presidential authority” and noting that it is “expressly premised on legitimate purposes.”
• This Proclamation builds on President Trump’s first-term travel ban, incorporating an updated assessment of current global screening, vetting, and security risks.

JUSTIFICATION FOR FULL SUSPENSION BY COUNTRY

Afghanistan

• The Taliban, a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) group, controls Afghanistan.  Afghanistan lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents and it does not have appropriate screening and vetting measures.  According to the Fiscal Year 2023 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Entry/Exit Overstay Report (“Overstay Report”), Afghanistan had a business/tourist (B1/B2) visa overstay rate of 9.70 percent and a student (F), vocational (M), and exchange visitor (J) visa overstay rate of 29.30 percent.

Burma

• According to the Overstay Report, Burma had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 27.07 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 42.17 percent.  Additionally, Burma has historically not cooperated with the United States to accept back their removable nationals.

Chad

• According to the Overstay Report, Chad had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 49.54 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 55.64 percent.  According to the Fiscal Year 2022 Overstay Report, Chad had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 37.12 percent.  The high visa overstay rate for 2022 and 2023 is unacceptable and indicates a blatant disregard for U.S. immigration laws.  

Republic of the Congo

• According to the Overstay Report, the Republic of the Congo had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 29.63 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 35.14 percent.

Equatorial Guinea

• According to the Overstay Report, Equatorial Guinea had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 21.98 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 70.18 percent.

Eritrea

• The United States questions the competence of the central authority for issuance of passports or civil documents in Eritrea. Criminal records are not available to the United States for Eritrean nationals.  Eritrea has historically refused to accept back its removable nationals.  According to the Overstay Report, Eritrea had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 20.09 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 55.43 percent.

Haiti

• According to the Overstay Report, Haiti had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 31.38 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 25.05 percent.  Additionally, hundreds of thousands of illegal Haitian aliens flooded into the United States during the Biden Administration.  This influx harms American communities by creating acute risks of increased overstay rates, establishment of criminal networks, and other national security threats. As is widely known, Haiti lacks a central authority with sufficient availability and dissemination of law enforcement information necessary to ensure its nationals do not undermine the national security of the United States. 

Iran

• Iran is a state sponsor of terrorism.  Iran regularly fails to cooperate with the United States Government in identifying security risks, is the source of significant terrorism around the world, and has historically failed to accept back its removable nationals. 

Libya

• There is no competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents in Libya.  The historical terrorist presence within Libya’s territory amplifies the risks posed by the entry into the United States of its nationals.

Somalia

• Somalia lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents and it does not have appropriate screening and vetting measures.  Somalia stands apart from other countries in the degree to which its government lacks command and control of its territory, which greatly limits the effectiveness of its national capabilities in a variety of respects.  A persistent terrorist threat also emanates from Somalia’s territory.  The United States Government has identified Somalia as a terrorist safe haven.  Terrorists use regions of Somalia as safe havens from which they plan, facilitate, and conduct their operations.  Somalia also remains a destination for individuals attempting to join terrorist groups that threaten the national security of the United States.  The Government of Somalia struggles to provide governance needed to limit terrorists’ freedom of movement.  Additionally, Somalia has historically refused to accept back its removable nationals.

Sudan

• Sudan lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents and it does not have appropriate screening and vetting measures.  According to the Overstay Report, Sudan had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 26.30 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 28.40 percent. 

Yemen

• Yemen lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents and it does not have appropriate screening and vetting measures.  The government does not have physical control over its own territory.  Since January 20, 2025, Yemen has been the site of active U.S. military operations.

JUSTIFICATION FOR PARTIAL SUSPENSION BY COUNTRY (Immigrants and Nonimmigrants on B-1, B-2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J Visas)

Burundi

• According to the Overstay Report, Burundi had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 15.35 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 17.52 percent. 

Cuba

• Cuba is a state sponsor of terrorism.  The Government of Cuba does not cooperate or share sufficient law enforcement information with the United States.  Cuba has historically refused to accept back its removable nationals.  According to the Overstay Report, Cuba had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 7.69 percent and a F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 18.75 percent.

Laos

• According to the Overstay Report, Laos had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 34.77 percent and a F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 6.49 percent.  Laos has historically failed to accept back its removable nationals. 

Sierra Leone

• According to the Overstay Report, Sierra Leone had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 15.43 percent and a F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 35.83 percent.  Sierra Leone has historically failed to accept back its removable nationals. 

Togo

• According to the Overstay Report, Togo had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 19.03 percent and a F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 35.05 percent. 

Turkmenistan

• According to the Overstay Report, Turkmenistan had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 15.35 percent and a F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 21.74 percent. 

Venezuela

• Venezuela lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents and it does not have appropriate screening and vetting measures.  Venezuela has historically refused to accept back its removable nationals.  According to the Overstay Report, Venezuela had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 9.83 percent.

President Trump Holds  Bilateral Meeting with
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
White House.  
Apr. 7, 2025

President Trump held a Bilateral meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, where he proposed a bold vision for securing a lasting peace in Gaza.

President Trump secured Israel’s end of war in Gaza ultimatum demanding the safe return of the remaining hostages held by Hamas.
 

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu:  We will eliminate the trade deficit with the United States we intend to do it very quickly we think it's the right thing to do and we're going to also eliminate trade barriers a variety of trade barriers that have been put up unnecessarily.

And I think Israel can serve as a model for many countries that should do the same.

I recognize the position of the United States it says you know we're allowing other countries to put tariffs on us but we don't put tariffs on them.

And you know I'm a free-trade champion and free trade has to be fair trade and I think that's basically the position that you have put forward Mr. President, We are going to eliminate the tariffs and rapidly I had the opportunity to speak to Secretary Lutnik yesterday we talked about how we could affect this quickly and I hope to bring a solution very quickly.

We are not talking about intentions.  We are not talking about words.  We are talking about results.  And those results are going to come.

That's the first.

President Trump:  Thank you very much that's very nice!  Thank you!

Addressing Egregious Actions of
The Republic of South Africa

EXECUTIVE ORDER

February 7, 2025

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:

     Section 1.  Purpose.  In shocking disregard of its citizens’ rights, the Republic of South Africa (South Africa) recently enacted Expropriation Act 13 of 2024 (Act), to enable the government of South Africa to seize ethnic minority Afrikaners’ agricultural property without compensation.  This Act follows countless government policies designed to dismantle equal opportunity in employment, education, and business, and hateful rhetoric and government actions fueling disproportionate violence against racially disfavored landowners.
In addition, South Africa has taken aggressive positions towards the United States and its allies, including accusing Israel, not Hamas, of genocide in the International Court of Justice, and reinvigorating its relations with Iran to develop commercial, military, and nuclear arrangements.  

     The United States cannot support the government of South Africa’s commission of rights violations in its country or its ‘undermining United States foreign policy, which poses national security threats to our Nation, our allies, our African partners, and our interests.

     Sec. 2.  Policy.  It is the policy of the United States that, as long as South Africa continues these unjust and immoral practices that harm our Nation:
          (a)  the United States shall not provide aid or assistance to South Africa; and
          (b)  the United States shall promote the resettlement of Afrikaner refugees escaping government-sponsored race-based discrimination, including racially discriminatory property confiscation.

     Sec. 3.  Assistance.  (a)  All executive departments and agencies (agencies), including the United States Agency for International Development, shall, to the maximum extent allowed by law, halt foreign aid or assistance delivered or provided to South Africa, and shall promptly exercise all available authorities and discretion to halt such aid or assistance.
          (b)  The head of each agency may permit the provision of any such foreign aid or assistance that, in the discretion of the relevant agency head, is necessary or appropriate. 

     Sec. 4.  Refugee Resettlement and Other Humanitarian Considerations.  The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall take appropriate steps, consistent with law, to prioritize humanitarian relief, including admission and resettlement through the United States Refugee Admissions Program, for Afrikaners in South Africa who are victims of unjust racial discrimination.  Such plan shall be submitted to the President through the Assistant to the President and Homeland Security Advisor.

     Sec. 5.  General Provisions.  (a)  Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect: 
          (i)   the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or 
          (ii)  the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals. 
     (b)  This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations. 
     (c)  This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

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February  7th,, Rev. February 11th, 2025 , April 7, 2025, Rev. April 8th, 2025, June, 14, 2025, July 8, 2025, Rev. July 10th, 2025